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Cities have always been global nodes where people, cultures and goods 
intersect. More than any other of the Urban Age cities, Istanbul has 
performed this function for several thousand years: a global ‘hinge’  
city that connects civilisations and continents. 
While it may not be growing at the dizzying pace of Mumbai or Shanghai,  
nor suffering from the widening social inequality and violence of São Paulo, 
Mexico City or Johannesburg, Istanbul faces many of the same challenges 
confronted by all Urban Age cities including London, Berlin and New York: 
economic stability, social cohesion and climate change. 
At the Istanbul Urban Age conference, the ninth in an international 
investigation of cities, which started in 2005, we will be addressing these 
issues with urban experts and civic leaders from cities around the world, 
placing a mirror to Istanbul to reflect on shared problems and solutions  
– from the very real threat of flooding and earthquakes to the need to  
retain a clear sense of identity and cohesion in a fast-moving world. 
Bringing to a close the first cycle of the Urban Age, Istanbul appropriately 
marks the beginning of a new phase of urban exchange with the creation  
of LSE Cities, an international centre supported by Deutsche Bank. From 
January 2010, LSE Cities will continue the work of the Urban Age together 
with the Alfred Herrhausen Society and expand into new areas of research, 
education and outreach centred on the links between the physical and the 
social, seeking the ‘grammar of success’ for cities of the twenty-first century.
Ricky Burdett
Director, Urban Age 
London School of Economics  
and Political Science
Wolfgang Nowak
Managing Director 
Alfred Herrhausen Society  
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Istanbul is a city as beautiful as Venice or San Francisco, 
and, once you are away from the water, as brutal and ugly 
as any metropolis undergoing the trauma of warp speed 
urbanisation. It is a place in which to sit under the shade 
of ancient pines and palm trees for a leisurely afternoon 
watching sun on water, looking out over the Bosporus. 
But also, in some parts, to tread very carefully. Istanbul 
has as many layers of history beneath the foundations of  
its buildings as any city in Europe. In 2010, it will become 
the European Cultural Capital. Depending on how you 
count, Istanbul has been the capital city of three, or perhaps 
four, empires. It is still shaped by the surviving fragments 
of Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Venetian and Ottoman 
civilisations. It has Orthodox Christian churches, Sunni 
mosques, and Sephardic synagogues. It has vast classical 
cisterns, ring upon ring of ancient fortifications, souks 
and palaces. It also has desolate concrete suburbs of 
extraordinary bleakness, urban terrorism, and a rootless, 
dispossessed underclass struggling to come to terms 
with city life. 
It is the largest city in a state that emerged in 1923  
from the chaos of World War I and the Versailles treaty, 
and the vision of modern Turkey’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, 
who, though he was born in what is now Thessaloniki, and 
so unmistakably a European, moved his capital to Ankara, 
a city created almost from nothing. For the first few decades 
of modern Turkey’s existence, the state devoted most of its 
resources to the new capital and its infrastructure. For a 
while it looked as if Ankara and Istanbul might become 
twin poles: one a European gate, the other a counterbalance 
in the heartland of Anatolia. As Turkey’s urbanisation 
started to accelerate in the 1950s, the balance shifted 
overwhelmingly towards Istanbul. The rural poor poured 
into the big city and what used to be considered a 
cosmopolitan enclave, a demonstration of Turkey’s 
tolerance of other ethnic groups and faiths, has also become 
the heartland of its most conservative constituency. It is  
a city in which 3,500 dispossessed gypsies, descendants  
of a community that has lived in the Sulukule district in  
the shadow of the Byzantine city walls for centuries, are 
systematically being moved out of sight and out of mind  
in an operation that recalls Robert Moses’ determination  
to drive federally funded highways through the black and 
Puerto Rican neighbourhoods of New York City.
Istanbul is the largest and most febrile urban centre in  
a country with an army committed to secularism, which,  
in some extreme cases, shades away from Atatürk's ideals 
towards authoritarianism. If the generals miscalculate, it 
has the potential for an insurgency that could make Turkey 
a kind of Algeria and Istanbul its Algiers. But Istanbul is 
also what is driving Turkey, toward Brazil, Russia, India 
and China, the new economic powerhouses. The collapse  
of the Soviet Union made Turkey in general, and Istanbul  
in particular, a vital new centre for services and expertise 
profiting from a rapid growth in the energy-rich former 
Soviet republics. It is a phenomenon that is reflected in the 
array of carriers at Istanbul’s greatly enlarged airport, from 
Uzbekistan Airways, and Dniproavia, Tajikistan Airlines, 
Air Astana, Donbassaero and Tatarstan Airlines, their hulls 
painted in gaudy colours, more like busses than Boeings. 
It is also visible in the stream of ships that clogs the 
Bosporus day and night, a continuous double file of tankers 
and freighters flows past the minarets and the suspension 
bridges that define the city. Istanbul is the base for the 
architects, the construction companies, the advertising 
agencies, and the banks that are reshaping Kazakhstan  
and Azerbaijan, and the Ukraine and even Russia. It has 
banks and television stations; it has manufacturers that are 
shooting rapidly up the value chain from generic products 
to designer label kitchen sinks.
Istanbul is Turkey’s passport into the European Union. 
It sees itself as part of a group of cities on an axis running 
from Dubai to St. Petersburg. If London is Europe’s first 
global city, Istanbul sees itself as its second. It’s a city whose 
influence is shaped by both culture and commerce. Istanbul 
has a thriving approach to contemporary art, although 
surprisingly perhaps, given the close personal interest that 
Ataturk himself took in architectural issues, importing 
tHE CitY tOO biG tO Fail 
As Urban Age changes its focus to Istanbul, Deyan Sudjic frames the city’s urban history 
through cultural, economic and political comparisons with global cities around the world. 
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In 2010, it will become the European 
Cultural Capital. Depending on how you 
count, Istanbul has been the capital city 
of three, or perhaps four, empires.
Playing host to several civilisations and empires, Istanbul’s silhouette is defined by minarets, spires, columns and more and more tall buildings. The historical peninsula sits at the intersection of the Marmara Sea, the Bosporus and the Golden Horn.
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Austrians to plan Ankara, it has not as yet developed a 
distinctive architectural culture of its own in the way  
that Mexico or Australia have. Its geographic size and 
population mean that Istanbul has a strong claim to 
being regarded as the largest city in Europe, even if it  
partly lies in Asia, where a third of its citizens now live.  
In the European suburb of Levent, one of Istanbul’s main 
business districts where banks cluster, you can find 
facsimiles of smart London Chinese restaurants and  
mega shopping centres. But Istanbul is also a place with 
settlements within its limits, in which Kurdish migrants 
from rural Anatolia tend flocks of sheep under the gaze  
of prefabricated concrete apartment blocks.
It is a city like no other and yet it is a city that has  
things in common with many other cities, even if it does 
not always recognise it. While Cairo’s population has 
doubled, Istanbul’s population, like Lagos, has quadrupled 
since 1980. It straddles two continents, in a way that is  
very different from, but inevitably also reminiscent of, the 
twin cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez straddling the  
Rio Grande, blurring Mexico with the United States.
Istanbul is home to nearly 13 million people, governed 
in a recently created unitary jurisdiction, which saw the 
city’s land area nearly triple from approximately 1,800 km2 
to 5,300 km2. Even now, it still pulls in another 1.5 million 
workers every day, swelling its peak time population to  
15 million. The city administration is attempting to limit  
its population to 16 million, fearing that if it is allowed to 
spread unchecked it will reach an impossible 25 million, in 
a country that has currently 71 million people. But this is 
really in the hands of the national government, rather than 
the city, given that the GDP of the poorest regions in 
Turkey is just 20 per cent of that of the richest areas of the 
country. With such an imbalance, it is no wonder that 
Istanbul has become a magnet for the rural poor. Turkey’s 
internal migration has had the effect of making the 
inequalities of Istanbul grow more acute, rather than less, 
even as it has prospered over the last decades. And it is not 
the master of its own fate. There is the TOKI state housing 
programme, run by the Prime Minister.
Very few cities have such a compartmentalised 
geography. The vast majority of Istanbul’s citizens never 
make the crossing from one continent to the other. But the 
10 per cent who do cross from one half of the city to the 
other every day amount to a still huge total of 1.2 million. 
And to accommodate them, there is a plan to build a third 
bridge across the straits. However, it is feared by some that 
this will destroy the reservoirs that feed the city. Ask civic 
leaders if there is an environmental problem for Istanbul. 
The first thing that they talk about is August 17, 1999,  
when a serious earthquake hit the city, causing 20,000 
deaths. Natural resources, population growth, and civil 
equity barely figure.
But there are ambitious plans to create linear sub 
centres, both on the east and the west sides of the city, 
allowing the two sections to function better. The one on  
the Asian side of the city, at Kartal, is being shaped in its 
early stages by a dynamic masterplan prepared by Zaha 
Hadid. Among such privately financed developments, 
Istanbul has been investing heavily in its infrastructure.  
A metro system is gradually taking shape, the trams are 
being revitalised. There is a new rail tunnel under the 
Bosporus, which will allow the realisation of the ancient 
goal of one of Europe’s empires: to create a direct rail  
link from Berlin to Baghdad.
In a world in which an accommodation between 
competing power blocks is essential for both cultural and 
political reasons, Istanbul is a key bridge between them.  
It is a city with more than enough of the usual urban 
problems, but that also has the energy and the resources  
to stand a chance of addressing them. It’s in nobody’s 
interest that they should fail.
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Deyan Sudjic is the Director of the Design Museum  
in London, co-chair of the Urban Age Advisory Board  
and co-editor of The Endless City, published by Phaidon. 
Sudjic curated Design Cities, which opened at Istanbul 
Modern in 2008.
Istanbul is Turkey’s passport into the 
European Union. It sees itself as part  
of a group of cities on an axis running 
from Dubai to St. Petersburg.
Accommodating at once centuries of history and an expanding urban modernity, Istanbul acts as a microcosm patchwork of Turkey’s diverse settlement typologies.
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From a distance, Istanbul is the immutable intersection of 
vast and diverse mobilities. It reaches across the East-West 
and the North-South axes of the world, and all their possible 
variants. Out of these histories of intersections comes the 
need to develop specific capabilities for handling and 
enhancing network functions; it is not simply a question of 
location at intersections. It seems to me that developing such 
capabilities across diverse histories and geographies is a 
particularity of Istanbul’s deep history. It is also one of 
growing importance in today’s networked world. Several 
major trends make this visible. Here I limit myself to three. 
A first trend concerns the flows of capital: Istanbul is at 
the centre of a geography of capital flows that stretches both 
East and West. Even though the EU is Turkey’s dominant 
trade and investment partner, current post-Cold War 
geopolitics make Asian countries increasingly important. 
The second trend concerns the in- and outflows of people, 
and here again we see a remarkable bi-modality between 
Europe and Asia. The diversity of people migrating to and 
through Istanbul raises a question about the specific forms  
of knowledge that arise out of these intersections, about the 
contents at the heart of networked flows at a time of growing 
worldwide articulation among diverse complex cultures. 
The answer, perhaps, is reflected in a third trend coming 
out of a study of the top 60 cities in the world in terms  
of political and cultural variables. Istanbul, that city of 
intersections and mobilities, sits in the top 30, specifically  
as a global policy nexus, and as a city for human capital and 
talent. Below, I will work through each trend in more detail.
In terms of capital flows, Turkey’s dominant trade and 
investment partnership is with the EU. In 2007, trade 
between Turkey and the EU stood at US$ 12.4 billion, an 
astounding thirty-fold increase over the 1990 to 2000 annual 
average. Of all EU countries, the Netherlands’ US$ 5.7 billion 
made it by far the largest single investor in Turkey, with  
a group of smaller EU countries together accounting for 
another US$ 4.9 billion. The long history of economic 
interactions with Europe since World War II and during  
the Cold War has fed this overwhelming dominance.
But Asia is rising fast. At the end of 2007, by far the  
two largest recipients of Turkish foreign direct investment 
(FDI) were the Netherlands and Azerbaijan, a striking 
juxtaposition that fully captures Turkey’s geographic 
articulation of East and West. They were followed by Malta, 
Luxembourg, Germany, the US, and Kazakhstan. As for the 
major sectors of this FDI, the Construction and the Real 
Estate industries together account for 20 per cent of the 
foreign firms operating in Turkey. Turkish construction 
companies work in a large number of foreign countries too, 
with the most significant concentration of cumulative value 
from 1980 to 2009 in Italy (US$ 102 billion), Libya (US$ 50 
billion), and Ukraine (US$ 21 billion). A number of countries 
follow, with cumulative investments ranging between US$ 10 
and 16 billion, including Switzerland, Luxembourg, Russia 
and Sudan, once again highlighting Turkey’s bridging of  
different historical geographies.
Along with a trade orientation that spans its geopolitical 
region (see ‘Regional Context’ on page 38 of this newspaper), 
there has been a dramatic increase in Turkey’s total FDI stock 
abroad. By 2007, Turkey’s FDI stood at US$ 12.2 billion, an 
eleven-fold increase compared to 1990 (US$ 1.1 billion) and 
three-and-a-half-fold compared to 2000 (US$ 3.7 billion). 
Similarly, while capital began flowing out of Turkey at 
exponential rates, by 2007 the inward flow of FDI stood  
at US$ 146 billion, a thirteen-fold increase over 1990  
(US$ 11 billion), and seven-and-a-half fold compared to  
2000 (US$ 19.2 billion). It is the combination of capital 
flowing in and out, to and through the region that marks the 
intersection of capital mobilities in Istanbul. Such a dramatic 
increase in capital relations across and within the region 
within two decades has led to the developing capacity of 
Istanbul’s changing manufacturing, financial and service 
industries, now a magnet for human capital and innovation. 
The draw of Istanbul is not lost on foreign firms looking 
for a city in which to locate their headquarters. Of the more 
than 19,000 foreign firms operating in Turkey, well over half 
are headquartered in Istanbul. About 10,700 are EU firms, 
including 3,100 from Germany and 1,800 from Britain. At  
the other end, 4,300 foreign firms are from Asia, including 
910 from Iran, 450 from Azerbaijan, and 300 from China. 
While EU firms are still dominant, the rise of Asia and the 
changing geopolitics of its immediate region put Istanbul  
at the centre of a vast space now characterised by the  
co-presence of multiple and diverse firms and projects from  
all over the world. According to a study of the future of 
European cities, Istanbul is one of the key cities in what is 
considered to be emergent Europe, a geographic space that 
runs between Western Europe and West Asia.
While capital flows are one way of identifying economic 
relations extending to and through the city, the flow of people 
brings skills, inventiveness, and cultures. These are all 
elements easily overlooked in debates about migration. The 
fine grain of cultures shaped by people on the move and by 
the intersections of global and local get wired into cities,  
and feed ‘cityness’. All of this has inflected Istanbul’s unique 
geopolitics and cultures. 
As of 2006, Turkey’s global emigration map was still 
dominated by one recipient country: Germany. Whether we 
are counting the 1.7 million Turkish nationals, the 2.7 million 
born in Turkey, though not necessarily holding Turkish 
nationality, or the even larger number of second and third 
generation Turkish-Germans who now, thanks to a recent 
change in Germany’s naturalisation law, no longer hold an 
ambiguous citizenship status, the Turkish presence in 
Germany is very strong. The next largest foreign resident 
Turkish populations are in France (229,000), the Netherlands 
(171,000), Austria (150,000) and Belgium (111,000), followed 
by a large number of countries with smaller numbers: from 
Sweden with just under 100,000 to Russia with 2,000.
The global geography of Turkish emigration is changing. 
Mirroring the flows of capital that move East and West,  
major destinations of people leaving Turkey continue to be 
European, but in addition we see growing, although still 
smaller, flows to Asia. Cumulative departures from 2000 to 
2006 were 322,000 to Germany, 57,000 to France, and 55,700 
to Austria, followed by smaller numbers to a variety of other 
countries. But the dominance of Turkey’s relationship with 
the EU can mask the shifting geography of its migrations.  
In 2006, for example, departures for Germany numbered 
30,000, followed by 20,000 to Saudi Arabia, 8,300 to France, 
and a number of smaller, but significant, flows to the  
post-Soviet Asian republics. 
 Migration into Turkey is small, with only 1.9 per cent 
foreign-born among the total population, a figure that 
includes return migrants from Germany and elsewhere. But 
also here we see new geographies of origin, beyond the EU.  
In 2006, 191,000 foreigners moved into Turkey, mostly  
from Bulgaria and Azerbaijan. These two nationalities also 
dominated the cumulative inflow from 2000 to 2006, with 
373,700 from Bulgaria, 73,000 from Azerbaijan, while only 
48,400 migrated from Germany. These dominant in-flows 
were followed by smaller, but significant populations coming 
from Greece, Russia, the US, Iran, Iraq, the United Kingdom, 
and elsewhere. The origins of migrations are shifting from 
West to East. Most of the in-flow comes from Bulgaria and 
Azerbaijan, while most of the out-flow goes to Germany  
and France. 
tHE iMMutablE intERsECtiOn 
OF Vast MObilitiEs
A key factor in the development of compelling and competitive cities is the flow 
of capital and people to and through them. With a focus on regional and global 
intersections in the political economy, Saskia Sassen outlines the trends that 
place the future of Istanbul at the forefront of these flows.
FOREiGn DiRECt inVEstMEnt anD intERnatiOnal FiRMs in tuRKEY
FDi intO tuRKEY  
2004-2008 
(MilliOns us$)
tuRKEY FDi OutFlOWs  
1980-2009 
(MilliOns us$) 
intERnatiOnal FiRMs 
OPERatinG in tuRKEY  
in 2007
European Union (27) 44,245 8,679 10,720
Germany 2,992 665 3,125
The Netherlands 13,043 4,266 1,419
United Kingdom 2,957 536 1,831
France 3,633 105 -
Italy 1,191 120 -
Other EU Countries 20,429 2,986 4,345
Other European Countries (Excluding EU) 2,401 1,016 1,691
Africa 111 426 309
USA 6,048 702 834
Canada 242 2 120
Central-South America and Caribbean 595 17 105
Near and Middle Eastern Countries 6,381 3,826 3,072
Azerbaijan - 3,420 453
Iraq - 7 511
Iran - 162 910
Gulf Arabian Countries 5,722 56 -
China - 26 300
South Korea - - 134
Japan - - -
Other Asian Countries 1,058 867 796
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Another important, but more temporary, intersection  
of work and national cultures occurs on short-term trips.  
As is the case in most countries, migration figures are 
dwarfed by the numbers of foreigners entering Turkey for 
various short-term purposes as well as citizens coming for 
short-term visits. In 2006, the largest single purposes for 
coming were travel, entertainment, culture, and visits to 
family and friends. And yet people do travel to Turkey for 
work. In 2006, the largest single groups of foreigners were  
the 7 million managers and professionals, and another 1.1 
million in secondary service professions. 
Entries of foreigners reached 19.3 million in 2006, up  
from 13.7 million in 2004, and 11.3 million in 2001. Between 
2001 and 2006, over 23 million people visited Turkey from 
Germany, nearly 9 million from Russia and the United 
Kingdom each, 7 million from Bulgaria, and 4 million from 
Iran. These are far from insignificant numbers. They 
represent the incredibly diverse range of people moving in 
and out of the country, each carrying with them specific 
histories and cultures, feeding Istanbul’s cosmopolitanism.
Some of these emergent geographies of the flows of capital 
and of people feed into the two final variables I want to 
discuss. One is the significant role of Istanbul as a centre  
for global policy exchange. Kearney’s 2009 study of 60 cities 
along five variables (business activity, human capital, 
information exchange, culture, and policy engagement),  
finds Istanbul in the top ten cities worldwide on the policy 
engagement variable, along with Washington, Beijing, Paris, 
Cairo, London and Brussels, among others. The study defines 
the policy engagement variable as ‘influence on global 
policy-making and political dialogue.’ 
The second, which is not unconnected, is the fact that the 
study finds Istanbul in the top 15 cities on the human capital 
variable – defined as a city that ‘acts as a magnet for diverse 
groups of people and talent’. Along the other cities in the top 
group are Tokyo, New York, Hong Kong, Chicago, Sydney 
and London. In the case of Istanbul, the key factor feeding its 
high rank is the large number of international schools, which 
functions as an indicator for characteristics of the parents of 
these children. 
It is worth noting that of the five factors measured, the 
most important one feeding the top ranking cities is the 
presence of a foreign-born population: it is the single largest 
factor by far, feeding New York’s top rank on the human 
capital variable, and one of the two largest factors in Hong 
Kong’s fourth place ranking. Istanbul is well positioned to 
gain ground here: even though it is still a country with a very 
small foreign-born population, it is clear that it has benefited 
from an enormous variety of origins among its immigrants.
I see both of these prominent positions, in policy 
engagement and human capital, as having to do with 
Istanbul’s strategic role at the intersection of diverse 
economic and geopolitical geographies. In an increasingly 
networked world, this role and the capabilities involved have 
taken on growing importance. 
Cities have long been at the intersection of cross-border 
circuits – flows of capital, labour, goods, raw materials, 
merchants, travellers. Asia and Africa have seen some of the 
oldest and vastest of these flows, and Europe some of the 
densest. Cities were strategic spaces for the economies  
and cultures that arose out of these flows, for making the 
capabilities needed to handle and govern these intersections, 
and for the housing of power – economic, political, cultural.
These circuits are multidirectional and criss-cross the 
world, feeding into inter-city geographies. The formation  
of inter-city geographies is today contributing a critical 
infrastructure for a new global political economy, new 
cultural spaces, and new types of politics. Some of these 
inter-city geographies are thick and highly visible – the flows 
of professionals, tourists, artists, and migrants among specific 
groups of cities. Others are thin and barely visible – the 
highly specialised financial trading networks that connect 
particular cities, depending on the type of instrument 
involved, or the global commodity chains for diverse 
products that run from exporting hubs to importing hubs. 
The vast expansion of the geographies of these flows in  
the current period has further brought out the importance  
of cities at these intersections. For some cities, such as 
Istanbul, this is an old history, for others, such as Miami, a 
new one. The ascendance of Asia on the world economic and 
geopolitical map has brought added strategic importance to 
some of these cities, among which most prominently Istanbul. 
Saskia Sassen is the Lynd Professor of Sociology and Member 
of The Committee on Global Thought at Columbia University, 
and an Urban Age Advisor. Her recent publication is 
‘Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global 
Assemblages’ ( Princeton University Press 2008).
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tOP 10 EMERGinG EuROPEan CitiEs
RanK CitY COuntRY
1 Budapest Hungary
2 Warsaw Poland
3 Moscow Russia
4 Istanbul Turkey
5 Sofia Bulgaria
6 Bucharest Romania
7 St. Petersburg Russia
8 Ankara Turkey
9 Kiev Ukraine
10 Yekaterinburg Russia
MiGRatiOn anD sHORt tERM Visits tO tuRKEY
POliCY inFluEnCE HuMan CaPital
CuMulatiVE aRRiVals  
FOR sHORt tERM Visits 
(natiOnals anD  
nOn-natiOnals 2000-2006
CuMulatiVE inFlOW OF 
MiGRants intO tuRKEY  
2000-2006 
CuMulatiVE OutFlOW  
OF MiGRants  
2000-2006
Germany 23,933,415 48,400 322,000
Russian Federation 8,959,822 46,200 -
United Kingdom 8,724,427 32,300 -
Bulgaria 6,872,570 373,700 -
Netherlands 6,335,209 - 30,900
Iran 4,089,853 41,500 -
France 3,869,890 - 56,900
Austria 2,809,797 - 55,700
USA 2,671,226 41,900 -
Greece 2,569,173 45,800 -
Belgium 2,552,993 - 23,100
Israel 2,270,623 - -
Italy 2,104,938 - -
Ukraine 1,931,396 - -
Azerbaijan 1,836,595 73,300 -
Georgia 1,824,789 - -
Sweden 1,774,612 - 7,200
Romania 1,429,198 - -
Switzerland 1,331,262 - 18,400
Source: Ernst and Young, Reinventing European Growth: 2009 European Attractiveness Survey.
Source: The Global Cities Index by A.T. Kearney with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Foreign Policy.
Embassies, consulates and trade missions
Think tanks
Partner cities
Local organisations with international reach
Headquarters of international organisations
Political conferences held in the city
Foreign-born population
Inhabitants with university degrees
International students at the tertiary level
International schools at the primary and secondary level
Top global universities
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Brussels
Berlin
London
Milan
Copenhagen
Amsterdam
Paris
Moscow
Geneva
Vienna
Madrid
Zurich
Cairo
Frankfurt
New York
Singapore
Hong Kong
Sydney
Kuala Lumpur
Taipei
Seoul
Shanghai
Bangkok
Mumbai
Osaka
Tokyo
Los Angeles
Chicago
Boston
San Fransisco
Toronto
Vancouver
São Paulo
Beijing
GlObal POWER CitY inDEX 2009
1 - 9
13 + connections between two cities
7 - 12 connections between two cities
4 - 6 connections between two cities
10 - 19
20 - 29
30 +
Number of aliates of 
the top 50 banking and 
insurance companies*
Number of headquarters 
of the top 50 banking and 
insurance companies*
* Fortune magazine's 2009 list of the top 500 global companies, ranked by revenues.
1 - 3
4 - 9
COMPREHEnsiVE POWER RanKinG
GlObal FinanCE CiRCuit
The Global Power City Index (GPCI) introduces a new 
angle for global city rankings: Comprehensive Power. 
Whereas most of the existing city rankings are based  
on conventional urban functions such as business or 
financial indicators, the cities’ comprehensive power  
is evaluated by analysing 68 indicators representing  
6 urban functions. This allows the evaluation of cities 
from the perspective of those who are living, working, 
studying, visiting or creating art in the city, defined  
as ‘Global Actors’, as well as six urban functions:  
the Economy, Research & Development, Cultural 
Exchange, Liveability, Environment and Accessibility. 
In 2009, New York ranked as the most powerful 
among 35 cities, followed by London, Paris and Tokyo. 
New York ranks first in the Economy, Research & 
Development, and in the actors’ rankings for Researchers, 
Artists, Visitors, and Residents. Still, New York ranked 
in the lower half of all cities when it came to Liveability 
and the Environment, confirming it is a city with plenty 
of opportunities, but that they come with compromises. 
The Environment function measures the ecology, 
pollution, and natural habitat using ten sub-indicators, 
and its effect is most visible in North-American cities  
in whose cases it is pulling down their overall score.
While London shows similarity to New York, Paris  
is a different story. It ranked first in Liveability and 
Accessibility, and second for Artists and Residents, 
whereas the rankings in Economy, Research & 
Development, and for Managers were relatively low. 
The result mirrors that of New York: Paris is a  
liveable city, but comes with economic compromises. 
Meanwhile Tokyo, which is in fourth place, has the 
second highest score in Economy and Research & 
Development, and yet ranks relatively low on the 
Managers’ rating. The other weak point for Tokyo is 
Accessibility: despite its sophisticated public transport 
systems at the inner- and intercity level, it is ranked 
relatively lower because of its comparatively poor 
connection to the international airport.
 Singapore ranked fifth overall, confirming its status 
in South-East Asia, followed by a host of European cities. 
Berlin maintains its popularity among most of the 
actors, besides Managers, with a high score in Liveability, 
echoing Paris in its focus on quality of life. Beijing and 
Shanghai ranked lower in Comprehensive Power, and  
yet ranked relatively high in both the Economy and 
Managers’ indicators. In terms of business development, 
it seems these cities have the capacities required to be 
Asian financial centres. 
Researching the ranking of global cities uncovers 
how these cities interact with each other on an industrial 
level, creating relationships of dependency, competition 
and cooperation. One of the extensive analyses of these 
hidden global circuits shows the connection between 
headquarters, worldwide corporations and cities, and  
is based on a survey of the top companies in the world. 
Lines connecting city to city are showing the circuits of 
the companies’ head and affiliated offices. As the line 
becomes bold, the sum of the circuits between cities 
increases. The diagram below identifies the flows of 
global finance, where the striking triad of New York, 
London, and Tokyo remains. Other studies show the 
different circuits created by manufacturing companies,  
a more diverse set of cities including New York, London, 
Paris, Madrid, Tokyo, and Seoul. Other sectors are set to 
be analysed, and will uncover the world’s hidden global 
circuits, representing the age of global cities. 
The Global Power City Index at the Institute for Urban Strategies is 
researched under the direction of Sir Peter Hall,  
at the Mori Memorial Foundation, a non-profit organisation 
funded by Mori Building in Tokyo and the Mitsubishi Research 
Institute. Researchers include Saskia Sassen, Richard Bender, Heizo 
Takenaka, Hiroo Ichikawa, Takayuki Kubo, and Manabu Mineo.
Boston
Geneva
Brussels
Copenhagen
Frankfurt
Toronto
Sydney
Los Angeles
Madrid
Hong Kong
Zurich
Seoul
Paris
London
New York
Tokyo
Singapore
Berlin
Vienna
Moscow
Sao Paulo
Taipei
Fukuoka
Bangkok
Milan
Kuala Lumpur
Beijing
Osaka
San Fransisco
Vancouver
Chicago
Shanghai
Cairo
Mumbai
Amsterdam
This map represents the number of banking and insurance headquarters and 
affiliates in cities around the world, and the number of connections between them.
Economy
Research & development
Cultural exchange
Liveability
Environment
Accessibility
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Cities are our society’s centres of human creativity, 
interaction, economic activity, knowledge, diversity and 
culture. Over half the world is now urban, and according  
to the 2006 State of the World Cities report, urban-based 
economic activities account for 55 per cent of the gross 
national product in the least developed countries, 73 per 
cent in middle income countries, and 85 per cent in the 
most developed countries. Cities are precious.
Cities are also critical geographical units in the 
formulation and implementation of sectoral policies –  
in water, transport and communications, energy, waste 
management and construction – that will shape our future 
for better or worse. Over the next few decades, climate 
change related disasters will have a significant economic 
and human impact on cities, in developing as well as in  
the most developed countries. Cities are at risk. 
Cities are also where a range of environmental and 
developmental challenges find their crude expression –  
air and water pollution, greenhouse gas emissions from 
transport or energy consumption, social exclusion and  
slum developments, poverty and criminality. When we 
realise that cities emit three quarters of pollutant emissions 
worldwide, we should think that cities are the place where 
the ‘big push’ should be undertaken, to use Jeffrey Sachs’ 
expression. Greening our cities can not just have immediate 
multi-dimensional economic benefits, but also long-term 
positive effects as it will reduce the impact of cities on 
climate change, and de facto the impact that climate  
change will have on cities. 
The cluster of human settlements is embedded in our 
postmodern culture, especially in developing countries, 
where a total of 145,000 new urban dwellers are introduced 
into the urban age every day. It is absolutely necessary  
to generate a global action plan for mayors to improve 
sustainability locally, and promote the sustainable green 
development of their cities. Local Agenda 21 enshrined in 
the 1992 Rio Convention led to a proactive engagement of 
mayors from around the world to drastically reduce their 
city emissions. While there is evidence that implementing 
Local Agenda 21 has proved challenging, even in some 
developed countries, there is a general recognition that  
it contributed to setting the stage for local authorities to 
take up the challenge of improving the environment in  
their cities. 
The time has now come to take a step further, and to 
think of the myriad challenges laid out in Local Agenda  
21 in the context of an Urban Age seeking its way towards  
a Green Economy. Cities will be central in bringing about 
tomorrow’s economic benefits and welfare, the provision of 
decent jobs and human well-being within an environment 
liberated from the risks and threats of climate change, 
pollution, resource depletion and ecosystem degradation. 
Part of the multi-billion stimulus packages being 
enacted around the world to face today’s multi-dimensional 
crises are destined to boost green infrastructure, maximise 
energy use and materials efficiency, stimulate the use of 
renewable energy, and generate new kind of jobs, all of 
which will help create cleaner, greener and richer economies. 
Nonetheless, key questions remain: will the 16 per cent of 
green stimulus allocated in climate change investments be 
sufficient to restructure the global economy? Will all this 
work and what can ‘greening’ do for the world cities and  
the world economy, for employment and for poverty?
Achieving the transformative change in cities requires 
that we urgently integrate urban design in our planning 
policies, co-integrate nature and human economic 
development harmoniously, building and designing with 
GREEn ECOnOMY  
FOR an uRban aGE
Pavan Sukhdev outlines the changes a green economy would have on cities, 
and the possible city solutions for climate change. 
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It is absolutely necessary to generate a 
global action plan for mayors to improve 
sustainability locally, and promote the 
sustainable green development of  
their cities.
While China is set to become the world’s leading buyer of wind turbines, it opens several coal power plants every week. Climate change needs multi-faceted urban solutions that target both technologies and behaviours.
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nature. In order to give birth to a green urban age, we need 
to reduce our consumption patterns, change our habits,  
and base our production dynamics on resource efficiency 
and recycling. Many of these indicative criteria depend  
on the way cities have been shaped. In US cities, David 
Satterthwaite has noted how people use six times more cars 
than in wealthy Asian cities, mostly because of the urban 
sprawl and the lack of connectivity to public transport. In 
International Energy Agency ‘business as usual’ scenarios, 
CO2 emissions from the transport sector are expected to 
grow by 120 per cent by 2050 compared to 2000 levels. The 
global car fleet will triple, and more than 90 per cent of this 
growth will take place in non-OECD countries. In order  
to curb greenhouse gas emissions from transport, we must 
reduce automobile dependence, foster a rapid modal shift 
towards less carbon intensive forms of transport such as 
rail, and improve fuel and motor efficiency. 
Cities can catalyse a modal and efficiency shift by 
targeting investment for well-planned, greener transport 
infrastructure that meets the needs of all users – both 
motorised and non-motorised. The planning of urban 
centres and their peripheries according to mixed-use  
and smart growth design principles must be part of a 
sustainable transport future. Urban development along 
these principles will serve to lower dependence on personal 
vehicles and support the increased use of public transport 
systems and non-motorised transport for short distances 
and daily commutes. Together with integrated transport 
planning and demand management, low-carbon fuels and 
greater electrification of transport are needed to meet 
short- and long-term economic and sustainability targets. 
The efficiency of light-duty vehicles in OECD countries  
is already capable of being improved by 30 per cent  
over the next 15 to 20 years. A widespread adoption  
of this efficiency in non-OECD countries and greater 
hybridisation and electrification of fleets could deliver  
a 50 per cent improvement in vehicle efficiency. 
Policies promoting densification in the design of cities 
can reduce demand for long-distance transport. Planning 
and high density developments are totally compatible, as 
can be seen in the successful examples of planning green, 
dense cities that exist in some major wealthy Asian cities.  
In addition, land use regulations can ensure that 
habitations are located in places that provide greater 
efficiency in the use of energy and materials. For instance, 
many environmentalists want to limit development in 
Californian coastal cities, even if households there 
consume less energy due to geographical reasons than 
elsewhere in the US. Yet restricting construction in 
California could mean more houses in Houston, Texas, 
where households consume more energy for heating and 
people have to drive more because of the urban sprawl.
Incentives and regulations in the building and 
construction sector offer opportunities for cities and local 
governments to leverage their authority in the setting  
of standards and the issuing of building permits. These 
measures, including mandatory investments in energy-
efficiency or the installation of renewable energy 
technologies in buildings, can make a substantial impact. 
Many countries are already heading in this direction. 
Germany, for instance, launched a programme retrofitting 
existing housing stocks to improve energy efficiency.  
So far, retrofitting over 200,000 apartments has created 
25,000 new jobs and sustained 116,000 existing jobs. A 
worldwide transition to energy efficient buildings would 
create millions of jobs as well as the ‘greening’ of existing 
jobs for the estimated 111 million people already employed 
in the sector. Investments in improved energy efficiency  
in buildings could generate an additional 2 to 3.5 million 
green jobs in Europe and the United States alone. The 
potential is much higher in developing countries and in 
countries in transition. The latter often have large stocks  
of inefficient buildings. Investments in green buildings 
have already been proposed for inclusion in a number of 
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8.5%
29.4bn
percentage of the funds allocated to green sectors
Recommended
green dimension
(Nicholas Stern,
February 2009)
total recovery package in late 2008/early 2009
30bn
453bn
81bn
751bn
24bn
376bn
490bn
GREEn stiMulus FunDs 2008/2009
bREaKDOWn OF GREEn stiMulus FunDs
A Green Urban Age will have to recognise 
and confront the social and developmental 
challenges facing cities today head on.
economic stimulus packages, including France, Germany, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. 
Technologies and materials to improve the efficiency of 
buildings are commercially available at competitive prices. 
Using current building technology, we can already cut 
energy use by around 80 per cent compared to conventional 
designs. In order to achieve a wide adoption of these 
technologies and materials in new construction and 
renovation, however, there is a need for large-scale 
investments in skill development and capacity building. 
This is essential for increasing the supply of, and access  
to such technologies and materials, particularly in 
developing countries.
A Green Urban Age will have to recognise and confront 
the social and developmental challenges facing cities today 
head on. We now realise that urban dwellers are not only 
those who fully benefit from cosmopolitan urban lifestyles, 
but they are also the two billion people without access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation, victims of all kinds  
of inequalities. Beyond good planning and carbon-free 
technological solutions, the postmodern sustainable  
city should also be a well-organised place with low 
unemployment, social equality, green open space, social 
interaction platforms and universal education with 
provisions for basic needs. 
Sustainable cities can partly be achieved by increasing 
participation in planning and decision-making in and 
around cities. Participatory budgeting as developed in  
Porto Alegre, Brazil is an accurate social solution to 
allocate public money, avoid money leaks and increase 
spending efficiency. The green urban revolution will  
occur through the joint collaboration of local community  
based organisations, international organisations and 
governmental agencies. 
Will the world have to wait for the right mix of  
political will and coordinated policy actions to take place 
before sustainable growth can begin? Perhaps not. ‘There is 
already a green economy breaking through what is breaking 
down’, as Lawrence Bloom, chief of the Green Economy 
Initiative’s sustainable cities’ sector group puts it. Our hope 
is that the successful models we have already seen will be 
given the opportunity to scale up and succeed the world 
over. Our vision is no less than a society living in harmony 
with nature, thriving on a truly global green economy. 
Carbon capture and storage
Building energy eciency
Low-carbon vehicles
Waste and water management
Renewable energy
Rail
Electrical grid
100%
75% 20%5%Germany
13% 67% 18% 2%Untied Kingdom
6% 22% 26% 18% 10% 16% 2%Europe (all countries)
29% 6% 27% 9% 11% 14%4%United States
6% 20% 6% 23% 45%South Korea
3% 55% 13% 9% 9%EU Institutions
1% 45% 31%China 23%
Japan 100%
Pavan Sukhdev is the Project Leader for the Green Economy 
Initiative (UNEP), Study Leader for the G8+5 commissioned 
report on The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB), and Chairman of the Global Markets Centre 
Mumbai (Deutsche Bank).
10  unDERstanDinG CitiEs
In 1986, one of the editions of the German news weekly  
Der Spiegel depicted a severe warning on its cover: Cologne’s 
famous gothic cathedral was shown half submerged in an 
endless sea of water with not a single other building visible.  
The issue was titled ‘the climate catastrophe’ and linked the 
global environmental crisis not only to the great aspirations 
of mankind – Cologne’s cathedral was the tallest structure in 
the world in 1880 – but also to the disappearance of a city, 
exposing its vulnerability to the forces of nature.
The cover was of course an exaggeration at a time  
when the public knew little about carbon emissions, climate 
change and rising sea levels. Yet it was in the mid-1980s  
that humanity’s ecological footprint surpassed the earth’s 
capacity. Since then, our massive ecological debt has 
continued to increase. Despite the establishment of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, global carbon emissions have shot up by 
another 26 per cent and the global sea level is now expected 
to rise up to one metre by 2100. 
We now know that cities and climate change are 
inextricably linked. The widespread acknowledgement of the 
risks associated with global warming and the need for urgent 
global action coincides with the global shift from a rural to an 
urban global population. Cities are vulnerable to a range of 
effects, of which the rise of sea levels, freak weather conditions 
and water shortages are among the most prominent. The 
United Nations estimates that no less than 400 million urban 
dwellers are exposed to risks associated with sea level rise. But 
although urbanisation brings a disproportionate hunger for 
development and consumption of the planet’s scarce natural 
resources, well designed cities can offer a viable answer to the 
search for more sustainable lifestyles.
Urbanisation is accompanied by excessive material 
consumption, more energy-intensive food supplies and 
ever-increasing flows of goods and people. Between 1950 and 
2005, the urban population grew globally from 29 to 49 per 
cent, while global carbon emissions jumped from 1,630 to 
7,985 million tonnes. It is now frequently stated that cities 
emit around 75 per cent of all carbon emissions. Some cities 
emit so much that they rank among entire countries, as is the 
case with Shanghai, which would place 25th in a global 
ranking of carbon output per country. While such statistics 
fail to recognise the complexity of linking emissions to a 
specific territory, they also mask how locally produced, 
exported and indirect carbon emissions are differentiated.  
It is true that most statements about city specific carbon 
production fail to recognise the complexity of assigning 
emissions to specific territories and how to differentiate 
locally produced, exported and indirect carbon. However, 
most estimates suggest that cities are responsible for a 
disproportionately higher share of global carbon output. 
Indirect emissions can have a particularly strong impact: for 
example when including the emission from air travel to and 
from London, aviation is the city’s largest single source of 
carbon emissions, calculated at approximately 34 per cent.
About two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions are 
energy related, of which the top two sources, heating and 
electricity for buildings comprise 25 per cent, while transport 
and industry are responsible for 22 per cent each. By 
comparison, emissions from buildings in high-income cities 
typically account for 60 per cent, and transport for 30 per 
cent. It is transport emissions that are particularly worrying. 
Even within the European Union and its ambitious carbon 
reduction policy, transport-related carbon emissions have 
increased by a staggering 36 per cent between 1990 and  
2006 while other key sectors have at least achieved  
modest reductions. 
What is worse, carbon emissions from transport are 
increasing more rapidly in the world’s fastest growing 
metropolitan areas. This is partly because some cities are 
CitY MaKinG as CliMatE POliCY
With cities contributing disproportionally to global carbon emissions, Philipp Rode describes 
how focusing on the core qualities of the compact city is the key to fighting climate change. 
At their most basic level, cities follow 
the logic of any larger organism: they 
consume less energy per unit than 
smaller ones. 
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Carrying almost 440,000 passengers a day over 40.4 kilometres of designated bus lanes running on one of its busiest motorways, Istanbul’s Metrobüs has successfully reduced travel times, and increased the use of public transport. 
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pursuing conventional models of modernisation, creating an 
infrastructure legacy matching those of the cheap oil period 
of the 1950s and 1960s. This politics of concrete and steel, 
celebrating urban motorways, flyovers and tunnels not only 
ignore the vast evidence that road construction leads to more 
traffic and longer travel distances rather than a reduction in 
congestion, but they can eventually result in the destruction  
of the city itself. According to empirical estimates for 
metropolitan areas in the United States, each new highway 
penetrating the urban core has led to a decline of central city 
residents by 18 per cent. Metropolitan regions that once 
embraced the automobile have become endless cities with 
cars demanding more space than ever before. Today, the  
São Paulo metropolitan region has more than 6 million cars, 
an amount that supersedes the total amount of cars in India 
in 2005; at the same time, the overlooked city centre, with  
its direct access and public transport links, has been 
abandoned by most middle-class residents and the city’s 
leading corporations.
In cities, high standards of living do not necessarily entail 
consumption of an equally high level of natural resources.  
At their most basic level, cities follow the logic of any larger 
organism: they consume less energy per unit than smaller 
ones. By concentrating people, processes and interactions, 
cities not only vastly increase social and economic 
opportunities but, up to a certain size, they benefit from the 
economy of scale in infrastructure and can optimise the 
efficiency of a broad range of services. A recent comparison 
of German cities has shown that on average, the amount of 
road surfaces or the length of electric cables increase only by 
80 to 90 per cent when the population doubles, instead of the 
expected 100 per cent. 
This translates into a better environmental performance 
of cities compared to their regional context: New York City 
produces only 1 per cent of the country’s overall greenhouse 
gases, but is home to 3.7 per cent of its population. Even 
when considering all indirect and embedded carbon 
emissions, urban living outperforms suburban and rural 
lifestyles in rich nations, as the Stockholm Environment 
Institute has recently shown for the United Kingdom. There 
are also enormous differences between cities: most cities  
in the United States have three to five times the gasoline 
consumption of European cities, despite offering at least  
the same quality of life. 
A closer look at specific factors contributing to carbon 
efficiency reveals the dynamics of how a certain compact 
urban territory can outperform its hinterland or sprawling 
spatial configurations. Two decisive factors are reducing 
energy consumption associated with buildings and transport. 
The amount of energy per square metre needed for heating 
and cooling a building is highly dependent on the basic 
building configuration. For example, joint research by Urban 
Age and the European Institute for Energy Research has 
shown that detached houses with the same insulation 
standards and location in moderate climates require more 
than three times the energy per square metre compared to 
multi-storey city blocks. 
In the case of transport, the positive ‘urban effect’ is 
two-fold. Firstly, it means a closer proximity, and, secondly,  
it equates with a shift towards more environmentally friendly 
modes of transport. Compact city configurations generate 
high levels of accessibility while reducing travel intensity. 
Barcelona and Atlanta, for example, have similar populations 
but their built-up territory is vastly different at 162 and  
4,280 km2 respectively; the longest travel distance between 
two points in the city is almost four times longer in Atlanta. 
Generally speaking, three key spatial factors – density, 
mixed-use and poly-centricity – influence the creation of 
proximity in cities. No single factor reigns supreme. 
Considered equally, they can also play an important role in 
increasing the use of sustainable transport modes such as 
walking, cycling and public transport. 
A city’s ability to accommodate more environmentally-
friendly lifestyles is linked to a range of interrelated factors, 
from high rates of apartment living to low car dependency. 
But the primary appeal comes from the potential to link 
these two factors to social services, cultural amenities and 
economic opportunities unknown to territories that are 
characterised by the opposite.
Ever since economist Nicholas Stern referred to climate 
change as ‘the greatest market failure the world has ever 
seen’, the critical role of governments in tackling the global 
environmental crisis has become more obvious. New 
regulations, taxes and emissions trading will all have to  
play a key role before a more dynamic private sector fully 
embraces green development. At the city level, long-term 
strategies which utilise the inherent characteristics of cities, 
including their competitive advantage as energy efficient 
systems, will have to focus on urban form and concentrating 
activities, uses and functions. The spatial structure of cities  
is the result of a complex interaction of market forces with 
taxes, regulation and infrastructure: while proactive 
intervention for these three in particular is possible in 
principle, it will require integration with overall city-wide 
strategies at each level of governance if they are to have the 
desired impact. Any endorsement will also have to recognise 
the critical role of urban building typologies and that of 
accessibility based on proximity, mobility and connectivity 
rather than simply expanding transport infrastructure. A 
city’s expansion into its rural hinterlands is an especially 
important consideration: once land is developed, it is almost 
impossible to convert back to open space. Thus planning will 
have to be reinvented as an essential component of what 
Anthony Giddens refers to as ‘the politics of the long term’, 
avoiding reverting to the unsuccessful models of the past.
Such successful models of change can only be brought 
about with, and not against, citizens. Over centuries, cities 
have been progressive environments embracing individual 
changes in behaviour – a central prerequisite for the 
emergence of more sustainable lifestyles. As dynamic and 
reflexive organisms, cities can be quickly mobilised to 
implement and test new approaches while receiving 
immediate feedback from residents. The long list of recent 
transport innovations is a revealing one: strategies such as 
congestion charging (London, Stockholm, Milan), urban 
cycling (Copenhagen, Bogotá, Paris), bus rapid transit 
systems (Curitiba, Bogotá, Istanbul) and temporary street 
use (Rio de Janeiro, New York, Tokyo) are paving the way for 
world-wide application. And they have already reduced green 
house gas emissions: each year Calgary’s new light rail saves 
about 590,000 tonnes, London’s Congestion Charge 120,000 
tonnes and Paris’ Velib bike-sharing scheme 18,000 tonnes. 
These instructive examples illustrate the enormous potential 
for political convergence around a climate policy with 
socio-economic urban objectives. Low carbon cities will 
significantly improve the quality of life long before reductions 
in carbon emissions will limit the effects of global warming. 
To underline the urban potential of greening our 
societies, we must clearly differentiate between resource-
intensive urban agglomerations and energy-efficient cities – 
not all settlements of a certain size or within a metropolitan 
region exhibit the core qualities of a city. But if a city can 
prioritise the sharing of resources, widespread use of public 
amenities and ultimately an energy-efficiency combined with 
social opportunity, city making will help provide solutions  
to the global environmental crisis. 
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New York City’s ‘Green Light for Midtown’ is changing the way the city views its streets. These images of Herald Square show mixed-use pedestrian and cycle ways contributing to green transport corridors. 
Philipp Rode is Executive Director of the Urban Age 
Programme and Associate of the Cities Programme  
at the London School of Economics.
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It is often said that a Europe of cities has emerged in the last 
generation, cities whose ties to each other weaken the bonds 
of each city to its own nation state. This proposition is both 
true and untrue. Just to make the matter more complicated, 
new membership in the European Union, as in Poland and 
Hungary, did integrate cities like Warsaw and Budapest 
into the network of European cities; economic and political 
integration, however, also stimulated social and cultural 
withdrawal from Europe.
The background to a Europe of cities lies in how most 
European cities dealt with the huge damage done in World 
War II. Recovery meant, largely, restoring the central-city 
fabric that existed before. New buildings filled in an  
old grain, one usually established before the Industrial 
Revolution, which meant in turn that the periphery of cities 
became the key site for new forces, the thinly populated  
or un-built periphery the receptor for new immigrants,  
new forms of industrial production and offices. Profound 
consequences followed: the human settlements on the 
periphery became isolated from, and invisible to, those  
who lived in the centre, while the economic activities at  
the edge followed a different path from economic renewal 
in the centre. The seats of national power were restored, 
following an old European pattern, to the compact city 
centre – a matter of re-linking centralised power to the 
fortunes of the urban centre.
This path of restoration in London, Manchester, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Warsaw, and Milan contrasted with 
the post-War decades in American cities, whose middle-
classes abandoned the central city; again, in a different way, 
to São Paulo and Johannesburg, places which in the growth 
years that began half a century ago, developed patchwork 
enclaves of race and class, cities which became archipelagos 
of poverty and wealth.
The Urban Age conference in New York addressed the 
hollowing out of the central city. William H. Whyte first 
plotted the movement of executive jobs from the city streets 
to isolated corporate campuses in the 1960s and 1970s,  
and he explored the worrying tendency of such companies  
to implode shortly afterwards. Ex-urban locations, he 
suggested, had the effect of isolating corporations from the 
face-to-face economy of the city, and thus further weakened 
companies that were already vulnerable. In Johannesburg, 
the work of the Urban Age found an equal hollowing out  
of its urban core. Here the driver was exclusively racial;  
the economics of large-versus-small business playing  
a weak role.
These very different ways of evacuating the centre 
contrast with the European city in the last half century. 
Rebuilding the distinction between centre and edge, 
privileging again the centres, marked Europe’s path of 
urban growth. The image of a ‘Europe of cities’ concerns 
the networking of those centres, not of the cities as a whole. 
Movements of populations from one periphery to another 
are quite rare: few Turkish families pushed to the edge of 
Frankfurt are prompted to make a beach-head migration  
to the edge of London, and there is little movement between 
the peripheries of London and Paris. All the same time the 
centres grow ever more tightly bound: the financial trade 
routes between the City of London and Frankfurt are 
stronger than, and largely divorced from, the financial 
activity each city does with its own nation. Similarly, the 
trade route of foreign tourism – a principle source of 
central-city wealth – is marked by a fixed London-Paris-
Rome path rather than by dispersal from the monumental 
urban centre into the rest of the nation.
These are familiar facts which, however, many working 
for the European Union hoped to alter. In the 1990s, 
Brussels’ officials in both the labour sector and in urban 
planning wanted cities in new member states, particularly 
Poland and Hungary, to break the post-War pattern of 
Western European growth. Through investment policy  
and the application of a common labour-law, Brussels 
sought to create more internally cohesive cities, less 
segregated from and more integrated with smaller towns  
in the same nations. This has not occurred, at least not in 
financial services, high-tech, and creative industries – the 
drivers of the new economy; more integrated into Europe, 
Warsaw and Budapest are increasingly withdrawn from 
their nation-states.
Many would argue that global capitalism is the source 
of centralisation and withdrawal, that this pattern of urban 
growth can be seen also in Mumbai, Tel Aviv, or São Paulo, 
that it is not distinctively European. At the Urban Age 
conference in São Paulo, Saskia Sassen argued that the 
rebuilding of central areas in cities, whether downtown  
or at the edges, is part of their new, global economic role. 
Rebuilding key parts of these cities as platforms for a 
rapidly growing range of global activities and flows, from 
economic to cultural and political also explains why 
architecture, urban design and urban planning have all 
become more important and visible in the last two decades. 
And more standardised. Related to this sweeping economic 
change is the fact that modern urban development has 
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If Turkey joins the European Union, what would happen to Istanbul? Richard 
Sennett describes the defining features of modern European cities, exploring 
the dual phenomena of a European network of cities and the status of hinge  
cities around the Mediterranean.
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The hinge city is a city of migrants rather 
than immigrants, a place of location rather 
than a destination, a city of mobilities.
Bog˘aziçi Bridge, the ‘First’ bridge, carries part of an estimated 420,000 cars every day, added to hundreds of thousands that cross the continents via ferries and sea buses. 
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homogenised building forms, the poured-concrete and 
glass box becoming ubiquitous. 
One reason standardisation has progressed lies in  
the fact that such buildings can be globally traded: like 
money, they are equally the same in all places. The social 
consequences of standardisation can also be taken to be 
global rather than European: homogeneity in built form 
abets segregation – that is, it becomes much quicker and 
easier to erect entire communities destined for particular 
social groups, to sort people out, than if planning has to 
adapt to the quirks and complexities of local buildings.  
This marriage of homogenisation and segregation is an 
issue Urban Age addressed in Mumbai. If true, then the 
prospect for Istanbul as a city in the European Union would 
mean that the machinery of the Union – its codes of labour 
and building practice, its banking rules on investment,  
its assertion of citizen-rights of free movement – abet the 
process of inclusion in a capitalist rather than a European 
order. ‘Europe’ lays down just a marker of how this larger 
inclusion will occur through accentuating the distinction 
between centre and periphery.
But that distinction matters in large measure because  
it is not static. Exclusion is not a fact that people accept 
passively. Much of the dirty work of rebuilding and 
maintaining European cities was done by immigrant 
labour; immigrants worked on building sites, cleaned  
the streets, staffed hotels and hospitals. Now, in the  
second and third generation of these immigrant families, 
continued existence as peripheral peoples is no longer 
acceptable. Nor has the concentration/withdrawal 
occurring in the centres of cities become naturalised as  
a fact of life among ‘native’ Europeans. The resurgence  
of cultural nationalism in the last decade signals in part a 
refusal of people outside the centre to be side-lined, their 
invisibility taken for granted, the local seen as mere decor. 
The centre/periphery distinction generates profound social 
dissonances. This is a large issue, one faced by any city like 
Istanbul entering a period of expansion. 
The dissonances of centralisation appeared in places as 
diverse as Mexico City and Shanghai in our study of global 
cities. But a more focused version of this problem might 
appear in Istanbul because it is a ‘hinge city’, an urban form 
which has had a particular shape in Europe. Venice is the 
European prototype of the hinge city. Renaissance Venice 
was built on trade with very distant places, dealing in spices 
from India, slaves from what is now Morocco, cloth and 
rugs from the countries along the Asian Silk Road, and 
sending to the East goods finished in Europe. Filled with 
foreign traders, Venice sought to contain them through  
the most rigid residential segregation confining Jews to  
the three ghetto islands, Turks, Germans, and others to 
fondaci, gated communities in which people were checked 
out for the day and checked in at night. The fondaci failed 
as containing institutions: foreigners gradually installed 
themselves everywhere in the spaces of Venice. 
What makes Venice the prototype of a hinge city is  
the impermanence in time of these foreigners inhabiting  
a cosmopolitan space. They seldom stayed more than a few 
years. And this has been largely true of hinge cities around 
the Mediterranean. We imagine that places like 
.
Izmir, 
Barcelona, or Casablanca are cities where different groups 
lived together generation after generation, but the statistical 
reality is that the internal composition of each community 
shifted from generation to generation. The Mediterranean 
hinge city earned its reputation for mutual tolerance  
only because much of its population used the city as a 
transit camp, a site for deals and work, by peoples of an 
entrepreneurial bent who were willing to move whenever 
they sensed opportunity elsewhere. Mutual ethnic tolerance 
thus rested on a lack of permanent identification with  
local life. The hinge city is a city of migrants rather than 
immigrants, a place of location rather than a destination,  
a city of mobilities.
Constantinople had, during the era when Venice 
dominated the Mediterranean, something of this  
character as well. In the wake of historical research 
by Fernand Braudel and William H. MacNeil, we now 
understand better than an earlier generation – which 
viewed the Sultanate as a closed society – just how dynamic 
the movement of people as well as goods through 
Constantinople was along the eastern and southern rim  
of the Mediterranean, even as Europe sought from the 
sixteenth century onwards to seal the northern rim.
In function, the urban ‘hinge’ addresses a basic problem 
in most crossroads cities. This is that the strength of 
commercial activity attracts more in-migrants than the 
cities can provide with jobs or opportunities. Rather than 
rooting misery to one spot, the contacts and information 
flows which the hinge generates allow people to look and  
to travel elsewhere. In urbanistic terms, this means that 
public spaces for sociability acquire great importance:  
talk in the cafe or in the market is how people find work  
or opportunity.
It is sometimes thought that the advent of cyberspace 
communication will replace the physical public spaces of 
the classic hinge, but economically the case has not been 
proven. Face-to-face contacts and connections remain vital, 
because they generate personalised trust in what is being 
communicated, and such personalised trust is especially 
necessary for poor people to act on information. Without 
fat bank accounts or institutions to support them, the 
knowledge they have to act upon resides largely in how  
they assess the people who impart it.
If the ‘informal’ public realm is crucial for survival in 
the over-crowded, under-resourced crossroads city, a great 
planning tragedy is occurring today in cities around the 
Mediterranean. The hinges are, as it were, beginning to 
rust. Along the northern European rim, informal movement 
and informal labour are becoming criminalised. In my 
view, the European Union has wrongly conspired with 
rather than contested the nationalist impulse to make 
informality illegal. Along the eastern and southern rims  
of the Mediterranean, the hinge of mobility is rusting due 
to issues that more directly concern us as urbanists.
Much of the urban development occurring in Lebanon, 
Egypt, Algeria and Morocco is eliminating or weakening 
informal public space. In Beirut, for instance, post civil-war 
reconstruction has forced small-scale enterprises away from 
the seafront. In Alexandria, the renovation project around 
the library is replacing informal places usable by poor 
people with clean, controlled public space meant mostly  
for tourists. Some of this erasure and expulsion can be 
traced to economics, but basic issues of urban design are 
also involved in the weakening of the informal public 
realm. Informal public space requires under-determined 
urban planning, that is, an architecture which allows 
flexibility of use and admits physical gaps and indeterminate 
relationships between buildings. It is in these liminal spaces 
that informality can flourish – the cafe built into a parking 
lot or the market stall outside a loading dock. The virtue of 
informal public space in hinge cities requires us, in other 
words, to challenge ideas that emphasising spatial order and 
purpose in urban design, ideas realised in practice, produce 
an over-determined environment. 
Whether this is also a danger in Istanbul is an issue  
I hope will be raised by the Urban Age. If it is a danger  
you are facing, we ought to explore what we, as policy-
makers, planners, and architects can do to protect and 
promote informal public space. Both the challenges of 
centralisation and informalisation could be put as a 
question: does Istanbul in the future want to look more  
like modern Frankfurt or Renaissance Venice?
Richard Sennett writes about cities, labour, and culture.  
He teaches sociology at New York University and at  
the London School of Economics, and is co-chair of the 
Urban Age Advisory Board.
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The virtue of informal public space in  
hinge cities requires us, in other words,  
to challenge ideas that emphasising spatial 
order and purpose in urban design, ideas 
realised in practice, produce an over-
determined environment. 
Streets are places of commercial activity, providing much valued face-to-face contact and autonomous public spaces while keeping the city on a constant move.
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In July 2008, I could not find a seat on a plane from Beirut to 
Istanbul. Fearing that I would miss my appointment with 
Mayor Topbaş, I asked a travel agent to find me alternative 
routes via Damascus or Amman. She laughed and explained 
that tourists were flocking to Istanbul from all over the Arab 
world because of Noor, a highly popular Turkish soap opera, 
dubbed in Syrian Arabic dialect and broadcast across the Arab 
world via a Saudi satellite network. Travel agencies were 
organising guided tours to the villa and to the different 
neighbourhoods where the series was shot. Some 100,000 
Saudis visited Istanbul in 2008, up from 30,000 the year before. 
Their itinerary included the city’s historic monuments, but the 
Byzantine churches and Ottoman palaces were not the main 
attraction. The Arab public may have finally rediscovered the 
capital of an empire that controlled the region for over 500 
years, only their focus has been diverted.
The ‘Noormania’ of 2008 represented more than a fleeting 
infatuation. The attraction was to the blissful rendition of 
Istanbul, to a higher level of social tolerance within Islam, to 
the glitz of a city with 35 billionaires, and to the cosmopolitan 
lifestyle of a young couple living beyond the confines of their 
traditional values. Whereas the soap operas of Hollywood, 
Brazil, and Mexico have already disseminated their own 
portrayals of glamour and passion to Arab satellite televisions, 
observers of the ‘Noor’ phenomenon contend that the Turkish 
soap opera unfolds too close to home to be dismissed. The love 
between a young Muslim couple, a woman’s career drive 
supported by her husband, and the possibility of moving from 
a village in Anatolia to a villa on the Bosporus within the span 
of one life time captivated about 80 million Arab viewers in 
the last episode. This also unleashed a negative, visceral 
reaction from religious leaders who wanted to ban the show.
While social scientists debate the gender, class, and 
ethnicity impact of the Istanbul-based soap opera on the Arab 
world, the spatial and geographic terms of this relationship 
may be worth exploring as well. How could it be possible that 
Istanbul’s pull has not been felt in the Arab world until now, 
given the physical proximity, the historic connections, and the 
large overlap between the Arab and Turkish traditions, 
cuisines, music, and languages? 
From Hollywood, the answer would be ‘What is the 
difference?’ A video clip of the famous tune ‘Istanbul not 
Constantinople’, rendered by the Tiny Tunes animators, 
conflates stereotypes of Istanbul with those of the Arab world. 
Deserts and tents form the backdrop of the city’s minarets and 
domes. Lumping everything East of the Marathon planes 
together, however, is not a new mistake in American popular 
culture. Orientalist prejudices notwithstanding, cultural 
similarities are to be expected where there are geographic 
proximities. In this case, the recent Arab attraction to Istanbul 
may have more to do with the city’s ability to shun off such 
affinities; it is these evolving geographic relationships which 
help to explain Istanbul’s cosmopolitan profile.
The dynamics underlying Istanbul’s exponential growth in 
the past 20 years have been consistently ascribed to the advent 
of globalisation. Whether describing the financial and gold 
markets, the textile and fashion industries, or the construction 
and real estate enterprises, the city’s reach is increasingly 
beyond the immediate geography of Turkey and the confines 
of a national territory – Istanbul’s economic influence stretches 
to a second ring of regional, geographic proximities in Central 
Asia and the Balkans, and also to the world. As is the case with 
many global cities, Istanbul’s economic activities are rooted 
geographically and historically. For example, the construction 
industry’s link to Central Asia is based on geographic 
proximity but also on affinities with reawakened Turkic 
cultures in former Soviet nations. In globalisation discourse, 
however, emphasis is placed on transcending these 
connections and attaining a role, scale and scope that situate 
the city somewhere outside its immediate geography. In this 
respect, Istanbul dutifully obliges. As the capital of an empire 
that ruled over an extended territory, Istanbul illustrates the 
continuities between empire and global city through its 
current relationship with its first (national) and second 
(regional) territorial rings.
In this transition from geographic confines to a regional 
and then global role, it is significant to recognise which 
geographies have been suppressed. Istanbul’s connections to 
the Balkans, Central Asia, and Western Europe have all fuelled 
its ascent to a global city. European standards (and aspirations) 
guide its transport, infrastructure, and environmental 
standards. Its urban work force is increasingly Balkan. Yet its 
location in the Eastern Mediterranean region has largely been 
ignored. Thus until recently, it would seem that connections  
to and within the Middle East remain confined to the 
geopolitical space of the Cold War era. Certainly tensions in 
the Eastern Mediterranean between Greeks and Turks, Arabs 
and Israelis, Turks and Armenians, Cypriots and Cypriots, 
Turks and Arabs, Arabs and Arabs, etc. have hindered free 
trade and stronger cultural connections between Turkey and 
the Arab world. Lebanon, for example, has always had good 
trade relations with Turkey, but until recently prejudices 
against the Ottoman past and the strong cultural and political 
presence of Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities have 
prevented this connection from manifesting a more 
conspicuous cultural exchange.
Throughout the period of Ottoman rule between 1516 and 
1918, Istanbul exerted varying degrees of influence on cities in 
the Arab world. The models most frequently used to describe 
this influence are the triad of cities (Istanbul, Cairo and 
Aleppo) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the 
network of ports (Istanbul, Izmir, Haifa, Beirut, Thessaloniki 
and Alexandria) in the nineteenth century. In both models, 
Istanbul held primacy as a distant first, but was never obsessed 
with its centrality. In the early-sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the relationship between the imperial centre and its 
provinces tightened compared to the earlier Ottoman 
nomadic-state apparatus that maintained strategic distance as 
a means of exercising power. Even when Istanbul controlled 
the administrative organisation and institutional buildings in 
sixteenth-century Aleppo, the structure of waqf organisation, 
or religious holding of land, tended to reflect local practices 
and elite rule. In the nineteenth century, the discreet train 
lines connecting the network of ports to Turkey’s agricultural 
hinterlands further reinforced this loose relation between 
centre and periphery as the train system failed to create a 
network within the hinterlands. Ethnic groups, merchants  
and bazaars traded heavily with each other across the 
Mediterranean in an exchange of goods and ideas, but they 
held on to their respective hinterlands with loose reins.
A structural shift in the spatial organisation of the 
Ottoman Empire occurred in the late nineteenth century, 
particularly after its loss of the Balkans, when Istanbul sought 
to impose a more centralising presence in the Arab provinces. 
This translated into heavy investment in agricultural and 
irrigation reforms, new road networks, and the introduction  
of railroads, tramways, and waterworks into the major cities  
of the Eastern Mediterranean. Many of these projects were 
financed through private concessions to European companies, 
reflecting each countries’ growing interest in the region. Still, 
the image of the city-empire prevailed over these equalisation 
efforts. The clock towers and fountains planted in the centres 
of many Levantine cities have been interpreted as signs of 
modernisation, while the establishment of decentralised 
networks of trains and public spaces were seen as signs of the 
ubiquitous image of the centre, the Sultan of Istanbul. Despite 
these large investments aimed at equalising the regional 
territories through modernisation, the disparities between 
Istanbul and the Eastern Mediterranean remained vast until  
1918 when the Ottomans finally withdrew from the region. 
The subsequent creation of Arab nation-states, complete 
with their own exclusionary identities and prejudices, 
exaggerated their severance from the Ottoman past, and  
not only because the Arab states equated this past with the  
Turkish present. The perceived contradiction between Arab 
nationalism and the rise of Turkish nationalism further 
widened this cultural rift. Despite recent joint efforts between 
the governments of some Arab countries and Turkey to revise 
the history books, this past continues to be portrayed as a long, 
dark era. A second point of divergence surrounded Turkey’s 
decision to join the Baghdad Pact’s sphere of American 
influence in the 1950s, while Egypt led the Arab world  
towards a non-aligned position.
Between the World Wars, Istanbul lost both its ethnic 
populations to the nascent nation-states around it as well  
as its political primacy to Ankara. In 1927, the year of the first 
national census, Istanbul had a population of 690,000 whereas 
Turkey counted 13 million. That same year, Cairo, the second 
city of the Ottoman Empire, reached one million and 
superseded Istanbul. Cairo would continue to rise as the 
regional political and demographic centre. The independence 
of the Arab countries after World War II led to a period of 
rapid urbanisation around their capital cities: Beirut, Baghdad, 
Kuwait, Amman, and Abu Dhabi all witnessed exponential 
growth during this period while achieving primacy within 
their own national territories. Riyadh would have to wait  
until the mid-1970s to surpass the port city of Jeddah; only 
Damascus would remain rivalled in its demographic and 
economic primacy by the regional capital of Aleppo. 
When Istanbul again regained its prominence as the  
centre of industry and trade in Turkey, particularly during the 
liberalisation period under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
between 1950 and 1960, it set itself on a different path of 
growth and development than the Arab capitals. Before  
other cities in the region were feeling the effects of rapid 
urbanisation, Istanbul was challenged by the need to erect 
motorways to link its expanding metropolis, the growing 
‘misery belts’ on its periphery, and the stagnation of its inner 
city. It also went through the processes of urban renewal and 
building of edge city centres earlier than the others. The 
historic preservation movement in Istanbul also achieved 
immense powers in the 1980s, leading to its being listed as  
a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1985. Significantly, this 
came six years after Cairo and Damascus gained a similar 
status, but the scope and depth of preservation policies in 
Istanbul far exceed that of either. Istanbul has managed to 
curtail the growth of its informal sector more successfully 
than other metropolitan centres in the area. Amman, Beirut, 
Damascus, and even some of the wealthier cities like Jeddah, 
continue to struggle with the presence of large informal 
sectors. In 1996, as much as 75 per cent of Cairo’s residents 
lived in informal housing. 
Despite the growing rift, the Arab world and Turkey 
shared some of the planning and design formulas circulated by 
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Hashim Sarkis offers an overview of the political, cultural and economic 
complexities underlying the changing relationship between Istanbul and the  
greater region. 
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the Bretton Woods development agencies, the United Nations, 
and individual experts. For example, in 1938 the French 
planner Henri Prost, who worked in North Africa on the plans 
of Fez and Casablanca, is credited with the consolidation of 
Istanbul’s depopulated areas and the introduction of industry 
inside the city. Similarly, the Swiss architect-planner Ernst 
Egli, who worked between Ankara and Beirut throughout  
the 1930s and 1950s, proposed administrative reforms 
corresponding to the new metropolitan order of these cities. 
Perhaps one of the main commonalities between Istanbul 
and the wider region is in the urban administration of cities 
with mayors and cities with walis (governors), a challenging 
and conflicting system that sometimes leads to bizarre 
reporting structures and to delayed decision making. Since 
1984, however, Istanbul has managed to create a metropolitan 
municipality with an elected and relatively powerful roster of 
mayors to lead the city. Since then, the city has undertaken 
urban improvements, including those to increase control over 
informal development, which could be attributed to a 
strengthened local government. This is in contrast to most  
of the Arab cities, where central administrations continue  
to exercise relatively strong control over the budgetary and 
administrative responsibilities of their mayors, many of  
whom continue to be appointed, not elected.
The 1970s marked a significant overture between Turkey 
and the Arab world: blocked out of the European market, 
Turkish workers migrated to the Arabian Gulf. Today some 
100,000 Turkish workers live in the Middle East, around 
95,000 of them in Saudi Arabia, and the numbers continue  
to grow as Turkish engineers and construction companies 
move to the Gulf.
The twenty-first century rapprochement between Turkey 
and the Arab world, which has culminated in the ‘Noormania’ 
of 2008, is often attributed to the political ascendency of 
Turkey's Islamic AKP (Justice and Development Party). 
Interestingly, this is seen both as a gesture towards the Islamic 
world in defiance of continued snubbing by Europe, as well as 
an expansion of regional markets and economic powers that 
are strengthening Turkey’s bid for membership in the 
European Union. A clear indicator of such improved 
relationships is trade. Exchange between Turkey and the Arab 
world increased from US$ 11 billion in 2002 to US$ 62 billion 
in 2008. In 2005, a Turkish Arab Economic Forum was 
established with Istanbul as its permanent base, and in 2006  
Turkey was invited to become a permanent guest in the Arab 
League. Since 2002 Arabs have invested about US$ 30 billion 
into Turkey, mostly in Istanbul. Beyond trade, political 
rapprochement has accelerated during the past eight years  
and Turkey has graduated from nervous neighbour to trusted 
mediator and peace keeper between Arabs and Israelis. Talks 
to share electricity and water via under-sea conduits between 
Turkey and Israel and Turkey and the Arab World have taken 
this new cooperation to a futuristic level. 
It is in this recent period that a particular Turkish brand  
of large-scale real estate development and project management 
and construction merged with a finance and development 
brand from the Gulf. These brands have created a network  
of exchanges and an unusual margin of excess in the 
development of these cities. The United Arab Emirates has 
tried to build towers that bear its name over the precious 
skyline of the Bosporus. The British-Iraqi architect Zaha 
Hadid is designing the new district of Kartal on the southern 
Asian tip of the city. Most of these projects are private 
developments sponsored and supported by the city’s 
government. Timothy Mitchell suggests a similar phenomenon 
of excessive iconic mega-projects in Cairo where projects such 
as the 1990s ‘Dreamland’ operate beyond the sphere of 
governmental fiscal restraints and grow instead from the sale 
of cheap public land to generate a real estate market and 
finance public expenditure on infrastructure.
The gentrification and rebuilding of historic centres  
in Riyadh, Beirut, Aleppo, and now Jeddah and Doha,  
has reinvigorated interest in Ottoman architectural heritage, 
but not without transliterations and occasional 
misinterpretations. The developers of downtown Beirut 
preserved very few of the Ottoman era buildings but they 
countered with an overblown Ottomanesque revival style, 
including a new mega-mosque that dominates the downtown 
skyline. The restoration of Aleppo fared much better in 
preserving the Ottoman urban fabric and monuments by 
linking them to an economic revitalisation project. The 
destruction of an Ottoman fortress in Mecca in 2002 by  
Saudi authorities to pave the way for a housing project only 
serves as a reminder of the deep ideological tensions that 
remain between the two countries.
The rage against Noor by religious leaders was the latest 
expression of these tensions and may have led to the collapse of 
a new niche of tourism in Istanbul. And yet moderation finally 
prevailed: the flights to Istanbul continued to be full. 
I finally found a flight to Istanbul. I met with the Mayor  
in his summer offices on the Malta Kiosk in the Yıldız Palace 
gardens, where a member of his foreign relations staff 
addressed me in perfect Arabic. He and other staff members 
had studied Arabic in Jordan at the University of Zarqa as part 
of an exchange programme. The mayor does not speak 
English, but used his English translator in order to speak to 
me, an Arab professor from the United States, while I spoke  
in Arabic to his foreign relations staff.
From the Yıldız Palace gardens, the seat of power in the 
nineteenth century, endless panoramas open up in front of 
your eyes, and you can see across the Bosporus deep into the 
interiors of the city. Some of these interiors resemble edge 
cities and gated communities to be found elsewhere in the 
world, including Dubai, Beirut, Cairo, and Riyadh; so far,  
they have not overwhelmed this city’s unique beauty and its 
ability to seduce. No city in the world exhibits as much face as 
Istanbul. The expanse and extent of visibility weave a world of 
their own, inviting and forbidding at the same time.
How insignificant Beirut and Cairo must have been to 
Abdul Hamid II, the main occupant of Yildiz, against this 
opera (no soap here) of seduction. How unattractive they still 
fare in comparison. During our conversation, the mayor 
repeated after Napoleon that if the world were one country 
Istanbul would be its capital. Napoleon was no doubt exuding 
strategy, the mayor pride. I was trying not to be distracted by 
the beauty of the place and not to make much of the fact that 
my family name, Sarkis, was the same as the first name of the 
Armenian architect, Sarkis Balyan, who designed the Malta 
kiosk in the nineteenth century. The mayor must have known 
this, having been in charge of the restoration of the city’s 
palaces in his earlier career. What he did not know was that on 
the same grounds as we were having tea, Midhat Pasha, my 
wife’s great-great-grandfather, was tried for treason against 
Abdul Hamid II in 1881. Whether Arabs, Armenians, or 
Turks, we seem to be perpetually returning to this place to 
project our renewed desires on its unfolding geographies.
Hashim Sarkis is the Aga Khan Professor at Harvard 
University Graduate School of Design, and an architect. 
Sarkis is author of several publications including Circa 1958: 
Lebanon in the Pictures and Plans of Constantinos 
Doxiadis and co-editor with Eric Mumford of Josep Lluis 
Sert: The Architect of Urban Design.
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Text written in memory of Wissam Ezzeddine.
Whether describing the financial and 
gold markets, the textile and fashion 
industries, or the construction and real 
estate enterprises, the city’s reach 
is increasingly beyond the immediate 
geography of Turkey and the confines  
of a national territory.
Tahtakale, a neighbourhood with some of the best preserved urban grain, hosts dynamic commercial activity with goods coming from near and far.
This essay offers a comparative analysis of the development 
process of the three largest cities in Turkey – Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir – emphasising not the differences in their 
urban development within a nation-state but the similarities. 
While the roots of this narrative go back to the ‘shy 
modernity’ period from the second half of the nineteenth 
century to the proclamation of the Republic, the focus will be 
on three phases of political transition in Turkey: the period of 
‘radical modernity’ from 1923 to 1950; the period of ‘populist 
modernity’ from 1950 to 1980; and the ‘erosion of modernity’ 
which has occurred since the 1980s.
World War I saw the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire into nation-states. The proclamation of a Turkish 
Republic in 1923 involved both continuity and rupture from 
certain aspects of the past. The challenge was to transform a 
pre-industrial empire into a state that represented ‘radical 
modernity’ and liberated citizens from the constraints of the 
Ottoman Empire by placing trust in science and technology. 
The leaders of the Republic implemented institutional reforms 
that did not, however, adhere to a consistent or comprehensive 
political theory; instead they conceived the construction of a 
nation as a socio-spatial process defined by four clear strategies.
The first was the proclamation of Ankara as the capital 
city of a republic founded on the belief that a sense of national 
unity could not be developed within the cosmopolitan 
atmosphere of large port cities. It was hoped that an emerging 
middle class could establish new standards and values which 
would serve as an example for the whole country. In doing so, 
the success of Ankara as a modern capital became linked to 
the fate of a new political regime.
The second strategy was the construction of a railroad 
system to integrate the Turkish internal market. During the 
period of ‘shy modernity’, railroad construction had been 
carried out by foreign companies charged with connecting 
rural areas to port cities. This opened up more land to colonial 
powers, however, and resulted in the disintegration of the 
internal market instead of its integration. The new Republic’s 
administration was determined to implement an integrated 
rail network and thus doubled its size and, more importantly, 
converted the existing tree-like system based on port cities to 
a hub-and-spoke network, with Ankara at its hub.
The third strategy was the development of a government-
sponsored industrialisation programme aimed at reducing 
imports of foreign goods through construction of factories in 
small towns along the rail network. It was expected that these 
three strategies of ‘radical modernity’ taken together with  
a fourth to build public houses (halkevleri) in most cities 
across the country would penetrate all of Turkey from these 
focal points.
When Ankara was made the capital, Istanbul lost all 
administrative functions and the jobs that went with it. 
Although Istanbul maintained its position as Turkey's largest 
city, Izmir was overtaken by Ankara, which soon became the 
second-largest city.
Like many developing countries, Turkey faced rapid 
urbanisation following World War II with Ankara and most 
other cities experiencing six per cent annual growth rates. 
During this period of ‘populist modernity’ there was also  
a shift to formal employment opportunities, housing, and 
infrastructure to accommodate the growing urban 
population. But provision of these elements depended on  
a high rate of capital accumulation which did not yet exist. 
Another key challenge was that the education and skills of 
rural migrants were insufficient to sustain them in the city. 
Finally, rapid population growth increased land speculation, 
raising prices beyond the means of middle-income groups and 
expanding cities beyond their municipal boundaries. During 
these early years of rapid urbanisation, Turkey also moved 
from a single-party regime to a multi-party democracy – one 
in which populist tendencies increased and patron-client 
relations became dominant. This all coincided with an 
industrialisation programme that increased the demand  
for cheap labour in cities.
Although the urban middle classes, which included 
professional planners, supported implementation of the 
modernist legitimacy framework, in the face of rapid 
urbanisation, initially these groups insisted on sending 
migrants back to their villages. As incoming migration 
reached levels where such measures would be absurd, the 
middle class ‘imprisoned’ these new urban citizens in their 
minds as ‘peasants in the citys’. It was expected that with time, 
these migrants would learn to live within the modernist 
legitimacy models. This expectation, however, runs contrary 
to premises of acculturation theory. These groups expected 
that in the case of two cultures coming face to face, one would 
be transformed into the other. Such an expectation may have 
removed the need to search for a new legitimisation alternative.
In order to understand Turkey’s urban development in this 
era, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the central 
government’s planning ideology was undermined by the 
spontaneous actions of these new migrants as well as the 
middle classes. Planning ideology entailed implementation of 
a plan prepared with scientific methods. This plan of the city’s 
future would be announced to society and was meant to avoid 
development activities presented as a fait accompli. This 
would apply at the scale of individual buildings, for example 
by requiring formal permits for construction and for 
occupancy. It also involved establishing the Ministry of 
Construction and Resettlement (İmar ve İskan Bakanlığı), 
which functioned like a ministry of urbanisation. During this 
period laws were passed to protect the historical urban fabric 
and urban planning education was institutionalised. 
Metropolitan planning offices were also established in each of 
the three cities to help them comply with a key requirement 
from the Provincial Bank (İller Bankası): in order to secure 
funding for urban infrastructure, applicants needed to 
provide a city plan. 
The first serious impact of rapid urbanisation was a 
shortage of housing, and two types of spontaneous solutions 
were developed to overcome this problem. Government 
regulations did not offer the multitudes that had left rural 
areas the chance to sustain their lives, and soon the cities were 
encircled by the informal gecekondu settlements. Recognising 
the need for new housing, the populist democratic regime was 
tolerant of this phenomenon, especially when compared to 
dictatorships. It is for this reason that the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods of Turkey have always been superior in 
quality and appearance to their Latin-American counterparts. 
In order to reconcile this informality with the planning 
regulations born from the modernist legitimacy framework, 
the government passed a series of amnesty laws which 
retroactively legitimised some of the illegal gecekondu 
settlements. Yet the building of new gecekondus continued. In 
time, they would become partially integrated with the formal 
housing market until finally it became impossible for new 
migrants to build gecekondus. This was because land was 
controlled by radical political groups which provided 
gecekondus in exchange for political loyalty. 
The second response to provide spontaneous housing 
entailed a ‘build-and-sell’ (yapsatçı) strategy. It was developed 
by the middle classes who also faced a housing shortage when 
rapidly rising land prices eliminated the practice of registering 
a single building on a single parcel of land in a single name. 
The ‘build-and-sell’ solution enabled the middle classes to 
share the cost of a single parcel of land through fragmentation 
of ownership. It grew out of a process by which small-scale 
developers would acquire land from landowners in exchange 
for a selected number of apartment units in the multistory 
housing to be built on the land. The units remaining after the 
allocation to landowners were put on the market; not 
surprisingly, values were the highest in older parts of the city. 
This led to the formation of residential areas with inadequate 
infrastructure and densities far higher than those foreseen in 
plans. As it was easier to present this spontaneous 
development as congruent with modernist legitimacy models 
compared to gecekondus, the government put forward a law 
allowing for the registration of a building in more than one 
name, including rules organising the management of 
apartment buildings. With new development plans increasing 
the number of stories in the three big cities, building densities 
were increased, so ‘build-and-sell’ housing seemingly 
remained consonant with modernist legitimacy models.
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CitiEs in MODERn tuRKEY
.
Ilhan Tekeli offers a narrative about the history of the city and Turkey’s 
urbanisation by analysing the impact of modernism on urban planning.
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Post-war urban planning in Istanbul opened up large boulevards for roads, like here in Sisli, replacing mansion houses with mid-rise mixed-use apartment buildings.   
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Another spontaneous development was the dolmuş. 
Municipalities were unable to expand public transport to meet 
this increased demand and the dolmuş – a privately operated 
shared taxi service provided by small-scale entrepreneurs 
whereby old taxis were modified to accommodate more 
passengers – filled the gap. Since the dolmuş fares were shared, 
they were affordable to middle- and low-income riders. As 
local administrations could not hinder development of the 
dolmuş since the supply of public transport was inadequate, 
instead they organised the dolmuş system along particular 
lines in the city.
Such emergent solutions resulted in the three largest cities 
displaying similar growth patterns: expansion of the city 
along intercity motorways, high-density inner-city 
development, and growth of the central business district 
toward high-income neighbourhoods. In this model of 
growth, provision of social services in the high-density city 
centre remained inadequate, green areas were overtaken by 
development, traffic congestion increased, and cities began 
losing their identities as the historical urban fabric was 
replaced by ‘build-and-sell’ apartment blocks. Gecekondu 
settlements were also encircling these cities. The populations 
of the three big cities increased greatly, making Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir metropolitan cities. But cities that grow in 
this way do not possess the structural characteristics of 
metropolises of industrial economies; it is perhaps thus  
more appropriate to call them overgrown industrial cities. 
Confronted with this situation, attempts to sustain the 
modernist legitimisation framework could have included new 
planning approaches since planning was considered a 
legitimate political solution at the time. Implementation of 
partial development plans by local actors, however, challenged 
this framework. Large-scale developers with significant 
capital had also not yet appeared. Instead, development of 
large sites was carried out by a myriad of small-scale projects. 
These were undertaken by private real estate interests 
functioning as a fait accompli mechanism undermining 
urban development plans. The small-scale capital owners who 
took part in these partial development plans often made use of 
political channels within the context of populism while 
powerful political actors seeking prestige through large scale 
projects also undermined urban planning. 
In executing these ‘development operations’, priority was 
given to solving everyday problems of the people even if it 
meant sidestepping planning oversight or the rule of law. 
These large-scale development operations occurred only in 
Istanbul – for example the Bosporus Bridge and beltway 
project in 1967-73 by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel – but 
they could not be sustained for long periods of time, and were 
typically abandoned within four or five years given growing 
resistance within professional circles. 
Beginning in 1980, a new and open development policy 
oriented towards exports would define the Turkish economy. 
As state entrepreneurship waned, priority was given to the 
private sector. This transformation brought about a radical 
change in how Turkey established relations with the rest of the 
world. About ten years later, the disintegration of the socialist 
block and the end of the Cold War also provided important 
opportunities for Turkey to open its economy. Most important 
of all was the worldwide transformation following the 
economic crisis of 1970. This transition from industrialisation 
to a knowledge-based economy – from the Fordist type of 
production organisation to a more flexible type and from  
the world of nation-states to a globalised world – constituted 
the main dimensions of this transformation from modernism 
to postmodernism.
Istanbul began to regain functions it had lost in the 1920s 
after the Soviet and Turkish revolutions. These 
transformations would give Istanbul the status of a global city 
alongside the megacities of the world, although at the time 
urban planning circles in Turkey preferred to apply the 
concept of ‘world city’. 
After 1980, the processes determining the structure and 
expansion of Turkish cities also underwent an important 
change: instead of growing through the addition of individual 
buildings and decisions by individuals or small-scale 
developers, cities were being transformed by the actions of 
large organisations and powerful actors. Cities could now 
grow by the addition of large built-up areas through 
institutional arrangements and new building-supply methods. 
The most important of these was a mass housing model 
derived from the ‘build-and-sell’ method. Mass building was 
not reserved for residential development but was applied to 
business needs as well. This included industrial zones and sites 
for warehouses, wholesale trade centres, transport services, 
specialised production and free trade zones. In each, small-
scale developers or even individuals were organised into 
cooperatives or other institutional bodies to realise such 
large-scale operations. 
The creation of new self-contained business centres with 
all the necessary facilities and infrastructure undermined the 
role of the historical central business districts.The most 
prominent example was seen in Istanbul, where the old city 
centres of Eminönü and Beyoğlu could not meet the new 
control and management requirements. In constructing the 
new central business district of skyscrapers located along the 
Mecidiyeköy and Maslak axes at the western ridges of the 
Bosporus, access was provided to high-income residential 
areas in the North thanks to Istanbul’s new found capacity  
to mobilise large amounts of capital. 
During this period of growth, Turkey’s three main cities 
did not rely exclusively on a pattern of expansion to new areas; 
important transformations were also taking place in the old 
urban zones. Three key factors determined this 
transformation.The first was the new development dynamics 
that transformed Istanbul and, to a lesser extent, Ankara and 
Izmir, from overgrown industrial cities to city-regions. This 
transformation prompted important functional changes in 
the city centres. For example, although Eminönü, the city’s 
oldest centre of business, lost several of its production and 
service functions, it gained important touristic and cultural 
roles. A similar process has taken place in Beyoğlu. 
A second change took place in the provision of transport 
infrastructure whereby all three cities borrowed large 
amounts of capital to realise public transportation projects. 
This led to gentrification of some neighbourhoods near the 
city centre, as in the cases of Cihangir and Kuzguncuk. The 
third factor was environmental and attempted to address the 
risks from earthquakes. For example, recently there has been 
increased pressure to upgrade the poor construction of older 
gecekondu and other substandard buildings. 
But what to make of the modernist legitimacy in these 
cities? As their development extends further into the 
periphery and central districts continue to be transformed, 
unauthorised construction is no longer specific only to 
gecekondu housing. Informal construction is increasing, even 
in the wealthier parts of Istanbul. Thus instead of gecekondu 
settlements becoming more in tune with the framework of 
modernist legitimacy models, the reverse is happening.
This is a natural consequence of a growth trajectory which 
adds large built-up areas en masse to a city’s existing fabric. 
Although it is possible to control and plan for a city’s future 
expansion, the best way of doing so is through incremental 
growth. In Turkey, development is controlled by powerful 
actors who do not mind paying the high costs involved.  
Thus a fait accompli occurs the moment a large parcel  
of land is bought.
Developed democracies have realised that it is no longer 
possible to control urban development using modernist plans 
representing a city frozen in time; instead strategic plans 
prepared through public participation and a deliberative, 
democratic process direct a city’s growth. Implementation  
of plans in Turkey, however, should not be confused with the 
transparent processes of developed democracies. In Turkey, a 
mayor’s use of authority is not always transparent. Meanwhile, 
the demands on behalf of civic groups for increased municipal 
authority in the name of national decentralisation and 
participatory democracy have at times exacerbated this 
misuse of discretionary powers. This is because Turkey’s city 
administrations have not been completely democratised yet, 
and strong municipal authority has created, in most cases, 
local fiefdoms rather than widespread civic engagement.
Like the lifespan of a human being, this urban narrative 
covers 80 years of development of Turkey’s three largest cities 
– it is a story of modernisation, democratisation, and 
urbanisation that has taken place in a far shorter time and 
with a less efficient form of capital accumulation than one 
finds in other European cities. 
.
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Haliç (the Golden Horn) lost its significance as a harbour, port and shipyard under changing political structures, but remains a major cultural and historical site.
Although it is possible to control and plan 
for a city’s future expansion, the best way 
of doing so is through incremental growth. 
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POPULATION GROWTH IN THE URBAN AGE CITIES
A few decades have passed since we first became  
aware that the world is a single system, integrated  
and synergetic but also small and fragile. We now 
know, for the first time in human history, that the 
majority of people on the planet are living urban lives. 
Despite the current global recession, projections tell 
us that this trend will continue. Seventy-five per cent 
of the global population is expected to concentrate  
in cities by 2050 – in megacities of several million 
people, or massively urbanised regions stretching 
across countries and continents. This relentless  
pace of urban change is likely to be fuelled by the 
environmental impacts of climate change, with more 
people – climate change refugees – abandoning 
exposed agricultural areas in favour of the relative 
protection and promise of the city.
The scale of today’s urban context is difficult to 
grasp. While only 186 million people lived in cities  
of over a million or more in 1950, this figure reached 
one billion in 2000 and will grow to 1.8 billion by 
2025. For megacities of ten million or more, the 
increase is twice as fast: from 23 million in 1950, to 
229 million in 2000, and 447 million by 2025. Yet 
whereas Europe, North America and Oceania became 
mostly urban before the 1950s and Latin America 
during the 1960s, Asia will only hit that mark in  
2024 and Africa in 2030. 
Even more challenging is the fact that today’s 
urban growth is concentrated in areas where poverty 
and deprivation are rife, where cities have the 
potential to either integrate or separate. According 
to the United Nations, Mumbai – India’s dynamic 
powerhouse – is  set to overtake Tokyo as the world’s 
largest city by 2050. Shanghai, meanwhile, continues 
to grow at a breathtaking pace in both height and 
breadth with more than 10,000 buildings over eight 
storeys high compared to just over 100 such buildings 
only 25 years ago. But rapid urbanisation is not always 
paralleled by the exponential economic growth and 
comprehensive infrastructure investments of the  
Asia Pacific region. Nowhere is this more true than  
in the two megacities of sub-Saharan Africa: with 
each passing hour, Lagos will add 67 new residents 
and Kinshasa 34 by 2025. Post-apartheid 
Johannesburg and Cairo face different problems. 
While Johannesburg struggles with crime, fear, 
segregation and AIDS, over 60 per cent of Cairo’s 
population lives in informal settlements and there  
is only one square metre of open space per person. 
Each Londoner, by contrast, has access to 50 times 
that amount. 
The information contained in this data section 
summarises research undertaken by Urban Age since 
2005. It includes an overview about urban trends in 
Istanbul and places it in a comparative context with 
other world cities, including New York, Shanghai, 
London, Johannesburg, Mexico City, Berlin, Mumbai 
and São Paulo. By investigating differing patterns of 
urban density, transport and governance, together  
with a wide range of social and economic indicators,  
the information provides unique insight into the  
DNA of cities today.
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URBAN POPULATION GROWTH AROUND THE WORLD
This world map shows the evolution of population growth 
and the United Nations’ projected population for the urban 
agglomeration in 2025 for the Urban Age cities and some of  
the largest and fastest growing urban centres around the world. 
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URBAN AGE CITIES COMPARED
Behind the statistics of global city growth lie very different 
patterns of urbanisation, with diverse spatial, social and 
economic characteristics that dramatically affect the urban 
experience in cities around the world and in addition to 
standard measures of population growth and density, 
economic weight and transport use, the Urban Age has 
assembled data from a range of official sources on energy 
consumption to global CO2 emissions, allowing a preliminary 
assessment of how these nine world cities compare to each 
other on key performance indicators. 
A graphic summary of these results offers some striking 
differences, especially when it comes to their speed of growth. 
While São Paulo has grown nearly 8,000 per cent since 1900 
and London by only 16 per cent (having experienced its  
major growth spurt in the previous century), it is Mumbai 
that is now growing the fastest of the nine with 47 new people 
expected to move into the city each hour by 2025. London, 
instead, will only gain one person per hour and Berlin will 
remain static. These trends mask different patterns of age 
distribution: close to a third of the residents of Mumbai, 
Johannesburg, São Paulo and Mexico City are under 20 years 
old, while in Shanghai and Berlin the younger generations 
shrink to 20 per cent or less.
Patterns of habitation also differ significantly.  
The high residential densities of New York’s Manhattan  
(53,000 people per km2) are nearly doubled in Shanghai 
(96,000 people per km2) and Mumbai, where, despite the 
fact that most people live in low-rise structures, residential 
densities reach over 100,000 people per km2. By contrast, 
Berlin peaks at only 21,700 and London struggles to reach 
17,200. São Paulo, Johannesburg and Mexico City prove to  
be the more dangerous places to live – ranging from 13 to 21 
murders per 100,000 people – while Istanbul and Mumbai 
have very low levels of serious crime with only 3 murders  
per 100,00 people, slightly worse than Berlin and Shanghai. 
These findings are paralleled by the level of income inequality 
indicated by the GINI index – a measure of income 
distribution with a higher number representing greater 
inequality – in each of these cities: Johannesburg, São Paulo 
* Estimated
** London and Johannesburg represent the current population in the administrative city as they do not have a corresponding metropolitan region.
*** PM10 refers to the amount of pollution in each city’s atmosphere. This index has been developed by the World Bank to measure the annual average concentration of heavy particulate matter in micro grams per cubic metre.
This data has been derived from various official statistical sources, including the United Nations Statistics Division and census for each city and country. Complete data sources available at www.urban-age.net
The ‘DNA of Cities’ presented above is adapted from originally published work in The Endless City, Phaidon Press (2008).
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and Mexico City are the most unequal cities, followed closely 
by New York, with London being the most equitable. Despite 
the fact that Mexico City’s per capita income is less than  
a third of New Yorkers’ (US$ 18,321 versus US$ 55,693), 
residents of Mexico City own nearly twice as many cars  
(360 per 1,000 people versus 209) and use roughly the same 
amount of water per person as Londoners (324 litres per day). 
While Johannesburg, London, Berlin and Mexico City 
contribute similar levels of CO2 emissions per person, the 
number doubles in Shanghai, where over 10,000 kg per  
person are produced every year owing to the presence of  
heavy manufacturing industry in its vast metropolitan region. 
This can be contrasted to Istanbul: with close to 38 per cent of 
its workforce in the manufacturing sector, the highest of the 
Urban Age cities, it only produces 2,720 kg of CO2 per person. 
Mumbai’s residents contribute only 371 kg per person – less 
than ten per cent of that compared to residents in other global 
cities. Given India’s economic and population growth rate,  
the future choices that cities like Mumbai make in terms of 
sustainability will have a dramatic impact on the ecological 
balance of the planet.
All cities, except for Berlin, punch above their weight 
in terms of the economy. Istanbul, with 17.8 per cent of the 
national population, contributes 22 per cent of Turkey’s GDP, 
while Mexico City’s 8.4 per cent drives Mexico’s economy  
with 21.5 per cent of national GDP. In New York City the 
figures comprise a smaller share: the city delivers only  
3.3 per cent of the United States’ GDP while hosting  
2.8 per cent of the nation’s population. Londoners, on the 
other hand, contribute over 16 per cent to the UK’s economy, 
but its residents are faced with the highest public transport 
costs across the sample, with the typical price of a journey 
costing three times more than in New York and 37 times  
more than in Mexico City or Mumbai. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND  
THE URBAN ECONOMY
Cities are engines of growth, centres of consumption and 
production. They promote economic vitality, cultural 
exchange and social integration. However, urban economies 
are also fragile. Their high reliance on the service sector 
makes them vulnerable to financial instability, as the current 
global recession shows. Yet, due to the high concentration of 
wealth and related consumption patterns of urban lifestyles, 
cities contribute to a high percentage of global CO2 emissions 
− up to 75 per cent according to some estimates – the main 
component of greenhouse gases. As these gases are emitted 
much faster than they can be absorbed by oceans, plants and 
soils, they have been building up in the atmosphere, trapping 
more and more heat. As a result, global mean temperatures 
have risen dramatically; by 0.76 °C compared to pre-industrial 
times. Higher temperatures increase the risks associated with 
rising sea levels, flooding, desertification and droughts. In 
2002, the World Health Organisation estimated that 150,000 
people died every year from the consequences of climate 
change, a figure that has been recently adjusted to 300,000  
to reflect the fact that illness spreads much faster in warmer 
weather. These initial estimates were based on a warming  
of just 0.6 °C. Yet if these greenhouse gas emission trends 
continue, global temperatures could rise 6 °C by the end  
of the twenty-first century.
However as can be seen in the map of flood risks below,  
the impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed 
across the globe. Residents of low income countries are often 
more vulnerable, partly because of their exposed geographic 
locations but also because they lack the resources to retrofit 
their environments to adapt or mitigate such risks. As is 
highlighted by the pie charts on the opposing page, developing 
countries emit far less carbon emissions than developed 
nations. Thus there is an inverse relationship between a 
nation’s role in accelerating climate change and its exposure  
to the environmental impacts associated with climate change. 
This can also be said of cities. With the exception of Shanghai 
and Mexico City, the urban centres that are most at risk  
tend to emit less CO2 per capita than cities in high income 
countries. Today, cities such as São Paulo and Mumbai do not 
damage the environment as severely as their more advanced 
counterparts, yet they are not able to prevent and mitigate the 
risks. The energy-intensive forms of development that cities 
of the global South are pursuing – increased car dependency, 
segregated planning, out-of-town shopping centres, reliance 
on fossil fuels and air-conditioning – will invariably increase 
pollution levels over time. 
When it comes to linking urban development to climate 
change, city dwellers are more efficient than their national 
populations. In the nine cities under investigation, only 
Shanghai and Mexico City have higher per capita CO2 
emissions than their respective nations. Well designed cities, 
which feature a dense urban fabric connected by an efficient 
public transport system, have the potential to play an 
increasingly critical role in balancing the equation between 
resource consumption and global sustainability. As long as 
sprawl is contained and the natural environment is protected, 
cities could have a positive impact on global ecology. But  
this can only be brought about through investments in green 
technologies and more energy-efficient buildings fostered  
by environmentally conscious policies, economic incentives 
and a change in lifestyles. 
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This chart shows CO₂ emissions per capita for the Urban Age cities and their respective nations. Istanbul, São Paulo and Mumbai 
(represented by emissions for residents of the State of Maharashtra), have the lowest per capita emissions compared to the very high 
levels of New York and Shanghai. Mexico City, London, Johannesburg and Berlin all have similar and relatively high per capita carbon 
emissions. However, these cities perform very differently than their respective nations. While Shanghai residents produce 250 per 
cent more emissions than the average Chinese, residents of Mumbai and New York produce only a third of the emissions of a typical 
American or Indian. London, Johannesburg, Berlin and São Paulo are also more efficient than their nations, producing just 60 per  
cent of their national per capita averages. 
These three pie charts illustrate the share of global CO₂ emissions, wealth 
and population attributed to low income countries, middle income countries 
(lower, upper) and high income countries. These four classifications have 
been determined by the World Bank according to each country’s 2008 per 
capita Gross National Product. Low income countries have a per capita GNP 
of US$ 975 or less, lower middle income countries between US$ 976 and  
US$ 3,855, upper middle income countries between US$ 3,856 and US$ 
11,905, while the per capita GNP of high income countries is greater than 
US$ 11,906. These groupings illustrate the relationships between countries 
at different stages of economic development and their impact on the 
environment. For example, while low income countries – such as Bangladesh, 
Somalia, Niger and Vietnam – make up close to a fifth of the world’s 
population, they contribute just 3 per cent of the world’s CO₂ emissions. 
Economic powerhouses such as India and China, meanwhile, belong to the 
subset of lower middle countries which contribute just under one quarter 
of the world’s wealth and over one third of global carbon emissions. The 
share of carbon emissions (16 per cent), wealth (15 per cent) and population 
(13 per cent) among upper middle income countries such as Brazil, Mexico, 
South Africa or Turkey is more proportional. Most strikingly, while half of the 
world’s population live in middle income countries (upper and lower put 
together), they emit half of the world’s CO₂ but produce less than 40 per cent 
of the world’s wealth. Not surprisingly, it is the high income countries of the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, which comprise a small 
percentage of world population and produce more than 60 per cent  
of global wealth and almost half of all CO₂ emissions. 
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The above graphic shows how the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured in billions of current US$ has changed from 1993 to 2008 
for the Urban Age cities and their nations. Data for Istanbul is available only until 2001. Then, Istanbul contributed 20 per cent of Turkey’s 
GDP and as the 2008 value has been estimated to be 22 per cent, the change between 2001 and 2008 has been interpolated. Even so, 
the economic performance of these cities mirrors that of their respective nations and the economic weight of New York and London  
is clearly visible: both produce much more than South Africa, and New York produced as much as Mexico in the late 1990s and as much 
as India in the early years of the twenty first century. Shanghai and Istanbul are by far the fastest growing economies – having overtaken 
Johannesburg and Berlin, they are now similar to that of São Paulo. Even though it has a larger population than New York, Mumbai 
produces 20 times less wealth and is faced with a much higher flood mortality rate. 
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URBAN FOOTPRINT
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ISTANBUL’S URBAN FOOTPRINT
These maps identify the built-up area, shown in grey, of nine 
world cities drawn to the same scale (200 x 200 km). They  
have been drafted using analyses of satellite images that 
capture the precise location of any built form or structure  
on the ground. They give an accurate and up-to-date account 
of the real shape of the urban footprint in these metropolitan 
regions today, offering a new perspective of settlement 
patterns across a range of global cities. 
Two phenomena immediately stand out. The first is the 
clear misalignment in some cities between the administrative 
boundaries and where the majority of people live and work, 
highlighting the fact that cities are dynamic while urban 
governance is static. As cities have grown, many municipal 
boundaries look increasingly outdated and unrepresentative 
of the functional extent of the city. While this is not the case 
for Istanbul and Shanghai, whose vast administrative 
boundaries encompass nearly all the continuous built-up 
area, most of the Urban Age cities spill out beyond their 
municipal boundaries. The extreme cases are Mexico City, 
New York City, São Paulo and Mumbai. In these four cities, 
the administrative cities contain only 44, 46, 57 and 65 per 
cent respectively of their metropolitan populations. This 
means that in Mexico City, the Mayor of Mexico DF is 
responsible for only 8.8 of the 19 million people who are  
a part of the city’s functional metropolitan region (which 
includes parts of the State of Mexico). On the other hand, 
London demonstrates the effectiveness of its ‘Green Belt’ – 
revealed by the white circle around its periphery – that has 
acted as an effective urban containment boundary for the  
last 50 years, without hampering its integration within  
the densely-populated South-East region. Berlin and 
Johannesburg also display a closer correlation between 
built-up area and municipal boundaries.
The second significant finding is the extreme variation 
in ‘land-take’ of cities in response to their geographic locations 
and differing population densities. Mumbai, with a population 
size comparable to São Paulo and Shanghai, is densely packed 
in a relatively small footprint within its natural contours 
between the Arabian Sea and the Thane Creek. São Paulo,  
on the other hand, has been able to expand horizontally along  
its high plateau, encroaching on natural features and water 
reservoirs to the South. The same pattern can be observed in 
Mexico City and in New York’s metropolitan region. Shanghai 
reveals a pattern of organic ‘satellite towns’ along radial routes 
feeding to the heart of this Asian megacity, with the bulk  
of development in central areas close to the Huang-Po River. 
Historically, Istanbul’s footprint has grown inwards from  
the European and Asian edges of the Bosporus strait and  
now covers around 16 per cent of the Province.  
  ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
 ADMINISTRATIVE CITY 
(KM2)
% BUILT-UP AREA METROPOLITAN REGION 
(KM2)
% BUILT-UP AREA
ISTANBUL 39  ilçe 5,343 16% 5,343 16%
NEW YORK 5 boroughs 833 88% 27,065 13%
SHANGHAI 18 districts 6,341 18% 6,341 18%
LONDON* 33 boroughs 1,572 53% 28,030 7%
MEXICO CITY 16 delegaciones 1,484 36% 4,979 25%
JOHANNESBURG* 11 regions 1,644 18% 17,010 5%
BERLIN 12 bezirke 892 38% 5,370 11%
MUMBAI 24 wards 438 53% 4,355 15%
SÃO PAULO 31 subprefeituras 1,525 56% 7,944 21%
BUILT-UP AREA
Pre-fteenth century Nineteenth century 1950
1970 1990 2000
These graphics show how Istanbul’s built-up area has 
expanded from the pre-fifteenth century up to 2000. In  
the late Ottoman era, the city started to develop from the 
historical peninsula on the Bosporus. By 1950, the built-up 
area expanded along the East-West axis, covering most of the 
Marmara Sea’s coast on the Anatolian side. Between 1950 and 
1970, the first wave of large-scale migration brought with it 
gecekondu (informal) settlements occupying large areas on 
the peripheries. Industrial development continued to promote 
migration, and by 1990, the forest and water reservoirs began 
to be threatened by uncontrolled development, further fuelled 
by the opening of two bridges spanning the Bosporus. In 
2000, the built-up area spread even further outwards on the 
European and Asian sides. A significant portion of this recent 
expansion can either be tied to the development of gated 
communities for the wealthiest of the city’s population or  
to mass housing for its middle classes. 
* London and Johannesburg do not have corresponding metropolitan regions and are instead represented in relation to the South East of England and Gauteng Province.
Istanbul provincial boundaryBuilt-up area 
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SÃO PAULO
São Paulo’s city government is led by a directly elected mayor, 
and São Paulo State is led by a directly elected governor. The 
mismatch between São Paulo’s municipal boundaries and the 
extent of the city requires these two levels to work very closely 
together. In terms of transport, the city government controls part 
of the urban transport system while the state is responsible for 
integrated transport planning across the metropolitan region. 
With respect to housing, both levels have housing enterprises 
with specific responsibilities. As concerns security, the military 
and civilian police forces fall under the State’s authority, while 
the city maintains a local police force. In the field of education, 
responsibilities are divided between the state and the city 
governments, while an institutionalised management structure 
exists for health care that distributes responsibilities among 
federal, state and local governments. A third, decentralised level 
also exists under the municipality: 31 subprefeituras are the main 
point of contact for the population. They manage local public 
services and have some planning and transport responsibilities. 
GOVERNING CITIES
ISTANBUL
Istanbul’s government functions within a unitary national framework  
with ‘federal’ ministries, based in the capital Ankara, providing health 
care, primary education, policing, some housing and transport, among 
others, in the city. The ministries’ involvement in city affairs is coordinated 
by a governor, who is directly appointed by central government. Some 
central governmental bodies such as the Mass Housing Administration 
have direct links to the Prime Minister, while the Transport Ministry’s 
involvement in Istanbul is coordinated by the Governor of Istanbul. One of 
the most important political figures in Turkey is the Metropolitan Mayor of 
the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM), who is directly elected by  
the city’s population for a five-year term and shares executive power with 
a Municipal Council formed by selected members of the city’s 39 District 
Municipalities and their District Mayors. District Mayors are also directly 
elected and lead the District Municipalities. The IMM enjoys extensive 
powers and a significant budget for citywide planning, transport, housing 
and environmental services, among others.
The governance of Istanbul does not, however, happen only at the 
municipal and central levels. Partly to comply with the European Union 
accession process, Turkey recently created the Istanbul Development 
Agency, one of 26 regional bodies assisting coordination between the 
municipal and central bodies as well as civic institutions for budgeting  
and planning of large-scale urban projects. In addition, there are provincial 
authorities for each of Turkey’s cities which have significant areas of 
responsibility, including masterplanning, although in Istanbul this 
responsibility has been transferred to the IMM. 
In 2004, the IMM’s administrative boundaries were extended 
to coincide with the larger provincial boundary. The administrative 
boundary increased threefold, from an area of 1,831 km2 to 5,343 km2, 
one of the largest municipal footprints in the world. As a consequence of 
this boundary overlap between the Provincial authority and the IMM, the 
Metropolitan Mayor’s power has increased considerably while the powers 
of the Provincial Special Authority have been reduced.
In an effort to enhance coordination between the various departments 
of the Metropolitan Municipality to help develop the city’s masterplan, 
the Mayor set up the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Design Centre 
(IMP) in 2005. The IMP was established through funding from BIMTAS, 
a public private partnership that serves as an affiliate company of the 
Metropolitan Municipality. Initially consisting of 400 experts, academics 
and key municipal members, the IMP has reduced in size in recent years.
At the local level, the administrative geography of the Istanbul 
province was rearranged in 2008 to have a single level of subdivisions or 
districts (ilçe). The number of districts has increased to 39 through the 
consolidation of 41 first-level municipalities into eight new districts and  
the merging of the former district of Eminönü into Fatih (now the only 
local district authority exerting power over the entire historical peninsula).
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NEW YORK
New York City’s government operates within a legislative framework 
determined at state level (the Federal State of New York). Federal 
government in the United States has no direct powers to direct or 
legislate for the actions of individual cities, though federal agencies 
operate in all parts of the country. However, the state level of 
government is important both as a legislator and because of its powers 
of budgetary supervision. The state also runs the major transport 
systems, is co-owner of the city’s airports and oversees some elements 
of the city’s economic development. Within this framework, the city is 
powerful by international standards: the Mayor of New York is one of 
the most important elected officials in the United States. Even so, local 
legislation is the responsibility of the City Council. New York City 
government is responsible for public education, public hospitals, social 
care, the environment, planning and some local transport. There are 
five boroughs, each headed by an elected Borough President which has 
rights to be consulted though they provide no services. There are also 
59 Community Boards which provide advocacy for neighbourhoods. 
These five charts are illustrative indications of how government structures are organised in Istanbul, São Paulo, New York, London and Mumbai. They are 
designed to give a crude impression of how the basic responsibilities are organised within each of these cities, identifying some of the key functions carried 
out at central, state and local government level. While they offer a useful comparative overview, they are not intended to give an accurate account of the 
detailed systems of accountability, which can only be explained comprehensively on a case-by-case basis.
MUMBAI
Mumbai’s government involves interventions at national, the state of 
Maharashtra, and local levels. The national government has a number 
of powerful departments that provide services and resources for the 
city. There is a significant level of state government, headed by a Chief 
Minister, which operates many services within the city, including 
roads, housing, education, health care, environmental services and 
policing. The city government is headed by an elected mayor with 
limited power. The real executive power lies in the hands of the 
Municipal Commissioner and the Secretary for Special Projects, both 
civil servants appointed directly by the Maharashtra State government. 
The state government has constituted a Metropolitan Planning 
Committee for the Metropolitan Area as required by the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). There is 
significant overlap between responsibilities at state and city levels. 
Overall, the city government is relatively less powerful than the state,  
as required by the JNNURM. 
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LONDON
London’s government operates within a relatively centralised, unitary 
state. Several central departments have responsibilities within the city, 
including health care, the regulation of commuter railways and as final 
arbiter for major planning decisions. Central government also has a 
number of regulatory powers over the mayor and the city’s boroughs. 
The Mayor of London is the elected executive for a number of major 
city-wide services, notably public transport and spatial planning. The 
mayor is overseen by an elected, non-legislative assembly. There are 
also 32 elected borough councils whose responsibilities include schools, 
social care, the environment, local transport and local planning. The 
City of London, the UK capital’s financial and business hub, has the 
powers of a borough but also several additional responsibilities. The 
government of London has been reformed on several occasions since 
the late-nineteenth century, most recently in 2000 to allow Londoners 
to vote for a mayor for the first time in their history. 
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DENSITY
Urban density is illustrated below in terms of the number  
of people living in each km2 of a 100 x 100 km urban area. 
Density is largely driven by topographical constraints and  
the location of public transport and other infrastructure,  
but also by each city’s inherited traditions of urban planning 
and development. While high density is sometimes associated 
exclusively with poor and overcrowded urban environments, 
it can also enable a higher quality of life and reduce the 
environmental impact of cities by facilitating walking and 
cycling. In doing so, high density urban areas can enhance a 
city’s vitality and make the provision of public transport and 
other amenities more viable. 
Urban Age cities demonstrate a wide range of differing 
density patterns – from the very high densities in the centres 
of Mumbai and Shanghai to the much lower density 
development patterns of Berlin and London. Johannesburg 
shows limited areas of high density set around a downtown 
that no longer has a residential population, in the midst of a 
very low-density sprawl. The pattern displayed by New York, 
on the other hand, shows how the constraints of waterways 
drive densities that rise to a ‘spike’ in Manhattan and parts  
of the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens, while the rest of the 
metropolitan region has a lower density.
São Paulo is multi-centred and similar in its overall 
density pattern to Mexico City. This is a striking comparison 
given that the two cities are very different in terms of their 
urban form − São Paulo’s skyline is dominated by high-rise 
apartment blocks, while Mexico City’s is consistently 
low-rise. It proves that urban form and density are different 
concepts. Furthermore, their similar density profiles shows 
how high-rise buildings do not necessarily create higher 
density in comparison to more tightly planned low-rise 
development, especially when individual towers are 
surrounded by large areas of motorways or unused space.
In Istanbul, density levels are high, particularly when 
compared to other European cities. The city’s peak density  
of 68,602 people per km2 is well above Manhattan’s extreme, 
and the average within a radius of 10 km is at least 30 per cent 
higher than that of any of the other American and European 
Urban Age cities. Istanbul also displays a distinct difference 
between the European and Asian sides: while density levels 
on the European side vary considerably – the highest and  
also some of the lowest densities within the built-up area can 
be found here – the Asian side is much more homogeneous 
and is dominated by mid-range densities around 20,000 
people per km2. 
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The line graph above shows how density levels change from the peaks in the 
city centre as one moves outwards towards the periphery. It highlights the 
differences that exist in terms of density patterns in four major cities. While  
New York and Istanbul both exhibit a rapid decrease in density as one reaches  
a distance of 10 km from the city centre, density levels in London and São Paulo 
decrease more gradually. São Paulo is the city in which density levels remain 
the most constant, reaching half their maximum value around 25 km from the 
centre, while in New York and Istanbul this occurs at a distance of roughly 15 km 
from the city centre.
All Urban Age cities have a higher Human Development Index (HDI) than 
their national hinterlands. The HDI score combines life expectancy, literacy 
rate, educational enrolment ratio with its per capita Gross Domestic Product 
to provide a snapshot of the quality of life in each city. London, New York and 
Berlin have the highest scores, followed by Mexico City, Shanghai and São 
Paulo. Johannesburg and Shanghai show the largest gains over their national 
averages, while living conditions in Berlin are roughly identical to the German 
average. Istanbul’s relatively low HDI can partly be attributed to a significant 
gender inequality for education levels in Turkey – while the adult literacy 
rate for men is 95.3, it is only 79.6 for women. This data highlights that there 
is no direct relationship between a city’s density and its quality of life. While 
Mumbai has the highest density and the lowest HDI score, New York City 
proves that high density and high quality of life are not mutually exclusive.
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Population Density (people/km2)
SHANGHAI PEAK 96,200 pp/km2
MEXICO CITY PEAK 48,300 pp/km2
JOHANNESBURG PEAK 38,500 pp/km2
ISTANBUL PEAK 68,602 pp/km2
NEW YORK CITY PEAK 53,000 pp/km2
BERLIN PEAK 21,700 pp/km2
SÃO PAULO PEAK 29,380 pp/km2
LONDON PEAK 17,200 pp/km2
0 – 1,000 
1,000 – 5,000
5,000 –10,000
10,000 –20,000
20,000 and over
MUMBAI PEAK 101,066 pp/km2
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TRANSPORT AND MOBILITY
Transport infrastructure is a critical driver of urban form, 
enabling centralisation of economic functions and the 
accommodation of a growing population along metropolitan 
rail and bus routes. Where public transport infrastructure 
is not in place, space-hungry motorways dominate, usually 
resulting in more sprawling forms of development and 
congestion as private car use persistently runs ahead of 
road building. The Urban Age cities offer varying levels of 
transport infrastructure. The most extensive metro systems 
have been put in place in London, New York and Berlin, while 
Istanbul, São Paulo and Shanghai have the smallest public 
transport network of the nine cities under investigation, 
leaving many areas without any access to either rail or metro. 
In Istanbul, construction is currently underway to expand 
the existing 76 km-long metro network to 231 km by 2015 
– although funding to complete this construction is not yet 
secured. At the same time, 9 km has recently been added to 
the Metrobus (BRT) to increase the system’s total length to 
50 km. The city’s BRT opened in 2007 and operates along a 
dedicated lane crossing the Bosporus Bridge between Avcılar 
on the European side, to Kadıköy on the Anatolian side. The 
extension will continue the BRT from Avcılar to Beylikdüzü 
on the European side and is expected to increase the current 
daily use to 1,170,000 passengers per day.
How people travel within cities – the ‘modal split’ – 
reflects the public transport infrastructure in place, but 
also local economic development, climate and urban form. 
Walking dominates as a form of transport not only in cities 
designed to be pedestrian-friendly, but also as a result of 
proximities created by high levels of urban density or when 
access to public transport and private motorised modes is 
limited. Therefore walking accounts for a massive 56 per cent 
of journeys in Mumbai, 45 per cent in Istanbul and around  
30 per cent of journeys in Johannesburg and Shanghai. 
Walking also accounts for a relatively high modal share in 
London and Berlin (20 and 25 per cent respectively). 
Cycling, on the other hand, is only a significant mode of 
transport in Shanghai (25 per cent) and Berlin (10 per cent).  
In all other cities, it accounts for less than 2 per cent of trips.
Around 40 per cent of residents in New York’s midtown 
Manhattan walk to work and over 90 per cent of affluent 
business workers use public transport in journeying to 
London’s financial hub. Shanghai has experienced rapid 
growth in public transport use, while cycling remains 
prevalent. Although Berlin has high rates of cycling, its 
relatively uncongested roads allow high levels of car use – 
despite the presence of a high-quality public transport system. 
In some other cities, even where there is a good metro system 
like that of Mexico City’s, informal transport by mini-bus 
often dominates, reflecting a mismatch between commuting 
patterns and infrastructure as well as the relatively high cost 
of public transport. 
The figures above refer to the ticket prices for a similar one-way metro 
journey in each of the Urban Age cities. London has by far the most 
expensive metro ticket (US$ 7.4): in Mumbai and Mexico City, the cost of a 
ticket is 37 times cheaper, reflecting the importance of the metro systems  
as an inclusive mode of transport there. Prices range from US$ 1.0 to US$ 1.4 
in Istanbul, Shanghai and São Paulo, while in New York and Berlin they are 
US$ 2.3 and US$ 4.1 respectively.
Road deaths per 100,000 residents are extremely high in Mexico City 
(29) and Johannesburg (26). They are lowest in London, Berlin, Shanghai, 
Istanbul, New York and Mumbai, with figures ranging between 1 and 4.4. 
São Paulo falls between these two extremes with 14 fatalities per 100,000. 
With the exception of Mexico City, road fatalities are lower than the  
national average in all cities.
The above chart shows car ownership expressed as the number of cars  
per 1,000 residents in each city. The data for Johannesburg refers to the 
Gauteng Province. Mumbai, Shanghai and Istanbul have the lowest levels  
of car ownership with 36, 73 and 139 cars per 1,000 residents respectively. 
This is in stark contrast to 368 in São Paulo, 360 in Mexico City, 345 in  
London and 319 in Berlin. 
Besides metro systems – most developed in mature cities such as Berlin, 
London and New York – regional rail is a significant component of rail 
transport in the nine cities. The estimated GIS figures for the regional rail 
network of each city within a 70 x 70 km area emphasise the extensive 
amount of rail infrastructure in London and significant levels in Berlin, 
Johannesburg, New York and Mumbai.
METRO TICKET PRICE (US$)
ROAD FATALITIES CAR OWNERSHIP SYSTEM LENGTH (KM)
PUBLIC TRANSPORT WALKING CYCLING PRIVATE MOTORISED
ISTANBUL 41% 45% n/a 14%
NEW YORK 56% 11% 1% 30%
SHANGHAI 19% 29% 25% 22%
LONDON 37% 20% 2% 40%
MEXICO CITY 79% n/a n/a 16%
JOHANNESBURG 32% 31% <1% 37%
BERLIN 27% 25% 10% 37%
MUMBAI 36% 56% 1% 5%
SÃO PAULO 32% 33% 1% 29%
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URBAN WORKFORCE
Nineteenth-century urbanisation was originally a by-product 
of the Industrial Revolution. Cities are now at the forefront of 
a new transformation: the shift to a knowledge-based service 
economy. The nine Urban Age cities are at different stages of 
this transition. The employment figures presented here show 
that London and New York are the cities that have advanced 
the furthest towards this economic transformation, although 
neither city has an economy based exclusively on financial and 
business services; retail, leisure, social and personal services 
continue to be major sources of employment in both cities.
Most of the other Urban Age cities retain 10 to 20 per 
cent of their secondary sector employment – dominated by 
manufacturing, industry, and construction. In some cases, 
a small agricultural sector also remains. Istanbul’s situation 
closely mirrors that of Shanghai − both cities have retained an 
extensive manufacturing base (38 and 35 per cent respectively). 
With respect to the other Urban Age cities, this difference 
originates from the fact that they are municipalities as well 
as provinces with large territories (usually in the periphery) 
where manufacturing and agricultural activities dominate. 
The shift towards a service-based economy has far-
reaching implications for urban government. Office 
development has created new urban districts often away  
from the traditional city centre, as is the case in London 
(Canary Wharf), Mexico City (Santa Fe) and Johannesburg. 
In some cases, these new developments have been criticised 
for their sterile quality as well as their lack of public 
infrastructure, for engendering social segregation, and 
for draining life from the traditional central business districts.
The success of an urban economy is ultimately determined 
by its level of inclusion. A city that features high levels of 
unemployment within delimited sections of its built-up area 
will expose itself to the pernicious effects of unequal life 
chances and relative deprivation. The provision of effective 
social systems and universal education and healthcare 
are therefore essential elements for fostering a successful 
and inclusive urban economy. Without these, cities may 
increasingly operate two parallel economies: one populated  
by a highly mobile, highly educated elite; the other dominated 
by people who lack the skills to share in the prosperity that  
the knowledge economy can bring. 
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The graphics above show the distribution of the population in Istanbul, New York and London in age groups and 
gender. Istanbul’s population is mostly dominated by people  below the age of 30, with those aged 20-29 years old 
representing close to 20 per cent of the overall population. In New York and London, by contrast, just 40 per cent 
and 41 per cent respectively are under 30 years of age. The similarities extend also to the elderly: around 16 per cent 
of the populations of London and New York are above 60 years of age, versus 8 per cent in Istanbul.
New York, London and Istanbul demonstrate varied distributions of jobs across their urban terrains, with 
unemployment often connected to areas of relative social exclusion and urban decay. London presents high 
unemployment rates in its older industrial core relatively close to the centre while New York’s more complex pattern 
can be explained by economic restructuring and residential segregation. Istanbul’s configuration of unemployment 
is characterised by much higher overall unemployment numbers. Low unemployment is clustered along certain 
segments of the coastlines while pockets of very high unemployment can be found in some neighbourhoods of  
the core areas of Beyoğlu and Fatih.
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ISTANBUL
For some 2,500 years, Istanbul has developed and  
re-developed itself, creating a city of multiple layers which  
are sometimes complementary and sometimes dissonant  
in response to its dramatic vertical topography and varied 
terrain along both side of the Bosporus Straits. Following  
the decision to make Ankara the national capital in 1923, 
Istanbul suffered a major decline in population and would 
not reach the one million mark again until the 1950s. 
Since then, the population has increased twelve-fold, 
creating a city of new typologies, new densities and new 
urban geographies. Rapid urbanisation brought with it the 
challenge of combining integrated planning with a careful 
consideration of both the city’s traditional delicate urban 
grain and the natural resources that have been supplying the 
city throughout its long history, including its busy waterways. 
The construction of two bridges over the Bosporus provided 
an opportunity to further integrate the two continents, but 
also allowed for an unprecedented intensity of residential 
development – both informal and formalised. Similar 
concerns have surrounded the debate over the construction 
of a third bridge, publically announced by the Mayor in late 
August 2009. The graphic below illustrates the complexity 
of some of these challenges by depicting interweaving 
but varied urban typologies (informal settlements and 
gated communities) with the city’s vital natural resources, 
historical monuments and green spaces.
More than many other global cities, Istanbul is a city 
of extreme typological variation, as can be seen in the 
aerial photographs on the opposite page. A regular street 
grid layout dominates the traditional grain in the Pangaltı 
district, where a strong sense of neighbourhood community 
pervades, albeit without the former mix of Muslim and non-
Muslim populations. Tarlabaşı offers a much more complex 
spatial picture; formerly the heart of the Pera district, it was 
cut off from its surroundings in Beyoğlu by the creation 
of the major Tarlabaşı Boulevard in 1980s. Since then, 
its houses, once occupied by the Greek community, have 
decayed through neglect or overcrowding, creating a pocket 
of urban deprivation cheek-by-jowl with Taksim Square  
and the city centre.
The Anatolian side offered a vast amount of unspoilt 
land before it was opened to development as a result of 
new planning regimes and the construction of two bridges 
over the Bosporus, in 1973 and 1988. Many of the newer 
typologies of high-end luxury houses and gated communities 
started spreading on the hills immediately behind the well-
conserved Bosporus shores. Although only about 10 per 
cent of the population commute daily over the bridges, new 
residences such as the ones in the hills of Anadolu Kavağı 
provide a higher quality of life for those with the means to 
commute between work and home. Gecekondu settlements 
sprouted in large parts of the city, many near the industrial 
sites along the Marmara Sea, such as Gülensu in the  
Maltepe district on the Anatolian side.
Green
Informal settlement
Gated community
Historical monument
Conservation area
Water
Istanbul municipality
Built-up area
Bridge (existing)
Bridge (in discussion)
2
3
41
5
URBAN AGE CITY DATA  35
URBAN AGE ISTANBUL CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 2009
1   PANGALTI
2   TARLABASI
3   FATIH SULTAN MEHMET (2ND) BRIDGE
4   ANADOLU KAVAGI˘
5  GÜLENSU
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The layout of streets, buildings and spaces form the spatial 
DNA of urban growth, the patterns through which city life 
can develop and cities can grow. These spatial arrangements 
are critical to the liveability of cities, to the quality of life  
that they can offer their residents, to the density that they 
can accommodate, and to their flexibility in adapting to 
change and growth.
The images presented here help to visualise the micro-
structure of urban neighbourhoods, how buildings (in 
black) and open spaces (in white) come together to create an 
integrated urban whole. The maps presented here illustrate 
the relationship between urban form and density in Istanbul 
in three neighbourhoods – high density, mid-level density 
and low-density – each covering one km2. 
The first neighbourhood is Nenehatun in the Esenler 
district, located on the European side and boasting the city’s 
peak density (68,602 people per km2). With a population 
of over half a million, the district was settled between the  
1960s and the 1990s and is composed of densely packed  
five- to six-storey apartment blocks. 
The second neighbourhood is Çukurcuma in the Beyoğlu 
district on the European side. Separated from the old city  
by the Golden Horn, this district is the arts, entertainment 
and night-life centre of Istanbul. It is home to a quarter  
of a million inhabitants, features a density of 23,383 people  
per km2 and is mostly composed of historical city blocks.
The third neighbourhood is Acarkent in the Beykoz 
district, a low-density area in the north-western reaches 
on the Anatolian side. A newly developed residential area,  
it features rows of identical detached single-family homes 
with swimming pools and gardens. At 1,320 people per km2, 
its urban fabric is 18 times less dense than Çukurcuma and  
52 times less dense than Nenehatun.
URBAN GRAIN
1 2
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1  NENEHATUN ESENLER 68,602 pp/km2
2   ÇUKURCUMA BEYOGLU 23,383 pp/km2˘
3  ACARKENT BEYKOZ 1,320 pp/km2
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REGIONAL CONTEXT
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•  1,000 per cent population increase since 1950, the highest of the OECD’s 
78 metro-cities.
•  12.7 million people in the area governed by IMM (Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality), over 15 million in the metropolitan region. 
•  Net migration rate has slowed from 10.76 per cent in 1990 to 0.2 per 
cent in 2008, compared to a 1.57 per cent projected growth rate  
between 2008 and 2023.
•  Main internal immigration is from the Black Sea and the middle and 
south-eastern Anatolian regions.
•  Istanbul has the highest residential density in Europe: 68,602 people/km² 
peak density; 20,116 people/km² central area density.
•  The city is run by the IMM (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), with a 
directly elected mayor.
•  27 per cent of national GDP, 38 per cent of national industrial output, 
more than 50 per cent of national service output and 40 per cent of 
national tax revenues come from the functional metropolitan region.
• 50 per cent higher productivity than the national average.
• 60 per cent of Turkey’s total trade goes through Istanbul.
• 11.2 per cent unemployment rate in 2008.
•  60 per cent of the population works in the service sector.
•  30 per cent of the population works informally.
•   37 per cent of the population works in manufacturing, producing 
80 per cent of the city’s exports.
•  50 per cent of housing is or was informal.
•  99 per cent of the population has access to municipal services. 
•   6.4 m² of green space per person in the province, compared to 
London’s 26.9 m², New York’s 29.1 m² and Stockholm’s 87.5 m² but  
only 1 m² of green space per person within the central built-up area.
•   2.72 tonnes of carbon emission and 383 kg of waste produced per 
person per year.
•   2,267 kWh of electricity and 56,575 litres of water consumed per 
person per year.
•   148.2 km of rail, with a further 160 km due in 2015, in the core of 
Istanbul province.
•   138.5 cars per 1,000 people in Istanbul, 45 per cent of the population 
walks; average commuting time of 48 minutes.
•   3 murders per 100,000 people but 44 per cent of the population 
is concerned about security and crime. 
•   Turkey is among the top five fastest growing OECD economies between 
2000 to 2008 (measured by GDP at Purchasing Power Parity) alongside 
Slovakia, Ireland, Norway and Spain.
•   24 per cent of the national population worked in agriculture in 2008, 
producing 8 per cent of national GDP.
•   27 per cent of the national population worked in manufacturing and 
construction in 2008, producing 24 per cent of national GDP. 
•   50 per cent of the national population worked in services in 2008, 
producing 58 per cent of national GDP.
•   Differences in growth rates among regions in the same country were 
larger than 6 percentage points in Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Greece and 
the United Kingdom, suggesting that national performance has been 
driven by the dynamism of a limited number of local regions. Between 
1995 and 2005 Turkey had the largest regional differences in GDP growth 
of all OECD countries.
•   Like Greece and Portugal, 10 per cent of the regions with the highest 
output contributed to over half or more of the national GDP.
•   Turkey has by far the greatest specialisation in construction industry in 
the OECD countries, followed by Mexico, Germany, France and the UK.
•   95 cars per 1,000 people, the lowest private car ownership rate of all 
the OECD countries.
The map above shows Istanbul in its regional context, highlighting all cities  
of over a million inhabitants and showing Turkey’s trade relationships with other 
countries in the region. Istanbul is among the top five largest cities in the region, 
with all of the other major cities to its east. With the exception of Iran, Turkey 
does not have significant trade relationships with its immediate neighbours:  
its major trading partners are Russia, Germany, China, Italy and the United States.
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This data is drawn from the OECD International Reviews: Istanbul, Turkey and other Urban Age Research.
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As part of the 2009 research, Urban Age again commissioned Ipsos, the global research company, to undertake a survey about 
quality of life in Istanbul to look at what residents really think. Ben Page, Luci Oliveira, Özlem Bulut, Burak Evren and 
Burçin Bakkalog˘lu highlight the survey’s major findings, and place it in a comparative context with Ipsos' previous studies for 
Urban Age in London and São Paulo.
Located in a dynamic emerging market economy, Istanbul  
is the economic and financial heart of one of the world’s 20 
largest economies. A modern megacity, full of contrasts, it 
has had rapid growth with relatively little effective planning, 
bringing major problems – high unemployment, an 
increasing informal sector economy, uncontrolled and  
illegal land occupation, the spread of slums, bad transport 
congestion, and air and water pollution. We are talking about 
Istanbul, but could well be talking about São Paulo, or indeed 
Mumbai. Despite Istanbul being over two millennia old, 
whereas São Paolo was essentially shaped in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, it is more similar to São Paulo than  
to many other European or Middle Eastern cities in terms of 
its social, economic and urban development. Both cities are 
located in countries that have similar positions in most of 
economic and social indicators: HDI (Human Development 
Index), life expectancy, adult literacy rates, unemployment 
and poverty. Is Istanbul also more similar to São Paulo than 
to London on most of the indicators in quality of life and in 
people’s perceptions of the urban environment? 
In terms of income inequality Istanbul is in a much better 
position than São Paulo. The Gini coefficient for Istanbul is 
0.43, while for São Paulo it is 0.61 – one of the highest levels of 
inequality in the world. In terms of economic development, 
São Paulo does better; it is considered the 19th richest city in 
the world in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity – 
London occupies the 6th position, and Istanbul the 34th.
The present survey lets us put this raw data in the context 
of citizens’ views, priorities and expectations on key quality 
of life issues, letting us compare how citizens living in three 
major cities of the world experience their city. Overall, 
Londoners are more satisfied with their city than people in 
Istanbul or São Paulo. Given that we find a strong correlation 
between income and perceived quality of life, this is perhaps 
to be expected, although it also reminds us that other things 
matter too, including inequality and physical capital. When 
we look at what citizens see as the best and worst things in 
each city, we get many clues as to why Istanbul scores closer 
to São Paulo than to London. 
In all three cities the top best aspects include job 
opportunities and education. For Paulistanos and Londoners, 
the range of shops comes as a third mention. In contrast, for 
people in Istanbul, heath services are mentioned more often 
as a key strength of the city.
Among the worst features of the cities, we find a single 
common worry everywhere: crime, with remarkably similar 
levels of concern, despite vastly different crime rates. Istanbul 
and London also identify other major problems, like traffic 
and the cost of living. 
Traffic congestion stands out as a major issue in Istanbul, 
in contrast to São Paulo, where thousands of people stay stuck 
in traffic jams and waste hours every day, but seem to have 
accepted the problem whereas in Istanbul it is felt intensely. 
Istanbul’s geography may explain the difference – there are 
only two bridges to cross from the eastern to the western side. 
The OECD estimates that more than 380.000 vehicles cross 
the Strait every day – while the designed capacity of the 
bridges is only 270.000 vehicles per day.
It is interesting to note how diversity and migration are 
reflected in people’s perceptions of their city. In London,  
32 per cent see ethnic diversity as one of the most exciting 
aspects of the city. In more homogeneous Istanbul, 8 per cent 
consider it to be a bad aspect while only 3 per cent see it as 
good – a surprising fact for a city that has recently been 
nominated the 2010 European Capital of Culture. When it 
comes to things that would improve the quality of life, major 
differences can be found between the three cities. By some 
margin, education stands out as an issue for Istanbul in a  
way that is not visible elsewhere. Similarly there is a major 
concern over environmental issues for Istanbul’s inhabitants 
– partly linked the threat of natural disasters, like the risk of 
earthquakes. In contrast, in São Paulo all the top issues are 
related to the social dimension: crime, health care and 
education, whereas Londoners prioritise both the economic 
(housing price), social (crime) and physical (traffic).
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uK tuRKEY bRaZil 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Rank 6 ($2,168 billion) Rank 15 ($886 billion) Rank 9 ($1,845 billion) 
GDP per capita Rank 19 ($35,601) Rank 62 ($12,865) Rank 80 ($9,747)
Unemployment rate 5.30% 10.30% 8.20%
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 3.60% 10.40% 5.70%
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank 21 (0.942) Rank 76 (0.798) Rank 70 (0.807)
Life expectancy at birth (years) Rank 18 (79.2) Rank 87 (71.6) Rank 81 (72)
Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and over) - Rank 99 (88.1) Rank 95 (89.6)
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Level of governance to address  
climate change
Concern for climate change according  
to education levels
EnViROnMEnt
The survey results point to a clear environmental concern 
in Istanbul's population – almost twice as many people 
think that efforts to protect the environment are needed to 
improve quality of life than in London. This may be caused 
by the fact that 57 per cent of the respondents are aware  
of the effects of climate change on their city. In terms of 
environmental concerns, water shortages come in a strong 
first position, with 81 per cent of the responses. Fears of 
desertification, extreme humidity and heat waves follow 
with 68, 63 and 54 per cent respectively. These concerns 
seem to originate from a desire to keep future generations 
safe from environmental disasters: 88 per cent of the 
respondents are concerned that the lives of their children 
and grandchildren will be threatened by the effects of 
climate change. Close to three quarters are also concerned 
about environmental threats to their own health. Concern 
for the environment increases with the respondents’ 
education levels: 87 per cent of those with a higher 
education are concerned about the environment while this 
figure falls to 54 per cent among those who do not have any 
education. Things are less clear-cut when looking at how to 
address climate change. No level of government is singled 
out as having the highest degree of responsibility. 
Moreover, there seems to be a mismatch between the 
policies that are advocated to address climate change and 
the actions that are being undertaken to mitigate it, a fact 
that needs taking into account in future debates about 
climate change and urban policies. While 76 per cent of 
respondents believe that switching to solar energy is the 
most sensible policy to address climate change, only 11 per 
cent have switched to a renewable energy provider and only 
9 per cent use a renewable energy source. Surprisingly, only 
27 per cent believe that it is a sensible policy to regulate 
energy consumption, while 72 per cent of the respondents 
have already reduced their energy consumption. 
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This graphic juxtaposes the answers from the survey with answers to 
the same question in a Eurobarometer survey of the population of the 
27 EU countries entitled ‘Europeans' attitudes towards climate change’. 
While the top three actions are the same in both surveys, citizens of 
the EU27 countries mostly recycle their waste, while Istanbul residents 
mostly reduce their consumption of water and energy.
The level of concern over environmental issues is quite staggering in 
Istanbul, ranging from fears of increasing water shortages to fears of 
increased inequality or ethnic and religious tensions. Moreover, there 
are also concerns that climate change can very negatively affect quality 
of life – as exemplified by concerns over humidity level increases, the 
spread of diseases, the loss of cultural heritage or unusual weather.
Switching to solar energy is considered the most sensible policy that can 
be implemented in order to address climate change. Education comes in 
second, paralleling its importance as a measure to improve quality of life 
in the city. It also seems to indicate that some respondents believe that 
current environmental problems can be attributed to people who are 
not aware of the environmental impacts of their actions. Respondents 
view regulation – be it of energy markets, energy consumption or 
consumer behaviour – as an important tool to address climate change. 
Finally, the environmental impact of unsustainable forms of transport is 
recognised, with calls to reduce car use and promote cycling.
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Trips to main daily activities by gender
0
20
40
60
Library
M
in
ut
es
Ist
an
bu
l
Sã
o P
au
lo
Actual
Accepted
Cinema Public
Oces
Hospital Museum Shopping
 Centre
Theatre Park
23
32
20
14
17
15
22
24
15 15
22
30
13
16
23
40
54
30
19
32
13
19
27
41
18
24
12
31
10
19
20
27
Invest in underground transport systems
Expand metrobus routes
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Return travel times to main daily destinations
In the past, most surveys of the way people move in cities focused only 
on motorised transport and tended to assume that journeys occur by 
only one mode of transport. This survey allowed for more specific and 
dynamic information about the main daily journey and it captures the 
multiplicity of different means of transport used by those surveyed. 
More than half of the interviewees only walk to their main daily 
destination while only 10 per cent of them only use the car.
One mode
Multiple modes
Other only
8.4%
Multi-modal
4.6%
Walking and 
dolmuş
5.9%
Bus only
2%
Car only
10.1%
Walking only
50.5%
Walking 
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11.4%
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and other
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Means of travelThe public view on solving the transport problems
A majority of those surveyed would prioritise the expansion of the 
metro and metrobus network. Only 3 per cent of the interviewees  
think that building the third bridge would improve the traffic situation.
Almost 70 per cent of the interviewees in Istanbul spend less than an hour in their daily commute to their 
main destination, while this figure is only 46 per cent in São Paulo. Only 7 per cent of the interviewees in 
Istanbul commute more than two hours, while close to 30 per cent do so in São Paulo.
Average return travel times to main destinations are lower the more people accomplish these by 
walking. In both cities, a small percentage of people are looking for a job or visiting health care 
facilities but their return travels times are very high.
Travel times to key destinations 
Average return travel times to main daily activities
For all urban destinations above in Istanbul and São Paulo, actual 
average travel times exceed the acceptable levels. Travel times – both 
actual and accepted – are lower in Istanbul for all key destinations. 
Close to half the men interviewed said that their workplace was their main 
daily destination, while this figure is only 13 per cent for the women, a majority 
of which go shopping or run personal errands in their daily routines.
tRansPORt
Traffic and transport congestion is one of the strongest 
characteristics of all megacities. But this is especially true 
when comparing Istanbul and São Paulo – Paulistanos 
would feel at home when driving in Istanbul and vice versa. 
But, as we saw earlier, Sampa residents seem rather more 
stoical – people are much more disturbed by traffic in 
Istanbul than they are in São Paulo. If traffic congestion  
is the same, public transport is quite different. It seems to 
work much better in Istanbul than in São Paulo – reflected 
in the satisfaction rates. But despite their anxiety about 
traffic, people in Istanbul would not think twice about 
buying a car if they could afford to: 80 per cent of non car 
owners would do it (as would 83 per cent in São Paulo). 
Another difference is the support for policies designed to 
promote more sustainable modes of transport and the 
reduction of the use of private cars. Perhaps reflecting 
better public transport and more anxiety about congestion, 
83 per cent of people in Istanbul say they would support  
a policy to reduce the use of private cars, encouraging the 
use of public transportation, cycling and walking – against 
73 per cent in São Paulo. In Istanbul 60 per cent of people 
would cycle if appropriate roads existed; 54 per cent in São 
Paulo would do the same. When we compare the position 
of car owners in both countries 62 per cent say they would 
use their car less if public transport was a better option in 
Istanbul, and 80 per cent say the same in Brazil. In Istanbul 
better public transport means it is faster, less crowded and 
more comfortable. To improve traffic conditions the top 
two solutions in both São Paulo and Istanbul are the same: 
investment in the subway system and expansion of bus 
corridors in the city. Generally, Istanbul residents are more 
supportive of a range of collective approaches to dealing 
with congestion – they are more supportive of introducing 
a London-style congestion charge. Around half of the 
respondents in Istanbul would support a congestion charge 
if new infrastructure or services were introduced, while for 
São Paulo this was only the case for around 30 per cent of 
the respondents. As in so many cities, actually delivering  
a system would require real political leadership: Istanbul’s 
government, however, appears to have more political 
capital to do this than those in many other major world 
cities. Finally, 70 per cent of respondents in Istanbul 
declared that they were satisfied with the city's metrobus 
system, while only 8 per cent of them were dissatisfied with 
it. On the European side, 77 per cent of respondents were 
satisfied with the metrobus, against 58 per cent for the 
Anatolian side.
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sECuRitY
Crime stands out as a major concern once we look at the 
details in Istanbul. Looking at general feelings of safety, 
most people feel safe in London, while only 31 per cent  
of people do in São Paulo, and even fewer in Istanbul  
(20 per cent). The pattern is the same in the International 
Crime Victim Survey (ICVS- 2005): in London 40 per  
cent of people considered a burglary in their houses in the 
coming year to be likely, while in São Paulo 72 per cent did 
and in Istanbul 75 per cent! Istanbul’s fear of crime seems 
much higher than that in many other major economies. 
Both Istanbul and São Paulo residents see improvements  
to their justice system as more important than on the 
ground policing to reduce crime. But Paulistanos stress the 
importance of more visible policing, more police posts in 
the city, punishments for teenagers and a faster and more 
severe justice system – in Istanbul teenage crime seems less 
of an issue. Overall, Paulistanos are much more optimistic 
that improvements can be made to the safety of their city. 
This may be linked to the much higher incidence of violent 
crime in São Paulo compared to Istanbul, with murder rates 
of 21 and 3 murders per 100,000 respectively. Because crime 
is high in São Paulo, it may seem to the respondents that it 
should be relatively easier to improve the safety situation.
Fairly worried
47%
Very worried
33%
Not very 
worried
10%
Don’t know
2%
Not at all
worried
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How worried are residents about crime? How to improve safety?
uRban GOVERnanCE
One of the biggest challenges for major world cities is  
the constant struggle of public services to keep up with 
population pressures. Projections for population growth in 
Istanbul see it grow from its present level of 12 million to 
16 million in 2017, and to 23 million in 2023 (see OECD 
Territorial Review for Istanbul, 2008). The overall 
performance of Istanbul is much better than São Paulo on 
many key services: transport and health services have a 
high level of satisfaction compared to São Paulo – scoring 
closer to its European counterparts. Some of this difference 
clearly exposes the differences of megacities in developing 
countries from the ones in more developed societies, and in 
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How satisfied are residents with city services?
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particular it highlights the differences in political and civic 
culture between European and Latin American countries. 
Bearing in mind that Brazil is the 9th largest economy in 
the world, while Turkey ranks 17th, and that São Paulo’s 
GDP is higher than Istanbul’s, we see that wealth per se  
is not necessarily translated into better quality of life, 
especially if it is distributed unevenly with relatively few 
public goods. Despite the challenges faced by Istanbul’s 
citizens, they are more positive about their local 
governance than in many other world cities, and  
much more so than in São Paulo or London.
Istanbul São PauloLondon
29%
44%
65%
São Paulo
47%
London
38%
Istanbul
74%
Afraid of being mugged or physically attacked? 
Technical Note
Ipsos KMG interviewed 1,013 Istanbul residents face to face, in their homes, in summer 2009. 
Data have been weighted to the known profile of the population.
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It’s hard to evaluate a city in which you have resided for 
years. You get too accustomed to every detail that makes  
it beautiful as well as evil. As a resident of this huge organic 
mechanism, you know which things don’t work well but you 
are also aware that it has its own characteristic features that 
make it unique and interesting, almost personifying it. 
A member of the global megacities league, Istanbul  
is counted as one of the major business, transportation, 
cultural and tourist hubs in Europe as well as the Middle 
East. Like any megacity, its exact population cannot be 
determined; even the official number fluctuates between  
12 and 14 million, a figure greater than the populations  
of 40 European countries. It is a metropolis so large that it 
extends more than 100 kilometres across and almost joins 
with Tekirdağ and Izmit, the cities of the two adjacent 
provinces, to form the Northern Marmara megalopolis. 
Since the rural exodus in the 1950s, Istanbul’s rapid 
population growth has caused problems with illegal 
settlements (gecekondu) which in turn have triggered 
deforestation, and transport, health care and education 
challenges among other urban issues. 
Istanbul currently lacks a strategic masterplan  
to coordinate development between the elected 39 
municipalities. Even so, foreign investors are continually 
looking to enter the city’s thriving property development 
market. This is partly because Istanbul remains a magnet 
for new residents from within the country and from abroad, 
as well as for global companies opening their Eastern 
European and Middle Eastern headquarters. But Istanbul  
is not counted as one of the most liveable cities in the world. 
Quality of life in Istanbul falls well below that in Vancouver, 
Copenhagen or London. According to the 2008 Mastercard 
Worldwide Centres of Commerce report, Istanbul ranks 
57th of 75 cities compared for liveability, despite having one 
of the lowest crime rates. And for over 50 years, Istanbul has 
not been able to prevent illegal settlements emerging on the 
outskirts of the city, although clean water, electricity and 
the sewage system reach almost the entire population, 
including these illegal settlements. So what is working in 
Istanbul has still not been answered convincingly.
One of the most obvious of Istanbul’s unique features is 
its geography. Topography is the strongest factor in Istanbul 
differentiating it from other global megacities. Steep hills, 
valleys, and the sinuous curves of the Bosporus dramatically 
shape the city’s urban pattern: its settlements and transport 
and even the ecology of the city. In Istanbul, the terrain 
creates the notion of orientation, almost inscribing a mental 
map of the city in the minds of its residents. Living in 
Istanbul one is constantly aware of water, a presence always 
in close proximity or just within view. One knows that the 
slopes of the valleys lead to the Bosporus or the Golden 
Horn. It is this presence of water straits and the city’s rising 
topography which make the scene an omnipresent feature 
in the everyday life of Istanbul’s citizens, an urban feature 
accessible by the majority without any social or economic 
class differentiation. And it is not a single scene but a 
collection of scenes from numerous vistas thanks to the 
dynamic topography of the city. 
The ability to experience the city with the visual senses 
creates an awareness of the whole, as if the whole city were 
an enormous stage or collection of screens. This is possible 
without an Eiffel Tower, a London Eye or similar iconic 
structure. So we can easily assert that topography is the 
major factor which makes Istanbul unique, even though it 
creates many problems for mass transportation. However, 
this distinguishing feature is not quite appreciated by the 
municipalities when drawing up the regional masterplan  
or building codes; it’s as if the city is as smooth as a blank 
piece of paper. Where building height restrictions are  
linked solely to the plot area, topographical differences  
are not taken into account or are seen as obstructions  
to be overcome or erased. 
Another unique aspect of Istanbul is less obvious  
and harder to explain. In order to analyse the city, I offer  
a metaphor which may at first seem awkward: Istanbul  
is a piece of wrinkled cloth pinched in the middle by  
a blue string. From a distance this cloth appears to have  
a homogeneous pattern and colour of its own. However, 
upon close examination one realises that it is not a simple 
sheet of cloth but an assemblage of many different textiles, 
each with slightly different colours, hues, textures and 
shapes. Yet, it is not a patchwork of similar orthogonal 
shapes, a metaphor frequently used to describe any 
metropolis where diversity is a defining feature. It is more 
like a cloth that has a camouflage pattern, where the shapes 
are amorphous. One of the layers of these amorphous 
shapes may correspond to the social strata of the city,  
while the other overlaps with topography, and yet another 
corresponds to the characteristics of its built environment. 
These layers and shapes do not have a specific rule. Against 
these expectations, Istanbul becomes a surprising and 
dynamic city. 
At the northern end of the Taksim-Harbiye axis, for 
instance, is one of the city’s most exclusive areas. It borders 
the Nişantaşı neighbourhood, a predominantly residential 
area featuring high-end shops for luxury foreign brands. 
Steps away in the adjacent Feriköy-Pangaltı neighbourhood, 
located on the slopes of the Dolapdere valley, are rows of 
apartment buildings and a rectilinear street grid which 
differ greatly from the interwoven streets and built form 
found elsewhere in the city. The social pattern of this  
area is also marked by lower income groups and strong 
neighbourhood relationships. And yet, at the lower end  
of the Taksim-Harbiye axis sit the congress centre, five  
star hotels and cultural facilities – the ‘jewels of the valley’. 
The same kind of juxtaposition can be found in any part  
of the city; in the gentrified urban grain of Cihangir,  
located near the low-income residents of Tophane and its 
neighbouring coastal business district. It is the relatively 
short distances between these unique areas that make  
the city unpredictable in every sense. The changing 
architectural styles, street patterns, topographical features, 
neighbourhood sizes and densities do not adhere to a rule 
that can be aligned to the social and economic characteristics 
of the inhabitants of these regions. Perhaps that is why the 
city lacks a strategic masterplan: until recently, analysis  
of this camouflage pattern has never been considered  
by the municipalities. 
The widely accepted western urban terminology 
proliferating in academia is not sufficient to explain the 
Istanbul condition. For instance, it is commonly argued that 
unlike Italy, Istanbul lacks squares which can be efficiently 
used for public spaces. However, the notion of public space 
in Istanbul is different from what it is perceived to be in 
western terminology. In Istanbul, public space does not 
occupy a static public square; it is defined as the axes where 
people move through and intersect in the city. The orthogonal 
zoning principles or other modes of gentrification applied in 
western cities cannot successfully be applied to the urban 
fabric of Istanbul.
Instead, Istanbul should develop an urban language of 
its own. And it should do so using its inherent features and 
codes – the elements which have not yet been comprehended 
or critically analysed. Deciphering the camouflage pattern is 
a crucial investigation, one which can only be accomplished 
through the coordinated efforts of many disciplines brought 
together. This research should not be left to urban planners 
or architects alone; the built environment is just a fraction 
of the whole of the experience of city making. Sociologists, 
economists, and even psychologists should work together to 
analyse how these seemingly incongruous neighbourhood 
patterns may live side by side: not only the tones or textures 
of different regions but the stitches that bind these areas 
together are important. The tension between the amorphous 
shapes and different shadings of the social, economic, 
architectural and topographical strata is the binding force 
of this camouflage-patterned textile called Istanbul. 
DECiPHERinG istanbul
For Ömer Kanıpak, Istanbul is like a wrinkled cloth, a camouflage pattern 
of histories, with all routes leading to the Bosporus. 
Ömer Kanıpak founded Arkitera Architecture Center after 
taking his Master's degree from MIT School of Architecture. 
He is currently responsible from the international relations 
and educational projects of the centre. 
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Istanbul’s unique topography allows for unexpected vistas of the Bosporus, Golden Horn or the Marmara Sea. 
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By the standards of neo-liberal globalisation, Istanbul is a 
success story. It is a business platform for the transnational 
corporate elite as well as a playing field for the cosmopolitan 
consumers of global lifestyles. There are blocks of newly erected 
high-rise office buildings, luxury residential compounds and 
towers, dozens of shopping centres offering an exclusive 
shopping ‘experience’. The city has been successful in 
showcasing its unrivalled cultural heritage, attracting a 
growing number of tourists. Its central areas have been 
beautified to offer the trimmings of global lifestyles. The 
gentrification of Beyoğlu and the historic peninsula, and the 
re-building of the waterfront around the Golden Horn have 
created new spaces of leisure and culture. Luxury hotels and 
world-class restaurants open every week, occupancy rates are 
high as international meetings and congresses proliferate, the 
nightlife and culinary delights are legendary. This is not an 
entirely skewed picture. Despite complaints from the locals, 
Istanbul’s entire urban area looks more ‘finished’ than before: 
roads are paved, new city parks have multiplied and municipal 
services function relatively well throughout the city.
This achievement is due in large part to the current 
structure of the world economy favouring the resurgence of  
the metropolis. Since the 1980s the control and management 
functions of global capital shifted to the great cities of the 
world. Speculative investment surged, making urban real estate 
development a leading sector. This political economic shift does 
not explain Istanbul’s performance on its own: the world 
economy may provide an opportunity but projects of the 
globalising elite cannot always be implemented. In fact, until 
the 1990s it looked as if Istanbul would miss the boat. Caught 
between a political class committed to populist modernisation 
and a timid bourgeoisie reluctant to alienate Ankara’s 
bureaucracy, actors in the city were unable to mobilise 
significant resources for global success. Things changed, 
however, when the conservative-Islamic AKP (Justice and 
Development) party – which won the 1994 local elections 
thanks to support from rural immigrants in peripheral 
neighbourhoods – proved to be surprisingly pro-business.  
In abandoning traditional populism they started looking for 
new ways to market the city; their adoption of the neo-liberal 
discourse found a perfect fit in projects preparing the city for 
showcase on the global stage. 
Istanbul’s accomplishment may in large measure be 
attributed to the coherence of the urban coalitions’ project to 
upgrade the city’s image and marketing potential in the eyes  
of a footloose global demand for investment, culture, or leisure. 
Since the mid-1990s, Istanbul has been a one-party city – an 
unusual continuity given the political instability that 
characterised the period after 1960. Initially, the election of 
Tayyip Erdoğan as mayor was considered by the secularist elite 
in Ankara as an act of rebellion to be punished. This in turn  
fed into the estrangement between the national capital in the 
steppes and the imperial city, but the rift was soon mended. 
Especially after the successful liberalisation of the Turkish 
economy, it was understood that the city served as the gateway 
to the country and perhaps to the greater region. And this 
crucial role could not be jeopardised. Thus the newfound 
understanding with Ankara facilitated the transition from an 
informal, unstructured and insufficiently institutionalised 
globalisation towards a more formal and deliberate platform 
which invited agents of global networks into the city. Following 
the political ascendancy of AKP to central government in 2002, 
the former Mayor of Istanbul (now the Prime Minister) 
reinforced this strategy to position Istanbul on the global stage.  
Official initiatives, such as a series of high-profile 
international meetings and conferences, were an important 
dimension of this project. More crucial, however, was the 
government’s desire to attract global flows to the city since 
Istanbul’s economic success would endorse claims for their 
liberal vision. Willing partners, the city’s bourgeoisie benefited 
from business initiatives and land development, mobilising a 
newfound interest in philanthropy. Ongoing series of art 
exhibitions, festivals of film, theatre, jazz, and classical music, 
on a scale that rivals that of any large European city, have been 
initiated by non-profit private foundations. Such endeavours 
have secured the willing cooperation of both the central and 
city governments: the most recent instance is the selection of 
Istanbul as 2010 Cultural Capital of Europe, the achievement  
of yet another public/private partnership.
Nonetheless, there is one group, the migrants of the last two 
decades, who have borne the brunt of this newly created wealth, 
especially because their chances to access self-made housing 
have all but collapsed. No longer able to build a gecekondu, 
recent migrants have been relegated to marginality in derelict 
neighbourhoods. More recently, they have been joined by the 
displaced population of inner-city squatters targeted by the new 
‘Urban Transformation’ law (Law 5366), which was designed  
to clean the city by razing unsightly neighbourhoods in core 
areas. Now, with the global crisis and economic downturn, the 
trickle down in the form of personal service employment also 
threatens to dry up. When unskilled jobs are harder to find, 
and wages that will sustain livelihood are a rarity, poverty 
becomes more visible. That this depravation coincides with the 
ethnic and social background of recent migrants – Kurdish 
migrants displaced from their villages due to the war, the Roma 
population of Sulukule threatened by ‘Urban Transformation’, 
refugees from African countries – has led to more than income 
polarisation and poverty. It has created social, cultural, and 
spatial exclusion, and perhaps a permanent sub-proletariat.
In a city where more than half the buildings were 
constructed illegally and where population growth was 
accommodated through informal production of housing, the 
end of populism served to announce that land had finally 
become a commodity. With it came the message that revenue 
rather than the opportunity to maximise political patronage 
should underlie policy. As a commodity, land became the 
favoured object of speculation – often in huge developments 
determining the spatial expansion of the city. Public sector 
infrastructure projects and motorway construction blazed  
the path, as in the residential and business development  
around TEM, the Trans-European Motorway. The central 
government’s Mass Housing Administration (TOKI)
participated in this development by creating high-rise 
residential units for low-income groups in the far peripheries  
of the city. Roads connecting to the anticipated third bridge 
over the Bosporus will likely create another axis of expansion 
North of the city. 
For most of its modern history, Istanbul’s spatial 
momentum has been determined by its population growth. 
Immigrants had to be accommodated even if their houses were 
illegal. Municipal services, schools, transport and public parks 
followed settlements, creating relatively decent, if uninspiring 
neighbourhoods. Then, as permits were obtained and shacks 
were turned into brick and mortar apartment buildings, the 
initial gecekondu housing was consolidated. Finally, some of the 
occupants could leave the old neighbourhoods and opt for 
middle-class residential developments. Real estate has always 
punctuated the stages of social and cultural transformation.
The current crisis, however, exhibits a less benign aspect of 
this spatial expansion in the form of real estate development 
fuelled by the global wave of speculative investment. Coalitions 
formed during the last 15 years facilitated and profited from 
this development; the financial explosion that accompanied 
economic growth contributed to it. As a result, Istanbul ended 
up with an enormous bubble of excess real estate – office 
buildings, shopping centres, and middle-class residential 
developments – just as occurred in East Asian cities prior to the 
1997 financial crisis and the United States in the run up to the 
2008 global economic collapse. These new developments broke 
fresh ground in the perimeter of the settled city, creating an 
extensive new sprawl with the hope of continued expansion. 
The bursting of the bubble in the credit market, however, has 
dashed the dream. There is likely to be a long wait before the 
existing stock finds utilisation through attrition, upgrading  
and expansion. The danger is that the cessation of new 
construction and land development will rob the city of its 
major motor of growth in terms of absorbing investment and 
creating employment, leading to an unavoidable period of 
relative stagnation. 
istanbul in a GlObal COntEXt
Çag˘lar Keyder maps out the spatial effects of neo-liberal globalisation in Istanbul, 
marking the relationships between the consolidation of private land, and rising social 
and spatial inequalities.
Çağlar Keyder is a native of Istanbul and works on historical, 
urban and development. He has published Istanbul: between 
the Global and the Local and teaches at Bogazici University 
and the State University of New York at Binghamton.
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Real estate has always punctuated the  
stages of social and cultural transformation.
In a city fuelled by a real-estate development boom, the TOKI tower blocks in Atasehir are transforming the derelict lands near the endless traffic of the TEM highway. 
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In Turkey, the authoritative relationship between state  
and society is mitigated by the populist political culture. 
And while the country’s populism has many roots, two 
main factors have contributed to its prominence: the vital 
demands from new urban citizens after rapid urbanisation 
since the 1960s, and an understanding of democracy 
reduced in its simplest form to voting.
There is no doubt that the will and the need for 
decentralisation in Turkey accelerated with urbanisation. 
Since the Turkish central government could neither control 
the mass urban migration, nor answer the vital demands 
emanating from the millions of new migrants, the masses 
produced their own ‘local solutions’ while public officials 
merely stood by. In exchange, migrants – eager to reward 
populist political parties that promised to tolerate informal 
job and housing markets – crowned politicians with votes 
and political powers. This system persisted until increasing 
complications stemming from the densification and 
diversity of urban settlements gave rise to the need for  
an effective and decentralised urban administration.
The main obstacle to what may be termed ‘institutional’ 
localisation in Turkey is democratisation. Partly from  
fear of an internal fracturing along ethnic lines, especially 
with regards to the Kurdish population, demands for 
‘decentralisation for democracy’ have not been welcomed 
by the well-established centrist state tradition. Instead, 
these calls are framed solely as a technical issue about the 
effectiveness of an urban administration, rather than about 
comprehensive political and institutional reform. It is  
not accidental that during the militarist regime following 
the coup in 1980, important institutional reforms to 
metropolitan Istanbul were introduced as part of a larger 
agenda to establish order and to solve urgent infrastructural 
problems. What is striking is that relative efficiency in 
solving urban matters were perceived by urbanites as 
‘democratisations’.
After all, the demands for decentralisation in Turkey 
run along two different strands: democratisation and 
efficiency. This is especially true with regards to urbanism, 
which oscillates between populism and authoritarian rule, 
two fundamental characteristics of the current political 
system. From this perspective, it is this dilemma in Istanbul 
that may be perceived as ‘chaos’.
In this context, it is necessary to first explain the 
meaning of the current two-tier structure of Istanbul’s 
urban administration. Both metropolitan and district 
municipalities have decision-making powers in so far that 
the metropolitan administration is responsible for macro-
level decisions concerning the entire city, while districts are 
responsible for decisions related to traditional municipal 
services. The metropolitan administration of Istanbul, 
follows the ‘powerful mayor and weak council’ model, one 
which enables a wide and non-transparent space for 
macro-level decision-making and, not surprisingly, favours, 
the mayors of metropolitan municipalities. Therefore, 
city-wide decisions are discussed and criticised in the 
media and by professional associations only after they  
have been made, thus fuelling rumours and complaints 
about corruption, criticism on judicial and technical 
inadequacies, as well as the anti-democratic nature of  
the decision-making processes. 
As with other cities that have grown rapidly and that 
urgently need solutions for their basic infrastructure 
problems, city-wide decisions to address the concerns of 
citizens are vitally important in Istanbul. However, since 
local administrations are not financially autonomous, they 
are engaged in a never-ending search for new resources to 
implement their decisions. Therefore, good relations with 
the central government are crucial. In Istanbul, most 
problems have occurred when the political party of the 
metropolitan municipality differed from that of the central 
government. At first sight, it is impossible to talk about a 
central versus local conflict: On the one hand Istanbul's 
local administration and the central government in Ankara 
are politically aligned and share common political views. 
On the other hand, the Prime Minister was formerly the 
mayor of Istanbul, and considers himself as an ’Istanbul 
lover.’ Finally, AKP’s great success in local politics helped 
them to achieve success at the national level.
However, upon gaining power and its political 
advantages, the central AKP administration began turning 
down calls for decentralisation, and instead reinforced their 
centralist tendencies further. Thus when it comes to the 
making of macro-level decisions it is possible to say that  
the central government exerts a strong influence in 
Istanbul. Moreover, Istanbul’s residents have generally 
supported decisions taken even by the central government 
because of their efficiency at the local level. 
These non-transparent decisions can be criticised as  
they violate basic public administrative and democratic 
principles. The closed, communitarian and disciplined 
structure of the AKP with a charismatic leadership prevents 
issues from being discussed more openly. However, rumours 
about central versus local conflicts do exist, and, what’s 
more, technical and legal deficiencies in these decisions are 
discussed among a limited number of professionals. Some  
of the decisions have been suspended by the legal authorities.
Paradoxically, Istanbulites do not seem to be very 
interested in how these decisions are made anyway.  
On the contrary, the fact that fundamental and urgent 
infrastructural problems are actually being addressed 
generates popular support. The Prime Minister, seems 
content that the public recognises and supports the central 
government’s role in projects concerning the city’s 
infrastructure. Indeed, these investments can be regarded 
as a reward for votes: and thus boost populist politics just 
like social relief for the poor citizens. 
Considering this, it is possible to say that Istanbul is 
being governed by a populist approach closely tied to the 
central government. In this context, it may be necessary  
to point out how the city is currently planned. In short,  
a strategic planning ethos now guides the city’s growth. 
Responsibility for this strategic vision has been transferred 
to the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design 
Centre (IMP), a new organisation that operates alongside 
political and bureaucratic bodies of the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality. Although the staff of this  
new organisation possesses expertise, decision-making is 
still left to the domain of populist politics and projects of 
the IMP tend to be selectively or only partially 
implemented, because it does not have administrative and 
technocratic influence. To sum up, we may claim that the 
technocrats are excluded from the decision-making process 
where their knowledge and expertise are extremely 
important for the city’s aesthetics and long-term growth. 
On the other hand, the European Union’s nomination 
process brings with it new influential concepts regarding 
urban governance. As a result, government bodies and civic 
groups are trying to identify new models for participation: 
local administrations have established city councils and  
are trying to foster stronger ties to civic groups in order  
to comply with legal obligations connected to these 
administrative principles. 
In this respect, Istanbul’s biggest obstacle is that the 
majority of its citizens are either not organised or take  
part in hierarchically structured ‘community’ groups. 
Possibilities for open participation remain limited but 
clientelist-ties become widespread. Another problem 
concerns the rights of organisations and the freedom  
of expression among social groups who suffer from the 
disadvantageous consequences of some urban renewal 
projects. For example, the Romani community, which used 
to live in the historical city centre, has been particularly 
marginalised. Overall, the administrative principle for 
enhanced governance currently relates only to the existing 
power groups and excludes the disadvantaged, the 
marginalised and minorities. However, thanks to Turkey’s 
nomination to the European Union new concepts have  
been introduced concerning human and minority rights. 
Local democracy will arrive to Turkish cities only after it  
is understood that populism and majority-rule do not equal 
democracy and that the demands of minority groups have 
to be taken into consideration.
Sema Erder is a Professor at Bahçeşehir University and 
writes on urban sociology, urban politics, migration and 
Istanbul. Currently she is working on a project on the 
globalisation of and challenges to the conventional Turkish 
migration policy. 
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In an overview of the relationship between the central and local administrations in 
Turkey, Sema Erder describes the obstacles and opportunities to improve how 
Istanbul is planned and managed.
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Taksim Square is still the most important square in modern Istanbul. Originally, 
Taksim means the distribution of water. Today, the currents of popular political 
culture begin their national trek here.
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Traffic congestion is diminishing the quality of life in 
Istanbul. Currently almost 1.8 million automobiles choke its 
roads. Blessed with graceful natural beauty as well as a rich 
historical urban fabric, Istanbul faces serious challenges in 
trying to accommodate an additional 84,000 cars every year. 
This rapid increase in motor vehicles, more than eight-fold 
since 1980, has coincided with a dramatic population and 
economic growth. As a result, Istanbul is now overwhelmed 
by a flood of people and vehicles, an inadequate road network 
and a public transport system that has been slow to develop. 
With new overpasses and an infrastructure that favour  
the private car, the city struggles with air pollution, the 
destruction of its natural and cultural heritage and congestion. 
Although there are only 139 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, the 
average travel time for motorised trips alone has increased 
from 41 minutes in 1996 to 49 minutes in 2006. Like many 
other metropolitan cities in emerging economies, Istanbul 
thus suffers from high traffic congestion despite a low level  
of car ownership.
Istanbul’s citizens make an average number of 1.74 trips 
each day. This is up from 1.54 per capita in 1996. What is 
more interesting is that while the rate of motorised journeys 
has actually declined from 1 per capita to 0.87, there has been 
a considerable increase in the share of walking, from 35 per 
cent to 49.3 per cent in the same period. Buses and minibuses 
also play a key role in the commuting patterns of Istanbul’s 
residents, comprising the highest share, 40.8 per cent of all 
daily motorised journeys. Taken together with shuttle buses 
operated by private companies to transport employees as  
well as school buses, they form essential and complementary 
modes of a successful public transport system. Yet, while  
the overall share of journeys made by public transport has 
remained at a stable level of 70 per cent over the last two 
decades, the increase in the share of private cars from  
19.3 per cent to 26.3 per cent has caused serious traffic 
congestion and environmental pollution. 
At the end of June 2009, the Ministry of Transportation 
announced the location of a third bridge over the Bosporus 
Strait. This announcement followed the earthquake proofing 
maintenance work on Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, the 
second bridge, which exacerbated the city’s already congested 
traffic patterns. Currently, approximately 420,000 vehicles 
cross the Bosporus each day on the city’s two existing 
bridges. The logic of the Government is rather simple. Today 
the two bridges are clogged. Because the city is growing fast 
and the number of automobiles is growing much faster, a 
third, even a fourth and fifth bridge are necessary. But this 
argument ignores a crucial factor in transport planning –  
the ‘induced traffic’ which results from changes in land  
use and activity patterns following road construction. Thus, 
construction justified as a remedy for congestion only creates 
congestion in its own right. In short, it is impossible to build 
one’s way out of traffic congestion. Attempts to do so only 
lead to a continuing cycle of rent-seeking land speculation, 
lobbying by construction firms, political patronage and a 
renewed search for ‘solutions’.
Public opinion about the third bridge is divided. In 
Tarabya on the European side and Beykoz on the Anatolian 
side, two districts which the third bridge could pass through, 
some residents hope the bridge will help develop their 
neighbourhood. But not everyone shares this optimism. There 
are also concerns that the natural environment, specifically 
the forests – the lungs of the city – and the water reservoirs  
in the North, will be severely damaged by the third bridge. 
Further evidence of how Istanbul’s transport policies fail 
to establish a sustainable low-carbon transport system for  
the city can be found in the controversy surrounding the 
Ministry of Transportation’s project to create the Bosporus 
Highway Tube Tunnel. This US$ 1.5 billion two-storey, 
two-lane, 5.4 kilometre-long tunnel is expected to bring 
almost 80,000 cars to the historical heart of the city each  
day. Yet despite calls from transport experts, professional 
organisations and NGOs, tendering of the project has been 
completed but neither the tunnel nor the third bridge are 
included in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s 
strategic plan for the city. 
In Istanbul, urban transport has long been formed by a 
road-based policy which lacks an overall financial strategy. 
Instead, major transport projects are developed and funded 
on an ad hoc basis. This trend to accommodate the increasing 
number of automobiles through a road network while 
extending an insufficient rail transit network has put 
pressure on the financial resources of the city: between 2001 
and 2007 alone, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
spent 14.8 billion TL (US$ 9.9 billion) on transport projects.
Although half of the daily trips are made on foot,  
cycle lanes and pedestrian pathways have been ignored by 
policymakers. Part of the reason cycle trips represent only 
0.05 per cent of the total trips in Istanbul is because of traffic 
and air pollution, but cyclists in Istanbul also confront 
flooded and obstructed cycle paths and a lack of adequate 
bicycle parking. There are rumours about a masterplan to 
add 1,004 km of cycle lanes but without a clear timeframe  
for delivery, implementation is doubtful.
Even so, progress is being made to reduce emissions 
caused by transport. The motor vehicle industry in Turkey 
has adopted the Motor Vehicle Technical Regulations of the 
European Union. And over the last decade, the urban rail 
transit network has expanded and emissions from road 
traffic have decreased due to an increasing number of 
vehicles equipped with catalytic converters using unleaded 
petrol, and taxis using petroleum gas. Istanbul’s Metrobus,  
a bus rapid transit, has decreased the emissions from road 
traffic as well. The system now carries almost 440,000 
passengers a day over 40.4 kilometres of bus lanes separated 
from the motorway at a speed of 40 km/h. This has reduced 
in-vehicle travel time by about 50 per cent and increased  
use of public transport. 
Transport greenhouse gas emissions result from a 
well-known ‘three-legged stool’: vehicle fuel efficiency, each 
fuel’s lifecycle – how long the greenhouse gas emissions 
remains in the atmosphere – and how much people drive. 
Recent studies make it clear that where and how we invest in 
transport infrastructure make a difference: people drive less 
in areas with greater transport options and where it’s easier 
to walk. Transport investments that reduce the demand for 
travel by car benefit the environment as well as the economy. 
One of the greatest challenges associated with implementing 
sustainable strategies relates to the need to pay sufficient 
attention to long-term impacts. Reducing greenhouse gases 
and improving air quality are likely to be of greater concern 
for future generations. Yet given their typical four or five  
year term of office, it is too easy for policymakers to focus  
on immediate needs and overlook long-term problems. As  
a result, governments favour solutions achieved through 
policy measures which represent the supply-side of transport 
policy rather than the demand-side measures of regulation, 
information and pricing. Demand management measures are 
known to be more cost-effective in reducing congestion than 
infrastructure provision, but are more difficult to implement. 
It is now widely accepted that no single type of policy will 
solve our transport problems. We cannot, for example, build 
sufficient infrastructure to overcome congestion. Instead, a 
package of solutions implemented in tandem will be more 
effective than any on their own: for example, combining  
public transport improvements with parking controls and 
congestion charging can substantially reduce private car use. 
As the service level of public transport system improves, it  
is necessary to implement policy options such as congestion 
charging and parking policies to discourage car use in  
city centres. 
The Ministry of Transport and the Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality plays a key role in road transport management 
in Istanbul, yet responsibilities for traffic legislation and its 
implementation are scattered across more than ten other 
ministries and authorities. In a study carried out by the First 
Council of Urban Transport in 2002, 17 local and national 
authorities were identified to be partially responsible for the 
planning, investment, operation and management of the 
city’s transport. This fragmentation makes planning and 
coordination of activities extremely difficult. Mechanisms  
for establishing more effective coordination and streamlined 
decision-making between the ministries would go a long way 
to improving transport in Istanbul. In order to address issues 
of regulation, a proposal for new legislation has been 
prepared to establish one local authority to coordinate 
transport across Istanbul. 
Spatial planning and urban development in the Istanbul 
Metropolitan area are controlled by a mosaic of decision-
making bodies at the supra-national, national, regional and 
local levels. At the same time, the Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality faces overcrowding, immigration, insufficient 
policy programmes, illegitimacy, and an inefficient control 
system. But it seems so clear that decisions for major 
transportation projects are still made in Ankara regardless 
the master plans prepared in Istanbul.
Haluk Gerçek is a Professor of Civil Engineering at Istanbul 
Technical University, with interests in transportation policy 
and planning, sustainable transportation, economic and 
financial assessment of transportation projects.
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It is impossible to build one’s way out  
of traffic congestion.
Extensive car use congests Kabatas, a major public transport hub with a ferry 
terminal, tram station and a funicular connection to Taksim Square.
Haluk Gerçek offers an overview of Istanbul’s transportation system and 
its policies, and outlines the opportunities for sustainable public transport.
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In the context of Turkey’s accelerating membership 
negotiations with the European Union, and the popularity 
of the neo-liberal outlook within the Islamic AKP (Justice 
and Development) government, a more confidently 
outward-oriented, globalising and liberal-minded Istanbul 
has been emerging over the last decade. This changing 
mood and orientation in Istanbul is a positive sign for the 
rest of Turkey, as Istanbul has not only effectively become 
the country’s leading city, but also a microcosm of Anatolia. 
Istanbul’s predominantly migrant population comes from 
all over Anatolia, and they maintain their links and 
networks with the rest of the country. Thus, if this 
megalopolis of around 15 million can hold on to its 
perspective of what might be termed ‘worldliness’ – a 
combination of openness, liberalism, pragmatism, 
democratic culture, and global embeddedness – then this 
momentum would help Turkey become more centrally and 
deeply engaged with, and implicated in, world affairs. 
Turkey would finally leave behind the remnants of the 
inward-looking modality that has hitherto marginalised 
the country and condemned its people to provincialism  
and isolation.
Hrant Dink’s murder in early 2007 put the tentative  
and fragile nature of this new cultural orientation into 
perspective. The murder of Dink – an Istanbul-based 
journalist, writer and civil rights activist of Armenian 
origin – by a youth with ultra-nationalist connections in 
front of the office of the newspaper he edited, demonstrated 
that if there has been a certain opening up, diversification 
and reinterpretation of the mental maps of Turkey over  
the last two decades or so, this has been accompanied by a 
simultaneous convergence of reactionary positions whose 
common denominator seems to be precisely the fear of 
openness. What has surfaced is the precariousness of the 
culture of openness, now increasingly challenged by the 
very tensions it has given rise to. Hence, how the public 
culture of Istanbul develops is central to the position that 
Turkey will adopt in the global world order. Istanbul’s 
insistence on the virtues of openness, over and against 
regressive and nationalistic calls for defensive closure,  
will make all the difference.
Istanbul’s pull into the force field of globalisation  
is affecting deeply-rooted ways of thinking and acting.  
With its new spaces and cultures of consumerism, its 
expanding and deepening financial flows in the real  
estate and service industries, and its new mechanisms  
for the global integration of local cultures through 
commodification, globalisation is making irreversible 
entries into the daily life of the city, forcing change in urban 
spaces and on public culture. But it is far from clear how 
this process of globalisation might translate into an 
orientation towards worldliness in the city’s public cultural 
life. As the city opens itself up to the contemporary global 
order, the issue confronting Istanbul is not the choice 
between openness and closure, but a choice about the kinds 
of openness it will admit. Crucial to this debate is the city’s 
potential to articulate a counterweight to fundamentalist 
neo-liberalism by enhancing a democratic modality of 
worldliness. In the face of the uncompromising forces  
of urban globalisation now assaulting Istanbul, openness 
could be diminished to the status of a market-driven and 
market-shaped culture of self-interest. In this context, 
Istanbul’s choice should be for a kind of openness that 
deepens democratisation through empowerment of the 
excluded and the disadvantaged. What is not known is 
whether the elements for this culture of worldliness to  
be elaborated are present or emerging, or do not yet exist,  
in globalising Istanbul.
Istanbul, in fact, has thrown itself open to a new  
round of urban globalisation. When the Directorate of 
Privatisation Administration sold 100,000 square metres  
of National Highways Authority land in Zincirlikuyu to  
a Turkish business group for US$ 800 million in 2007,  
the price of land in this central business area increased 
substantially. Shortly thereafter, the Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality finalised the bidding process for a 46,000 
square metre warehouse space belonging to the Istanbul 
Transport Authority, situated immediately adjacent to the 
Highway Authority’s land. It was sold to a Dubai-based  
real estate company for US$ 705 million, with future plans 
to build the Istanbul ‘Dubai Towers’, Istanbul’s tallest 
building, at an estimated cost of US$ 5 billion now on hold. 
With this municipal sale, the value of property in the area 
rose to US$ 15,000 per square metre – surpassing average 
values in the central business districts of London and 
Tokyo. What was shocking was the speed with which the 
price of land almost doubled between these two sales, 
indicating the appetite of global real estate investors  
for sites in Istanbul. 
And there is plenty of land. The transfer of land to global 
commercial interests is no longer limited to one particular 
area of the city, as was the case in the mid-1980s. Public 
spaces located around the city are coming up, one by one, 
for large-scale privatisation and development initiatives. 
Public authorities and municipalities are not wasting any 
time to facilitate the sale of public land. Massive stretches  
of land around both the Galataport and Haydarpaşa zones, 
situated at the two key entrance ports from the Anatolian 
and European sides of the Bosporus, are now being 
considered for redevelopment. Considering that there is also 
the political will to support privatisation – Prime Minister 
Erdoğan recently declared that his duty is to market his 
country – Istanbul is going to witness more and more global 
capital pouring into its beleaguered urban space. 
Thus the new round of globalisation in Istanbul is 
primarily real estate driven. As Çağlar Keyder has 
remarked, ‘land has finally become a commodity’. It is 
within this context that the recent political initiative to 
push through large-scale urban regeneration programmes 
targeting neighbourhoods with low-quality housing or 
derelict but historically valuable properties should be 
evaluated. Policymakers at both the local and central levels 
are now frantically drawing up metropolitan-scale visions 
and plans to put in place the infrastructure required for  
the next round of investments. Cash-strapped municipal 
authorities are finding solutions through large-scale 
projects undertaken by powerful investment and 
construction companies. 
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istanbul's CHOiCE: OPEnnEss 
In a provocative assessment of the impacts globalisation and culture exert on 
Istanbul’s urban landscape, Asu Aksoy considers the potential for a new politics 
of openness accompanying the city’s re-emergence on the world stage.
Globalisation is forcing open the city’s 
urban spaces and cultural practices, 
bringing with it a parallel process of 
cultural change.
Extending from Taksim Square and cutting across the historical Pera district, pedestrianised Istiklal Avenue is a buzzing thoroughfare 24 hours a day. 
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istanbul’s GECEKOnDus
Orhan Esen describes the origins and socio-economic framework 
of informal housing in Istanbul. 
Originally a technical term, gecekondu derived from 
everyday language to signify a specific housing and 
settlement typology of self-service urbanisation that 
occurred during Turkey’s industrialisation and rural 
migration in the period between 1945 and 1985. Gece 
means ‘the night’ and kondu ‘landed’, hence gecekondu 
translates as ‘landed at night’. The term has evolved  
to encompass a variety of informal settlements and 
building typologies. Its usage denotes a bottom-up, 
spontaneous action, especially prevalent during the  
first wave of mass-migration, to provide mass housing 
under conditions in which conventional or government-
initiated models of housing supply failed. 
In Istanbul, this act of land-taking was by no means 
legal, but was nonetheless sanctioned as it allowed the 
government to pass the costs and political hurdles of 
urbanisation on to the migrants themselves. In doing 
so, businesses were able to disregard housing expenses 
when calculating labour costs and politicians could tie 
votes to the provision of land alone. This arrangement 
was accepted as long as these newcomers provided for 
their own welfare; and by growing food in their own 
courtyards and walking to jobs in nearby industrial 
factories, these newcomers were able to reduce the  
costs of urban living. 
All was made possible by the availability of publicly 
owned lots on what was then the urban periphery. 
Residents of the gecekondus were spared the full-scale 
expropriation and economic expulsion that commonly 
occurs during periods of intense urbanisation. Instead, 
they became urban without being forced to change too 
much, occupying a self-built garden town that was both 
rural and urban. The names of the original gecekondu 
settlements frequently ended with tepe, meaning ‘hill’, 
to denote their location on the steep slopes of the 
valleys surrounding the city’s new industrial zones. 
The emergence of gecekondus followed industrial 
developments alongside four main axes: the Golden 
Horn, the primary location for industrial activity 
along the waterfront and its adjacent river valleys; the 
historical northern ridge of the Buyukdere; and two 
arteries to the West (the E5 motorway historically 
known as the London Road) and to the East (the 
Ankara motorway) both of which also serve some older 
industrial settlements behind the Marmara coast. As 
transport shifted away from the coasts to road networks, 
the older Bosporus industrial settlements also attracted 
gecekondus, although much more moderately.
Residents organised their communities and their 
own economic networks: the construction, transport 
and distribution of consumer goods, and sometimes 
even the infrastructure needed for water and electricity 
supply for their households. Demolitions and conflicts 
with authorities were not unusual but when demolition 
did occur, new homes were frequently reconstructed 
on nearby land, with former lots taken over by migrant 
groups backed by more influential political actors. 
In the early 1960s, gecekondu settlements became 
an officially accepted solution to housing the majority 
of new migrants. From then onwards, Istanbul 
experienced a unique socio-political climate, which 
temporarily diminished the initial scepticism among 
the middle classes about the gecekondus. This wave 
of sympathy and identification continued beyond the 
events of June 1970 when Istanbul became occupied by 
the industrial working class. Thus after World War II, 
residents of the gecekondus found they could convert 
their inherent rural poverty into comparative wealth 
within the space of one generation. At a time when 
the city’s population was close to 4 million, originally 
barren settlements had already become blossoming 
garden cities. However, large-scale urbanisation 
in the 1980s and 1990s almost totally displaced 
such manifestations of the golden age of informal 
urbanisation, which is remembered by some older 
Istanbulites as the ‘innocent’ period of migration.  
As a consequence the gecekondu vanished as abruptly 
as it appeared on the stage of Istanbul’s history.
It is the ‘neo-liberal revolution’, which began in the 
mid-1980s, that has made Istanbul what it is today: 
a post-gecekondu city whereby developers convert 
households in the former gecekondus to middle-class 
standards. A socio-economic heterogeneity now defines 
this post-gecekondu condition and has helped original 
migrants improve their economic status. After the 
1999 earthquake, a ‘top-down neo-liberalism’ agenda 
emerged which expropriated the property obtained 
through informality, and downgraded development 
rights obtained through informal urbanisation 
to a second-class status. This has resulted in the 
empowerment of new large-scale developers and  
actors dominating the production of urban areas. 
Orhan Esen is an independent urban researcher, writer 
and city guide. He writes on performance in the city, urban 
shelters, transportation, environment and urban identity. 
The head of TOKİ, the Prime Ministry’s Housing 
Development Administration, declared that half of 
İstanbul’s housing stock (approximately 3 million 
buildings) would have to be replaced over the next 20 years; 
work would begin in 20 slum-housing areas. Istanbul’s 
residents – whether in Sulukule or in Süleymaniye within 
the historic centre’s city walls, in Tarlabaşı in the Pera 
district or Zeytinburnu to the West  
of the city – are now subject to municipal programmes 
involving the expropriation of private properties in return 
for cash compensation or relocation to new developments 
in the far periphery. Thus, the historic Tarlabaşı district in 
Beyoğlu, with its abandoned Greek Orthodox churches and 
its streets of dilapidated nineteenth-century houses – now 
occupied by Kurdish populations from the South-East of 
Turkey living side by side with local gypsy populations and 
illegal African immigrants – is targeted for clean up. This 
will entail turning the houses into ‘attractive’ residences 
with parking spaces and shopping areas; façades being  
one of the few remnants to be retained of the area’s unique 
character. Across the city, construction companies are soon 
set to start pulling down entire neighbourhoods. This work 
is carried out in abeyance of an explicit regeneration and 
redevelopment agenda to turn city spaces into money-
making assets: sites to accommodate the demands of the 
city’s newly expanding wealth or for tourism, for heritage, 
shopping, entertainment and large-scale events. 
In this new round of globalisation, global investments 
invade the most profitable areas, ones that are no longer 
associated with the industrial profile of the city. Investors 
are attracted to the skyrocketing consumer demand for 
high-quality housing, recreational and retail facilities,  
and not surprisingly, for cultural tourism. One by one, 
industrialised areas are being transformed; as stated by 
metropolitan mayor, Kadir Topbaş, ‘Istanbul should shed 
its industrial profile... Istanbul should, from now on, 
become a financial centre, a cultural centre, and a congress 
tourism centre.’ Results of this shift can already be seen in a 
550 hectares (5.5 km2) large redevelopment project, master 
planned by Zaha Hadid, and designated for an industrial 
area in the Kartal district along the Marmara shore on the 
Anatolian side, that hosts more than 100 factories. As part 
of the project, the former Mayor of Kartal had announced 
plans to attract US$ 5 billion from foreign investors to 
develop a yacht marina accommodating 1,000 boats, plus 
hotels, residences and plazas. In response, some 26 industrial 
landowners with factories in Kartal have started to move 
their production base, getting ready to turn their much 
sought-after land into shopping and recreational centres.
The project of globalising Istanbul initiated in the 
mid-1980s is now being fully realised. But this is a new 
round of urban globalisation. In the 1980s and throughout 
the 1990s, the global vision achieved partial and piecemeal 
results. This earlier phase was distinguished by real estate 
developments (shopping centres, residential complexes and 
commercial headquarters), which did not touch most of the 
city, nor did they have a large impact on the daily lives of its 
citizens. Instead, they remained sequestered projects of the 
city’s globalising elite, driven mainly by the Turkish-origin 
conglomerate capital. Istanbul thus entered the new 
millennium as a dual city. Now every part of the city  
is exposed to radical change as more and more land is 
pulled into the market sphere, catapulting the whole of 
Istanbul into an irreversible process of large-scale urban 
development. It is an overwhelming and all-encompassing 
transformation owing to the alliance of national and local 
political will as well as economic interests, but it is also 
happening because of the scale and scope with which  
global capital has entered the city.
This new round of urban globalisation is not driven  
by real estate alone. It is also a cultural project. As public 
spaces fall one by one within the ambit of design and 
management projects (invariably extensions of global 
property development companies), the city’s public space 
has become a business proposition conceptualised in  
terms of consumption and recreation. 
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Since the 1980s, gecekondus have either been transformed into apartments or 
replaced by mass housing blocks. 
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The Kanyon shopping centre, recently opened in Istanbul’s 
central business district of Maslak, illustrates how public 
space has been incorporated into the culture of hyper-
consumption. In as much as it covers a nearly 38,000 square 
metres plot of land, the centre literally transforms a huge 
public space into an affluent middle-class consumption 
arena; and it is not just a mere shopping experience. Four 
floors wrap around a canyon-like open-air environment  
to evoke the sense of being in a street lined with upmarket 
retail outlets, well-groomed street vendors selling traditional 
food from designer carts, and arty street-lighting and 
furniture. The publicity material boasts, however, that most 
walking areas are covered and climate controlled with 
natural light and open air allowing visitors to enjoy every 
season without suffering its excesses. What Kanyon offers, 
then, is a new interpretation and a new culture of the 
experience of the city and its variety of streets. 
In similar fashion, local authorities are initiating 
large-scale programmes using culture as a vehicle to 
regenerate city quarters. The Beyoğlu Municipality was the 
first to allow private developers to turn an entire street in a 
run-down part of the old Pera district into a themed street, 
based on the French lifestyle. Changing the name of the 
street from Algeria Street to French Street, everything, from 
street furniture, sculptures and wall paintings to the design 
of the restaurant interiors, was styled to evoke a certain 
image of Montmartre. The street, once a public space, is 
now a commercial area managed by a business association 
dictating the outdoor music, the architectural features,  
and advertising. At one point, there was even an attempt  
to install security guards at the entrance to the street in 
order to monitor the flow of ‘customers’. 
New urban regeneration projects and residential 
developments all come with a cultural approach to urban 
living. Culture is used to promote lifestyle. According  
to the marketing concept for one massive residential 
development project on the Anatolian side of Istanbul,  
My World Ataşehir, the new urban culture is informed by a 
dream of a world perfectly and completely thought through: 
here ‘you will find the life you are looking for’. Residents 
live happily within their own self-contained environments, 
with their own kind of people, without having to rub 
shoulders with others (even the next-door neighbours);  
they need only to leave their enclaves for work, and on 
weekends to travel downtown for a bit of heritage or arts. 
In Istanbul, culture and its various signifiers are 
shifting: in its anthropological sense as a way of life, in  
its economic sense as a business opportunity, and in its 
symbolic sense as a seat of power and status. Investing  
in art and culture has become the fashion of the day, and 
major business conglomerates and their foundations are 
competing with one another for suitable spaces to build  
arts and cultural centres. After the opening of Istanbul 
Modern, founded by the Eczacıbaşı family, one of the  
city’s prominent business families, came the recent 
announcement from the Suna and İnan Kıraç Foundation 
to turn the centrally located TÜYAP area – owned by the 
metropolitan municipality – into an international centre 
for culture and arts with a US$ 160 million cultural 
complex designed by Frank Gehry funded by the Kıraç 
Foundation’s US$ 500 million for arts and culture. For the 
first time, foreign involvement in the traditionally closed off 
arts and culture sector is occurring through joint venture 
agreements and collaborations; a five-year agreement for 
artistic and scientific cooperation between the Sabancı 
Museum and the Louvre will bring cultural capital in the 
form of exhibitions, know-how and networking to Istanbul. 
Culture is implicated in everything now. Companies use 
culture to enhance their image as sponsor, but investment 
in arts and culture also brings with it a higher profile and 
stature – elements which in turn help to boost a city’s 
overall appearance to investors, visitors and residents alike. 
The central government as well as the local municipalities 
are now undertaking huge cultural infrastructure projects. 
In the centre of the city, the Atatürk Cultural Centre 
(AKM) in Taksim and the Muhsin Ertuğrul Theatre Hall  
in Harbiye both illustrate the trend of targeting existing 
cultural facilities for demolition in order to build super-
modern, prestigious and multi-functional cultural spaces. 
In the case of AKM, however, redevelopment will take place 
instead of demolition, owing to the public outcry about the 
building’s secular and republican symbolism.
Central and local authorities of the AKP have instigated 
a number of key initiatives – for example, the Istanbul 2010 
European Cultural Capital project – explicitly aimed at 
using Istanbul’s cultural assets and resources to improve 
the global image of the city (and thereby the country). The 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s recently completed 
masterplan makes a great deal of its competitiveness by 
investing in culture to project a contemporary image of the 
city. Concepts about ‘city branding’ and ‘image marketing’ 
have thus entered into the city’s political vocabulary. 
Neo-liberal strategists use culture as a tool for revenue 
generation as well as tourism – approximately 30 million 
visitors to Istanbul are anticipated in 2010. Although 
initiated by the private sector, this cultural renaissance 
maintains the support from the government in the form  
of legal and regulatory changes, including a controversial 
new law for the ‘renewal’ of historic areas (Law 5366), in 
addition to well-financed programmes for the development 
and promotion of the city’s cultural and tourism 
infrastructure. Central government has committed an 
investment equivalent to the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism’s annual budget towards the restoration and 
regeneration of the city’s rich cultural heritage as part of the 
Istanbul 2010 programme. Istanbul’s bid to become a global 
‘open city’ involves transforming its image, creating what 
Mayor Kadir Topbaş refers to as ‘a city with a different 
attitude towards the world.’ 
As featured in The New York Times, Istanbul is enjoying 
a renaissance. Regarded as one of the most dynamic cities 
in the world, Istanbul is open to change, and, indeed, is 
changing fast. And not only that. In 2005 Newsweek 
magazine featured ‘Cool Istanbul: Europe’s Hippest City’. 
The picture on the front cover displayed a scene of a scantily 
dressed young man and woman dancing to dimmed red 
lights in a nightclub – a westernised lifestyle, not like the 
old and what may be regarded orientalist depictions of 
Istanbul with whirling dervishes or squatter areas. So  
what has changed in Istanbul? The answer lies in the shift 
away from an inward-looking stance that has taken place: 
globalisation is forcing open the city’s urban spaces and 
cultural practices, bringing with it a parallel process of 
cultural change. 
The city is finally relinquishing the feeling of isolation 
and provincialism that characterised Istanbul’s public 
culture up to the late 1980s, and even into the 1990s. As 
business conglomerates compete with one another about 
larger investments in museums, art collections, galleries 
and exhibitions, the old model of centrally controlled 
cultural provision is becoming obsolete. State-run cultural 
organisations, such as the State Painting and Sculpture 
Museum or the Atatürk Cultural Centre in Istanbul, are 
now having difficulties maintaining their place within the 
new cultural scene – difficulties attracting both audiences 
and sponsors, and management and financial difficulties as 
a consequence of being state-controlled. Sponsorship for 
commercially funded events such as the Istanbul Biennale 
now commands a company’s status and image, hence 
Istanbul’s Biennale is flourishing and has now become one 
of the key artistic events in Europe. The private sector’s 
reliance on transnational connections with international 
art institutions helps make the old, closed and inward-
looking modality in cultural provision a thing of the past. 
This turn towards greater openness and 
interconnectedness, however, is ultimately an outcome  
of the city’s gentrification. The ‘projected city’ is a collection 
of gentrified spaces, and the cultural imaginary is 
increasingly being shaped by this project of gentrification. 
What is significant is the relentless ascendancy of this 
imaginary. Behind it we find a previously unanticipated 
coalition of urban elites. This coalition involves what  
Orhan Esen calls the ‘North-Istanbul elites’ (the post-1980s 
generation of secular, middle-class and professional 
workers) and the rising commercial elites of the Islamic-
oriented traditional circles, politically represented by the 
‘innovative group’ in the ruling AKP. Until now, these two 
elite groups had remained polarised. They now share a 
common aspiration and a vision of Istanbul as a globalised 
and gentrified city with orderly and clean public spaces and 
residential quarters, and an attractive public image with 
world-class services and goods. Cultural liberation thus 
responds to expectations of higher living standards.
What I have described so far is the global opening  
up of Istanbul according to an unfolding and relentless  
neo-liberal dynamic. In so far as the ruling AKP 
government have helped open up Istanbul to market-driven 
İz
ze
t K
er
ib
ar
There is clearly a need for a new politics  
of openness – a new perspective based  
on the notion that ‘a different global 
model is possible’.
Kanyon is one of Istanbul’s first mixed-use design complexes, offering a quasi-outdoor shopping experience.
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Tarlabaşı is a mixed-use neighbourhood located a few 
hundred metres from İstiklal Street, the cultural hub  
of the city. The area is mostly composed of four- and 
five-storey historic buildings dating back to the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Tarlabaşı was 
originally inhabited by non-Muslim minorities (Greeks 
and Armenians) who moved out of the neighbourhood 
after the changed political framework of the 1940s that 
excluded minorities. They were replaced by rural 
migrants from central and northern parts of the 
country in the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation 
era of the post 1950s. The area attracted another wave  
of migrants in the 1990s: this time from the Kurds 
escaping civil war in the south-eastern parts of the 
country. Tarlabaşı has also become host to African 
migrants, Romans and transsexuals.
The construction of a large boulevard in the late 
1980s cut the connection and increased the disparity 
between Tarlabasi and its immediate surroundings, 
especially with İstiklal Street, the cultural centre. Today, 
dilapidated after years of neglect, Tarlabaşı is a highly 
stigmatised neighbourhood, deemed ‘dangerous’ by  
the general public. Despite its close proximity to the 
cultural centre, the area has managed to miss the wave 
of gentrification and investment that has been taking 
place since the 1990s around İstiklal Street (i.e. Galata, 
Cihangir, Asmalimescit).
Around 20,000 square metres, consisting of 9 blocks 
and 278 plots, in Tarlabaşı were declared a regeneration 
area by the Council of Ministers in February 2006 
following a petition from the local municipality. The 
recently released renewal law, Law 5366, LAW for the 
Protection of Deteriorated Historic and Cultural 
Heritage through Renewal and Re-use, forms the basis 
of the renewal process in Tarlabaşı as well as in many 
other neighbourhoods within the historic city. The  
law makes the renewal of dilapidated areas in historic 
neighbourhoods possible through new expropriation 
powers given to the local authorities to implement 
renewal projects for several blocks without the consent 
of the property owners. 
The renewal process in Tarlabaşı formally started 
when a private development company, GAP İnşaat,  
won the bid for the preparation and implementation  
of the area’s redevelopment in April 2007. GAP İnşaat’s 
offer represented the largest, leaving 42 per cent of the 
current floor area for the existing owners after renewal. 
Seven local architectural firms, some of the leading 
offices in the city, have been subcontracted by GAP 
İnşaat to prepare projects according to the proposed 
plan to transform the area into a mixed-use development 
with luxury residential units, shopping centres, cafes 
and hotels. 
The proposed plan, however, has met with resistance 
from the majority of residents. In 2008 the owners, 
landlords and renters came together and established  
an association to oppose renewal. They claim that the 
current offer of the development company is not fair 
and demand better conditions. So far they have 
managed to freeze the process for now.
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Islam summarises the development pressures threatening one 
of Istanbul’s historic neighbourhoods.
global forces, the city’s transformation has been a state-led 
project. This restructuring of the city suits the aspirations 
of its globalising elites and an expanding base of property 
owners. Considering that 58 per cent of the households  
(out of around 2.5 million from the 2000 census) live in 
their own property, a considerable proportion of the urban 
population is directly implicated in the changing economy 
of the city. What is more, according to the Istanbul 
Governor’s office quite a significant proportion of this 
property-owning category consists of those living in 
recently legalised squatter settlements, or gecekondu. 
In other words, as the squatters of yesterday turn into 
property owners of today – however unplanned and 
rundown their properties might be – the scale of market 
activity is extended. 
This process brings together very different 
constituencies with diverse lifestyles, values, beliefs and 
practices. It represents a coalition of self-interests involving 
Islamic communities, secular elites, large capital, small and 
conservative business interests, and so-called bourgeois 
bohemians. All these different groups can, in different ways 
and combinations, join forces – awkwardly, and ironically 
– in their jostle to benefit from Istanbul’s transformation.  
It is this broad social, cultural and class basis of globalising 
Istanbul that balances the calls for closure. Nevertheless, 
this programme of openness hangs in delicate balance  
in Istanbul, as discourse feeding on nationalism and 
anti-European sentiments increasingly finds a receptive 
audience. One reason behind this is the exclusionary 
mechanisms that globalisation has set in motion. In 
Sulukule, for instance, one of the oldest Roma 
neighbourhoods, almost all of the 620 households have 
been evicted from their properties, with all the tenants 
relocating to far-flung destinations, despite the fact that 
they have been residents in this area for generations. This 
has been because of a municipality-led renewal project, 
proposing to turn the neighbourhood into an upmarket 
housing area. The same fate awaits the local Roma 
population and the recent Kurdish immigrants from  
the South-East of Turkey in the Tarlabaşı district. These 
residents are very poor, but more significantly, without  
title to their land they are unable to take part in Istanbul’s 
increasingly market-oriented housing economy. It seems 
that those lacking title will be quietly relegated to the status 
of the invisible, no longer heard in the public sphere, except 
when they become junkies, dealers, or criminalised youth. 
Insufficient welfare state structures alongside the 
collapse of informal and identity-based incorporation 
mechanisms in the city have created exclusionary dynamics 
that operate on a much larger scale than ever before. With 
high levels of unemployment, an unqualified labour force 
and the continuing influx of immigrants from the rural 
areas of Turkey, as well as from neighbouring countries and 
Africa, social exclusion finds fertile ground in Istanbul. The 
scale of the social problem becomes clear when considering 
that Istanbul’s official population increased from around  
10 million in 2000 to over 12 million in 2007. Almost all  
of this growth can be attributed to new migration. Even  
so, Istanbul lacks a social vision to engage the mounting 
exclusionary dynamics of market-based relations. 
Unchecked, they may eventually find expression in social 
fracturing, division and conflict. In a context where the 
division between the excluded and the included is 
sharpening dramatically, and where the familiar 
mechanisms of incorporation are increasingly being 
weakened, religious and ethnically-informed identity 
positions can become ready ciphers for frustration  
and anger. This new round of urban globalisation is 
characterised, moreover, by the sheer scale and power  
of global capitalist dynamics to undermine small-scale  
and individual efforts of urban constituencies hoping to 
determine the basic conditions of their everyday lives. 
Before this neo-liberal programme turns into a grim 
scenario where powerlessness feeds a backlash of political 
conservatism and authoritarianism, there is clearly a need 
for a new politics of openness – a new perspective based  
on the notion that ‘a different global model is possible’.  
Above all, this is a project requiring a prolonged process  
of negotiation, with an explicit agenda about the kind of 
globalisation and openness that might enlarge public spaces 
of interaction, engagement, and mutual responsibility – 
against the grain of the fragmentation and commercialisation 
of city spaces, which only serve to underscore growing 
social inequality and exclusion. Is this all just a dream?  
Will Istanbul come to terms with the choices it faces?  
In a context where the commissioning of internationally 
renowned architects for public projects faces mounting 
anger, with protestors posing the issue as a confrontation 
between local (read Turkish) versus the international (read 
outsider), the vulnerability of the neo-liberal project of 
openness becomes clear. The ‘old order’ may be dismantling 
on the ground, where traditional and non-formal structures 
are no longer able to act as incorporating mechanisms, but 
it is clearly not being written off entirely. Defensive and 
fearful responses to urban globalisation slip easily and 
seamlessly into an exclusionary language and rejection  
of difference and diversity. Ultimately this may fuel 
nationalistic fanaticism. The challenge is to deepen and 
secure the continuation of public experiences of worldliness 
– to not lose sight of the real choice that Istanbul needs to 
make. We have to hope that Istanbul’s worldliness can help 
maintain a democratic basis of social solidarity where the 
city is imagined once again as a public space for all. 
Asu Aksoy is presently in charge of international project 
development at Santral Istanbul, a new international arts 
and culture initiative by Istanbul Bilgi University, and a 
visiting fellow at Goldsmiths College, London.
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With plans of a major face-lift project to parts of the deprived district, 
Tarlabası may lose the social bonds that come from its fine urban tissue.
52  unDERstanDinG istanbul
To start with a few facts and figures, with 15 million the 
population of Istanbul and its emerging city region is one  
of the largest in South-East Europe. Geographically situated  
on two narrow peninsulas separated by the Bosporus, the 
northern shores of either landmass are covered by ecologically 
sensitive forests, water catchments and reservoirs vital to the 
future of the city. Because of these physical barriers, a major 
part of the population lives in a linear band approximately 
100 kilometres long and 20 kilometres wide. Hence Istanbul 
has a population comparable to that of the Netherlands 
concentrated in less than 10 per cent of its surface area. The 
greater metropolitan region of Istanbul accounts for slightly 
more than 20 per cent of the national population, while the 
city generates 40 per cent of value added and approximately 
50 per cent of the tax revenues of the entire country. Thus,  
the most significant part of Turkey’s economic activity, the 
manufacturing of goods and services, as well as its social life 
and artistic creation, all take place in this tiny north-western 
corner of the country.
It would be difficult to convince a contemporary visitor 
impressed by the size, density, dynamism, and congestion  
of the cityscape that only six decades ago, Istanbul was a 
forgotten and stagnant port city with less than one million 
residents cut off from world trade. The recent history of the 
city, however, sheds light on the dark side of Istanbul’s 
obscure and intractable socio-spatial formation. As is the  
case in many peripheral countries, the end of World War II 
constituted a major turning point in the social history of 
Turkey and Istanbul. In spite of notable efforts to industrialise, 
Turkey’s economy was basically agricultural. Urban residents 
accounted for less than 20 per cent of the population, and  
the bulk of its imports were financed by exports of semi-
processed agricultural products along with a handful of  
raw materials and minerals. 
In the 1960s a new regime of accumulation forbade 
investments in non-productive sectors such as housing and 
urban utilities, and instead gave incentives for domestic 
production. The underlying belief was that Turkey would 
solve its urbanisation problem and develop only if it 
industrialised. As expected, stopping all investments in urban 
infrastructure and metropolitan transport had important 
repercussions on the urban fabric of Istanbul. In addition, 
increasing land prices and unaffordable rents made housing 
of the emerging middle classes a major issue. Likewise the 
new regime was silent about – even blind to – how new 
residents should be housed. Unable to find formal solutions, 
these two groups of residents created ad-hoc solutions that 
now constitute the distinctive features of the urban fabric in 
and around Istanbul.
For the new middle classes, the approach consisted of 
transforming former detached single-family dwellings into 
apartment blocks. Landowners were not paid in advance but 
were instead compensated per apartment unit, depending on 
the level of the land and the rent. This significantly lowered 
the initial capital required for development and resulted in the 
ubiquitous four- to five-storey walk-ups constructed in the 
early 1960s and 1970s. These developments were carried out 
by small-scale entrepreneurs targeting middle- and higher-
income groups in highly sought-after and comparatively 
well-serviced parts of the city. 
Newcomers, on the other hand, built gecekondu (literally 
‘built overnight’) on irregularly subdivided ‘private’ property. 
Informal housing in Istanbul took place on small parcels of 
land, irrespective of topography, in back-to-back building 
blocks on narrow streets according to the orthogonal street 
grid. The provisions and quality of services improved over 
time in the gecekondu. Water, for example, was initially a 
major issue. Supplied through public fountains or municipal 
tanks, water supply developed into a cottage industry that 
provided jobs for the unemployed. Sewage issues were solved 
through septic tanks or local streams. With its unplanned 
high density, the urban infrastructure in the gecekondu was 
certainly significantly low. Water supply was intermittent  
and the quality generally failed to meet the minimum 
requirements set by the World Health Organization. Power 
cuts were also frequent. The chronic lack of investment by 
service providers forced residents to devise their own 
solutions by adding water tanks and pumps. 
To enhance its control over urban space, the new regime 
introduced unprecedented reform devised to regulate former 
squatter housing. This form of building amnesty occurred 
following the 1984 municipal elections and regularised all 
irregular constructions and add-ons, regardless of their size 
and building conditions. It provided security of tenure for  
a period of transition and a formal land title that had an 
immediate and significant impact on urban processes and 
land tenure systems.
Endowed with new discretionary and planning powers,  
as well as significantly higher revenues, the newly established 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality was capable of massive 
investment in urban infrastructure, metropolitan utilities and 
mass transit systems. With telecommunications being 
privatised, it was possible to have a phone connection within  
a week, whereas as recently as the 1970s it would have taken 
years. The new liberal regime reduced customs barriers and 
introduced preferential credit schemes for house buyers and 
passed new laws encouraging capital-intensive mass production 
in the housing sector. Due to the availability of long-term 
credit, large-scale investments in urban infrastructure enabled 
developers – the new actors in the city’s housing sector – to 
construct housing complexes at metropolitan fringes. The days 
of the petty producers were over.
In this new economic climate and era of new municipal 
governance, the city decentralised at an unprecedented speed. 
Decentralisation of the population went hand in hand with 
that of jobs, services, and shopping facilities. The inauguration 
of the second bridge over the Bosporus facilitated the 
northward decentralisation of the central business district. 
Systematic disinvestments and privatisation of state enterprises 
led to significant losses in the manufacturing sector and 
factories on the Golden Horn shores. Along the Bosporus 
these spaces were transformed to create new uses and jobs in 
the cultural industries. And as is the case in most global cities, 
the rise of the service economy created a minority of well-paid 
executives in finance and services. 
Although Istanbul still has a substantive stock of squatter 
houses, shared taxis and street vendors, it is no longer a city of 
squatters. It has been replaced by a new global city for which 
we urgently need a metaphor. The map below charts the 
contiguous growth processes that were instrumental in its 
formation. Thus the socio-spatial structures of former decades 
can be used as matrices or incubators for an emerging global 
city. As the Istanbul metropolitan region that is emerging 
around the new Marmaray mass transit system is constructed, 
we do not yet know how the city’s growth will evolve. But we 
do know that we have a vast urban age to discuss and reflect  
on its differences.
uRban sPaCEs in anD  
aROunD istanbul
Murat Güvenç and Eda Yücesoy offer a historical overview of how Istanbul’s urban 
configuration has been shaped by decades of demands for new housing and services.
1990-2000; 1980-1989
1980-1989; 1970-1979; 1990-2000
1970-1979; 1960-1969; 1980-1989
1960-1969; 1950-1959; 1970-1979
1929 oncesi; 1930-1949; 1950-1959; 1960-1969
Prior to 1929; 1930-1949; 1950-1959; 1960-1969
This map charts the city’s growth according to the date of construction of residential buildings. Darker shaded areas correspond to older buildings, providing an 
insight into how Istanbul’s socio-spatial urban formation has evolved.
aGE OF builDinGs
Murat Güvenç, urban planner, is a Professor in the 
Programme in Architectural Design at Istanbul Bilgi 
University. Eda Ünlü-Yücesoy, urban planner, is an 
Associate Professor in the Graduate Programme in 
Architectural Design at Istanbul Bilgi University.
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About 15 years ago, it was still possible to enjoy the  
bustling urbanity stemming from the mixtures of people, 
neighbourhoods and activities in Istanbul. Then, the flair  
of ancient Constantinople’s rich cultural diversity and 
proximity to the Asian continent was abundant. Today these 
characteristics are threatened by a wave of technology and 
modernisation. On the one hand this shows the emancipation 
and economic prosperity Turkey has achieved, but it has also 
introduced global structural challenges regarding mobility, 
urban renewal, social stratification and sprawl, as well as 
spatial and functional segregation at an unprecedented scale.
Over the past few decades, for example, an explosion of 
car ownership resulting from Istanbul’s new prosperity has 
put severe pressure on the city’s road system and has 
increased air pollution. This has happened at the same time  
as investments in public transport have lagged. Although the 
city introduced a new underground train running East to 
West along the coast under the Bosporus, as well as a Bus 
Rapid Transit line (BRT) along the urban motorways, traffic 
congestion is expected to reach paralysing levels over the next 
few years. This will no doubt cause considerable economic 
damage since traffic congestion hinders the flow of people, 
goods and information. And scale is certainly an issue. At 
times Istanbul’s congestion problem seems to be almost as 
bad as that of São Paulo or Jakarta. In today’s emerging 
modern society cars continue to be status symbols. Equipped 
with air-conditioning, a telephone and sophisticated 
computers, driving a car is like riding in a comfortable 
spaceship of clean air surrounded by a toxic universe outside. 
In Istanbul, the desire to own a car is further exacerbated by 
the sprawl of urban development extending beyond the 
Bosporus – with villages turned into larger suburbs, 
commuting times are rising rapidly.
The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has 
acknowledged that a proper system of public transport 
constitutes, like in every city, the only solution to counter  
this massive threat to mobility. At the same time, they have 
planned motorways, widened roads and introduced new 
traffic lanes that could create further divisions and destroy 
the city’s delicate and subtle neighbourhood structure.  
In response to complaints about the inaccessibility for 
emergency vehicles, the imminent collapse of buildings  
by earthquakes and the poor housing conditions of older 
developments, new neighbourhoods consisting of large super 
blocks with high-rise apartment towers, green spaces and 
parking facilities are being planned to substitute the existing 
ones. As a result, old, finely-meshed street patterns of the 
Gecekondu and yap-sat districts, with their intricate social 
and micro-economic structures, their vibrant street activities 
and their small-scale character, are being replaced by 
anonymous housing projects that could be anywhere in the 
world. The resulting functional segregation does not allow for 
small-scale economic improvisation and investment, one of 
the lifelines of Istanbul’s poor. What is worse, large numbers 
of the city’s diverse population are forced to travel considerable 
distances for even basic needs, further compromising 
mobility on all levels.
Gated communities emerged in Turkey in the 1980s,  
and have become the most important project of urban 
transformation and expansion in the city. Driven by an 
increasingly powerful real estate market, the phenomenon  
is tolerated by politics and planning, and is widely accepted  
by the public. This process is not only changing urban and 
architectural patterns in the city; equally important – but less 
understood – are the implications on the social and economic 
structures at the neighbourhood level.
Göktürk, a former agricultural village surrounded by 
state-owned forest and military sites in the North-West of 
Istanbul, represents a pioneer of this mode of development. In 
the 1990s real estate developers discovered the area’s potential 
for high-end housing developments. Since then, more than 30 
gated communities have been constructed in close proximity. 
This has resulted in a population increase from 1,500 in 1993 
to approximately 20,000 in 2008, as well as higher land prices. 
But it has also dissected Göktürk into fragments: what was 
once a village has been turned into an island among islands. 
And yet, although segregation seems to be the dominant 
pattern of Göktürk’s urban trajectory, integration is also 
taking place. A thin but indispensable network of economic, 
social and cultural encounters connects Göktürk’s seemingly 
separated fragments into an integrated economic whole. 
Outnumbered, the remaining villagers now benefit from 
opportunities in the gated community’s emerging service 
sector. They are employed as gardeners, housekeepers or 
nannies, and enjoy regular access to the everyday life of an 
elite otherwise behind closed walls. This economic boom, it 
would seem, has allowed individual benefits to overshadow 
the negative consequences of segregation.
A growing awareness about the scarcity of Istanbul’s 
natural resources, however, has sparked criticism about the 
unsustainable character of suburban developments such as 
Göktürk. In response, new planning guidelines are restricting 
the proliferation of gated communities on the outskirts of the 
city. At the same time, enormous regeneration projects in the 
inner city are making way for new large-scale developments 
in Istanbul’s historic centre. The recently adapted Law 5366, 
aimed at ensuring the sustained use and protection of 
deteriorated historical and cultural monuments and structures 
through their renewal and reuse, will allow for the vast 
expropriation and replacement of illegally constructed and 
inhabited buildings in Istanbul. In late 2007 the Turkish Daily 
News named 48 areas declared as regeneration projects in the 
city, a scale involving the demolition of 1 million buildings 
and repairs on another 200,000. Thus, instead of building 
exclusive urban exclaves on the city’s outskirts, an increasing 
number will be built inside the city: islands for upper-class 
housing, modern office space and commercial enterprises. 
Despite this trend, the traditionally small-scale 
entrepreneurial spirit and structure of Istanbul offers an 
alternative in the form of street guilds and bazaars 
specialising in particular types of goods. This concentration 
of goods brings with it a competition among sellers to 
differentiate themselves and their products; competitors 
concentrated together thus creates an orientation towards  
the public spaces – and greater visibility – in front of the 
buildings, pushing commercial activity onto the sidewalks 
and into the city’s street. This spatial condition emphasises 
mobility of people and goods and leads to a series of casual 
exchanges whereby the built structures accommodating these 
exchanges serve solely as a conduit for economic processes.
This contrasts to shopping centres and gated communities, 
which represent an entirely different concept of the city and 
the goods and experiences it produces. Precisely tailored to 
the specific needs of a limited user group, each contradicts the 
uncertainties, ambiguities and openness that define urban 
life. As secluded islands they orient themselves in opposition 
to the small-scale entrepreneurial structure. Turning the 
spatial code of the city inside out, instead of maximising 
coherence and permeability within a specific urban enclave, 
shopping centres and gated communities minimise points of 
intersection and operate in isolation. Chance encounters and 
the unexpected are substituted by organised events at a 
distinct destination. Instead of the buzz of urban life 
generated by active street fronts, the focus is on convenience 
and composed interior spaces. The result is urban space based 
on concepts of idleness and exclusion instead of integration 
into the dynamics of the city and its economy.
Istanbul, like any global city, cannot deny those who 
prefer to remove themselves from the urban economy 
through segregation; doing so would only curtail the flow of 
required investment in redevelopment and urban change.  
The negative consequence is thus unavoidable, even if it seems 
obvious: while isolated islands use investment capital from 
the city to hide themselves in ever-more grandiose stage-set-
like pieces of architecture, the city fades into the background, 
and the real urban complexity dwindles. 
Suburban gated communities, like Göktürk, became a reality in Istanbul in the 1990s, increasingly rubbing against gecekondus and village-like neighbourhoods.
istanbul's sPatial DYnaMiCs
Kees Christiaanse founded KCAP Architects & Planners, is  
a Professor of Architecture and Urban Design at the ETH in 
Zürich, and a Visiting Professor at the LSE. Projects include  
the HafenCity in Hamburg and the Olympic Legacy in London.
Mark Michaeli is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at  
the Institute of Urban Design of ETH Zurich and Visiting 
Lecturer at the University of St. Gallen. He has published on 
urban topologies, utopian urbanity and sustainable urban 
design strategies.
Tim Rieniets is a Senior Lecturer in Architecture and Urban 
Design at ETH Zurich, and coordinator of the Urban Research 
Studio. He is co-editor of the Atlas of Shrinking Cities and of 
Cities of Collision-Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict 
Urbanism. Tim Rieniets is co-curator of the 4th International 
Architecture Biennale Rotterdam.
Kees Christiaanse, Mark Michaeli and Tim Rieniets describe Istanbul’s 
evolving urban form and the proliferation of gated communities.
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In Istanbul, it is quite rare to find a proactive attitude – one 
that identifies a problem and brings alternative solutions – 
about the city’s future growth. Politicians are beholden to 
business-as-usual and short-term political imperatives, while 
the schools of architecture and urban planning develop studio 
projects on sites and problems for mere educational purposes 
rather than as proposals for actual alternatives to the city’s 
development. Practising architects also rarely respond 
proactively to Istanbul’s problems because of the profession’s 
unforgiving culture of survival. The few civic actors operating 
in the built environment are likewise too disorganised and 
lack either the management capacities or financial strength. 
Given this situation, one could come to the conclusion that 
the municipalities and mayors of Istanbul have not had any 
proactive support or contributions for years. 
Therefore, when Urban Age initiated a spatial study of 
Istanbul with the Arkitera Architecture Center, it was an 
opportunity not to be missed. Five young architectural teams 
were selected to propose solutions to the problems they 
detected as urgent issues for Istanbul. Free to choose the areas 
they would work on, it was each team’s responsibility to also 
define the problem they would develop an answer for. Thus 
three months of research resulted in five different proposals 
for five different areas and issues in Istanbul. They vary  
in scale and content, and although none of the proposed 
solutions are ready to be implemented, each of them 
demonstrates how a solution to neglected problems in 
Istanbul could be initiated. 
Hopefully it is not too naïve to believe these proposals, or 
similar studies, could be utilised in the real-life management 
of the city. In the meantime, since decision-makers in our 
cities really do need clever solutions instead of harsh reactions, 
as professionals we should be prepared to collaborate rather 
than resist.
Istanbul's northern forests, home to the city’s fresh-water 
reservoirs, also provide fresh air to the city. These natural 
resources have been threatened by the encroachment of illegal 
settlements since the 1950s, and the bridges across the 
Bosporus that connect the two sides of Istanbul. Now, the 
announcement of a third bridge has reignited the debate 
about the preservation of these forests. Despite strict 
regulations to preserve areas surrounding water reservoirs 
and the forests all over Turkey, especially in large cities, these 
laws are rarely enforced. On the other hand the emergence of 
'green' terminology has almost transformed these urban 
forests, which until recently were either perceived as just 
green stains on a map for professionals or as mere spectacle 
for the public, into intangible assets. 
SO Architecture focused on the Sultanbeyli area, a newly 
developed settlement on the edge of the northern forest of 
Istanbul. Their research asked an important question: how do 
you keep the forests free from illegal buildings? Without 
enhancing awareness of the public value of the forests, laws 
alone cannot protect the green areas of the city. According to 
SO Architecture’s proposal, the boundary between nature 
and the urbanised city should be utilised as public spaces. If 
they have the right to use this public corridor, the people 
living next to the forests are more likely to preserve the green 
areas.
 In the plan, the corridor between the settlements and the 
forests will have nodes with public facilities such as libraries, 
cultural buildings, community centres, health clinics, 
schools, religious buildings or kindergartens. These nodes 
will sometimes be located within the urban tissue, thus 
carrying part of the forests into the built environment, but 
sometimes the nodes will be inserted slightly into the forests, 
carrying the urban tissue into the green land. It is expected 
this will alter the boundary with the forest into a more 
integrated spatial field, connecting nature with the urban 
tissue like a zipper.
Halic, or the Golden Horn, became the neglected sister  
of the Bosporus after becoming an industrial area in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Substantial efforts  
to clean up this brown field area replaced almost all of the 
industrial buildings with parks in the 1980s. However, this 
rapid rehabilitation eradicated many valuable industrial 
heritage sites and the newly constructed green parks were  
not planned adequately enough to attract local residents. By 
2000, the area around the Golden Horn started to become an 
attractive tourist destination, although currently there is no 
masterplan to coordinate development.
According to PAB Architecture, the uncontrolled 
developments on the banks of the Golden Horn will 
eventually break the connections within the existing 
residential tissue. Without a masterplan many facilities are 
being constructed without any relation between them. If this 
process is not stopped, the future of the Golden Horn may 
again be as it was a hundred years ago, but this time not as  
an industrial brown field but a deserted spoiled graveyard of 
tourist facilities. Therefore PAB propose to extend a portion 
of the urban tissue into the empty green fields on the banks 
of the Golden Horn. These new clusters are intended to 
release the pressure on the existing urban tissue and to adjust 
the balance of empty green parks by creating multi-use 
structures that include housing, small offices and commercial 
facilities. These building clusters will also act as visual and 
physical bridges to the residential areas behind the road 
along the coast.
aRKitERa sPatial stuDY:  
PROaCtiVE aCtiOns
Ömer Kanıpak discusses the results of the five architecture teams 
commissioned by the Urban Age and Arkitera. 
Reframing the border between urban dwellings and the forest as a public space with 
nodes for public institutions allows a reconsideration of the value of urban forests.  
Clusters of buildings reconnect the waterfront to the city suffocated by roads.
sO?: natuRE nEXt tO tHE CitY
Pab aRCHitECtuRE: tHE nEGlECtED sistER
These pages present a small selection of the work completed by the five teams. 
Full proposals can be found online at www.urban-age.net. 
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8Arti examined two defining, intertwined features of 
Istanbul: its skyline and its valleys. The magnificent skyline 
of Istanbul's historic peninsula is a result of the clever 
utilisation of its topography. In 1936, a proposal to preserve 
this skyline stipulated that 40 metres above sea level, no 
new buildings should exceed 9.5 metres in height. This 
principle is still in force today, and has ensured the 
preservation of the historic peninsula until now. However, 
the city's rapid urbanisation has led to new settlements 
reaching the edge of the northern forests, which has almost 
hidden this topography with a homogeneous blanket that 
neglects the city’s dominant and unique geographic 
features and differences. 
The valleys act as ecological corridors that regulate air 
circulation within the city while they also collect and direct 
rainwater to the coast. However, until now those valleys 
have been considered as barriers for urbanisation: their 
riverbeds are covered and their banks are filled with, 
sometimes illegal, apartment blocks with insufficient 
infrastructure and social facilities.
8Arti chose a small valley reaching from the Levent 
business district to the Kagithane area as its project site.  
In applying an alternative 40-metre principle, 8Arti 
proposes to clear all buildings between sea level and 40 
metres above the valley basin and to transform the valley 
basin into a green public space. After this reclamation, the 
displaced population will be re-housed in the buildings to 
be erected above the 40-metre line above the valley basin. 
However, these new building settlements will be designed 
to accommodate an equal population and more social 
infrastructure with a more efficient planning code and  
a ‘super-social’ building for libraries, religious buildings, 
health and educational facilities.
How do you plan a parking strategy in a city that has more 
than 2.5 million private cars, with a daily increase of 400? 
Currently Istanbul can accommodate only 250,000 or so 
parked vehicles, mostly at sites maintained by the 
municipality's parking company. And while new building 
regulations demand parking spaces to be reserved in the 
planning phase, the old settlements do not have adequate car 
parking facilities. Given this situation, one can assume that 
most of the streets and open urban spaces are occupied as car 
parks, which comes close to the total land area occupied by 
buildings in Istanbul. 
Superpool Architecture decided to focus on the use of 
streets as public spaces. Istanbul is well known for the lack of 
planned and designed open spaces for the public. Given this 
situation one might expect that Istanbul’s open areas lack 
public life. However, Superpool chose two different sites to 
illustrate the opposite: one within the historic peninsula  
in Karagumruk on the European side, and another on the 
Anatolian side in a relatively recent settlement called Namik 
Kemal. The latter has a more regular street pattern compared  
to the organic pattern of Karagumruk. In Istanbul, public life  
is very vivid on the streets and defies any predictions or plans. 
The improvised public use of the streets is a key factor to 
consider while designing for Istanbul. However, most of the 
streets are largely occupied by parked cars which leaves little 
space for pedestrians or neighbourhood residents. 
Superpool proposed to build parking structures within  
two minutes’ walking distances in the two earmarked 
neighbourhoods and they proposed to use some of the streets 
as pedestrian areas or public spaces with restricted access by 
car. Some of the secondary streets will be turned into public 
parks with drop-off zones for cars, while some will function  
as playgrounds for children. Some may even be used as 
small-scale organic agricultural sites for the residents. This 
relocation of the cars and reclaiming of parking spaces will 
require a minimal intervention but will create the maximum 
amount of open air spaces that can be used by residents. The 
newly developed parking structures will require their own 
management plans and also include some commercial and 
social facilities for the community. The management plans  
of these parking structures will need to be developed in such  
a way that they allow long-term economic sustainability.
By the 1950s uncontrolled immigration to Istanbul had started 
to cause rapid urbanisation of the city. As a result, the free-
standing multi-storey apartment building became the model 
people believed would solve the housing problems for Istanbul’s 
citizens. This building type proliferated across the city, 
neglecting geographical, social, economical or even ecological 
differences. Urban forms and building codes were all adapted 
to regulate the spread of this type, which in turn created a  
dull urban pattern. The current activities of the housing 
development authority of Turkey (TOKI: Toplu Konut İdaresi) 
also boost the proliferation of these independent generic tower 
apartment blocks, which  
are now being built on the periphery of Istanbul. 
GB Architecture proposed to reinvent the perimeter block 
as a new urban form for Istanbul. Choosing a large area near 
Kucukcekmece, they argued that the current urban planning 
codes that encourage the building of independent tower blocks, 
are inappropriate for the city since they do not create enough 
public and semi-public spaces. Therefore, they developed a new 
masterplanning guide by first designing the areas within the 
perimeter blocks to allow alternative uses, multiple functions 
and varying floor plans. The resulting blocks create different 
forms of courtyards, with horizontal or vertical slabs that 
integrate with each other to act as a coherently working 
machine, as well as a defined urban space. This study also  
seeks to address the masterplanning of certain sites in  
Istanbul; GB believes special studies rather than an application 
of predetermined building codes should prevail to allow  
the diversity of the urban tissue to accommodate the diversity 
of the city.
Implementing a 40-metre principle recognises the unique topography of the city, 
opening up the valleys and waterways.
Relocating  parking allows streets use to adapt to people rather than cars, and 
recognises the street as the most important public space in Istanbul.   
With the same density as the isolated tower block, the perimeter block defines 
shared communal spaces.  
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